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World War II Almanac:
Commemorating the Great Crusade

It has been called the "Good War," the "Big One" or, simply, the "War." For many of the nearly 13 million Americans in service and 120 million or so on the home front, World War II was the most important event in their lives, an event from which others take reference. Simply put, the war revised the international and personal assumptions that had guided generations. The war brought this country out of the economic despair of the Great Depression devastated Italy, Germany and Japan and served as preamble for the Cold War. As history's most widely ranging conflict, the war changed the lives of hundreds of millions of people around the world and led to the deaths of nearly 40 million of them. For better or for worse, America was thrust into a leading role on the world stage.

Every soldier who has sworn to "support and defend the Constitution" in this post–Cold War Army owes much to the generation of citizens who fought abroad and who supported the war at home. We have all listened to their war stories, or have been eternally sorry we did not ask to hear them sooner. As we grew up, we read about the battles, reveling in the victories, suffering and, hopefully, learning from the defeats. We internalized and projected ourselves in the stories of courage, and we wondered at those of cowardice and incompetence. Through it all, we have suffered the admonition of "Well, back during the war. . ." We did not have to ask what war. We knew. And if we missed the point of the country's human investment and the war's ultimate impact upon our own generation, then we truly missed something.

During the years surrounding the war's 50th anniversary, nearly all newspapers and magazines, from the *Washington Post* to VFW magazine, are commemorating the war with clocklike regularity. *Military Review*, you may have noticed, is following a similar tack, with the added note that military journals have usually recognized that World War II is rich in lessons still to be taught. So, at least through 1995, in addition to our continued interest in full–length articles on World War II, we are publishing World War II Almanac to round out our commemoration program.

We began World War II Almanac in our April 1991 issue as a series of short articles (1,500 to 2,000 words) on prominent political, military, technical or social aspects of the conflict. Beginning in the January 1992 issue, we added a chronology by Major George Mordica of CGSC's Combat Studies Institute to each almanac. Topics for World War II Almanac generally fall into four classes: persons, events (including battles, invasions and campaigns), equipment and ideas or trends that played a role in the war. Subjects offered in almanacs to date include the development of the jeep, Operation *Barbarossa*, the 1941 Louisiana Maneuvers, Taranto, Pearl Harbor (of course), the siege of Singapore and the World War II emergence of the GI newspaper, *Stars and Stripes*. Future almanacs will address US submarine warfare, the Battle of Kursk, assault gliders, Operation *Torch* and other topics. "Ike Takes Charge," by Lieutenant Colonel Cole Kingseed, a regular contributor, begins on page 73.

World War II is a broad and fertile field for study, and we are actively soliciting World War II Almanac articles. We are especially interested in topics that may have had a far–reaching impact upon modern warfare, the development of the V–1 "Buzz Bomb" and the V–2 rocket for example. But we do not want to confine ourselves entirely to heavy subjects. The list of possible almanacs is virtually endless but includes Glenn Miller, *Ultra*, WACs, WASPs and WAVEs, the Manhattan Project, the Tuskegee airmen, the 1000–plane raid, Redball Express, the German "88" and "Rosie the Riveter." If you would like to take on one of these, or if you have another idea, call us. As the used–car dealer says, "No reasonable offer will be refused."

Historian Roger Spiller says that for most people, the events of World War II are "only a bit more familiar than the wars fought by the ancient Greeks, and our limited familiarity is fading daily." *Military Review's* World War II Almanac and other commemoration efforts intend to cast a light on the "Big One," a war that was really not that long ago.

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VII Corps in the Gulf War

Post-Cease-Fire Operations

Lieutenant Colonel Peter S. Kindsvatter, US Army

This is the third article chronicling the action of VII US Corps during operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. The first two, which addressed the deployment planning/preparations and the corps' actions during the ground campaign of Desert Storm, appeared in our January and February issues. Here, the author describes VII Corps' actions during the post-cease-fire operations.

THE VII (Jayhawk) Corps, at the initiation of the 100-hour war cease-fire at 0800 28 February 1991, could look back with justifiable pride at its accomplishments over the last 89 hours. Five Iraqi armored or mechanized divisions, to include the elite *Tawakalna* and *Medina* divisions of the Republican Guard, were destroyed as a direct result of the Jayhawk assault, as were at least five infantry divisions.[1] More important, Kuwait was free again.

The corps commander, Lieutenant General Frederick M. Franks Jr., held a commanders' conference at his tactical command post (TAC) in Iraq at 1220 on 28 February because, among other reasons, he "wanted to be the first of a long line of people to say well done." He added, "I'm not sure where this is going from here, but while it's fresh in our minds, I want to thank the soldiers for their superb performance."[2]

Indeed, no one knew for sure where things would go from there. As it turned out, the Jayhawk Corps would not depart the occupied portion of Southern Iraq until 15 April, following the Iraqi acceptance of the terms of the United Nations (UN) formal cease-fire. During those six weeks, the level of effort involved in destroying abandoned and captured Iraqi equipment and supplies, in continuing to receive the surrender of thousands of Iraqi soldiers, in providing humanitarian aid to refugees, in maintaining security along an almost 500-kilometer demarcation line and in preparing for redeployment would far exceed anything envisioned by the corps' leadership on 28 February.

Before the corps could reflect upon its victory, it was faced with an immediate challenge. At 0200 on 1 March, Army Forces US Central Command (ARCENT) informed the corps that it was responsible for securing and setting up a negotiation site where coalition and Iraqi military leaders could meet to establish the terms that would continue the temporary cease-fire. The site that Central Command (CENTCOM) wanted was Safwan Airfield, a military airstrip about four miles west of the Iraqi border town of Safwan (fig. 1). The negotiations were to take place the morning of 2 March.

There was just one small problem. The site was not held by friendly units. The mission to secure Safwan Airfield was passed to the 1st Infantry Division (ID), which was closest to the site, at 0300. ARCENT and VII Corps guidance to

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The [negotiation] site was not held by friendly units. The mission to secure Safwan Airfield was passed to the 1st ID, which was closest to the site. . . . Guidance to the Big Red One was no direct-fire engagements. If Iraqi units were in the area, the 1st ID was to get them to leave without a fire fight, except that units, as always, retained the right to defend themselves.

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the Big Red One was no direct-fire engagements. If Iraqi units were in the area, the 1st ID was to get them to leave without a fire fight, except that units, as always, retained the right to defend themselves. Thus began, as Franks noted, "what can best be described as a delicate operation."[3]

At 0615, 1 March, the 1st ID's divisional cavalry squadron, 1-4 Cavalry (CAV) (1st Squadron, 4th CAV), moved north toward Safwan in a zone reconnaissance. At 1015, 2d Brigade reinforced 1-4 CAV and assumed control of the operation.[4] The 1-4 CAV encountered an Iraqi armored unit near the airfield, and 2d Brigade found a dug-in infantry company near the town of Safwan.

Both enemy units withdrew peacefully, but only after some tense moments and a prominent display of 1st ID armored hardware. The airfield was secured by 1800.

Now began a scramble to set up the negotiation site. Luckily, the Iraqis asked for a 24-hour delay in the negotiations, giving the corps until the morning of 3 March to establish the site. The 1st ID provided the manpower to set up and secure the site; the corps secretary to the general staff established a cell on site to coordinate the effort; and the theater's SUPCOM (support

Figure 1. VII Corps Dispositions, 13 March 1991

command) provided the bulk of the needed supplies. Since Safwan Airfield was nothing but a 2-mile concrete runway with no supporting facilities, everything needed for the site had to be brought in. About 20 CH-47 helicopter loads of tents, wooden flooring, rations, water, chairs, tables and office equipment were flown in. After threading its way north from Kuwait City through the wreckage of Iraqi vehicles strewn along the road to Safwan, a SUPCOM convoy finally arrived early on the morning of 3 March, bringing floodlights, more rations, a mobile kitchen and portable latrines. Medical assets and communications equipment also arrived. By the time the negotiations started at 1130 on 3 March, a small tent city was thriving at the Safwan Airfield.[5]

An important aspect in establishing the negotiation site was a show of force, in case the Iraqi representatives entertained any thoughts about continuing the hostilities or making demands. When the eight Iraqi representatives arrived at a previously coordinated link-up point north of Safwan, 1st ID combat power was much in evidence. The Iraqis were put into HMMWVs (high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles) and escorted by two M1 tanks and two Bradley fighting vehicles (BFVs) from 2d Brigade, 1st ID, to the negotiation site. Every 100 meters or so along the 3 1/4-mile route was an M1 or a BFV with infantry. The negotiation tent was ringed with 50 BFVs, 36 M1 tanks, two howitzer batteries and a Patriot missile battery. Six Apache attack helicopters were lined up on the runway. The sign outside the negotiation tent said, "Welcome to Iraq—Courtesy [of the] Big Red One."

Franks met CENTCOM Commander General H. Norman Schwarzkopf at Kuwait City International Airport and flew him to the site in his corps command UH-60. They were escorted by a composite flight of helicopters from the 11th Aviation Brigade, including UH-60s from C Company, 6-159th Aviation Battalion and AH-64s from 2-6th CAV Regiment and 4-

Before departing Safwan, Schwarzkopf explained the cease-fire terms to Franks. There would be a military demarcation line. All Iraqi forces would withdraw north of that line. A 1-kilometer buffer zone would be established on each side of the line, and military forces from either side would not enter that buffer zone. Bypassed Iraqi units would be allowed to escape as long as they showed no hostile intent.

229th Attack Helicopter Regiment. During the flight, Franks showed Schwarzkopf the destruction on Highway 8, the oil field fires and some of the Iraqi forces destroyed by the Big Red One near Highway 8. Franks also explained there were large quantities of abandoned enemy equipment and munitions still to be destroyed. Schwarzkopf reiterated his earlier guidance to destroy it all and ask for whatever explosive ordnance disposal support was needed. Schwarzkopf also remarked to Franks that the operation had gone "just as we planned it."

Schwarzkopf, along with other coalition forces leaders who had arrived earlier that morning via helicopter, met with the Iraqi representatives from 1130 to 1340, after which Schwarzkopf announced to an anxious crowd of about 300 soldiers and 50 media representatives that the Iraqis had agreed to all of the coalition forces' terms.

Before departing Safwan, Schwarzkopf explained the cease-fire terms to Franks. There would be a military demarcation line (MDL). All Iraqi forces would withdraw north of that line. A 1-kilometer buffer zone would be established on each side of the line, and military forces from either side would not enter that buffer zone.

Bypassed Iraqi units would be allowed to escape as long as they showed no hostile intent. An orange panel or flag on a vehicle or aircraft would allow safe passage.

Schwarzkopf also tasked VII Corps to immediately establish an information exchange point at the road junction north of the town of Safwan. This point would serve as a location where the Iraqi and coalition militaries could meet to exchange information or discuss problems. Schwarzkopf also told Franks to destroy all captured or abandoned Iraqi equipment and ammunition, a mission that would prove to be immense. Finally, coalition forces would not withdraw from one inch of occupied Iraq until a formal cease-fire was signed.

On the evening of 3 March, the 1st ID established the information exchange point, setting up a general-purpose, medium tent and an M577 command post from the division's tactical headquarters. Major Bernard J. Dunn, an Arab linguist who served as the corps' liaison to the Egyptian corps during the war, was dispatched to the exchange point. On 5 March, Colonel Richard Rock and his liaison team, which had been part of ARCENT's liaison team to VII Corps, also arrived.[6]

Soldiers from the 1st Infantry Division conducting a show of force at the Safwan Airfield cease–fire negotiation site, 3 March 1991. (Below) General Schwarzkopf emphasizes a point to the Iraqi negotiators.

The Iraqis were put into HMMWVs and escorted by two M1 tanks and two BFVs, to the negotiation site. Every 100 meters or so along the 3 1/4–mile route was an M1 or a BFV with infantry. The negotiation tent was ringed with 50 BFVs, 36 M1 tanks, two howitzer batteries and a Patriot missile battery.

Six Apache attack helicopters were lined up on the runway. The sign outside the negotiation tent said, "Welcome to Iraq—Courtesy [of the] Big Red One."

The corps would operate this exchange point until formally handing it over to UN forces on 24 April. The 1st ID provided site support and then 3d Armored Division (AD), upon relieving 1st ID in sector on 20 March. The corps and ARCENT representatives coordinated with the Iraqis on a variety of issues, starting with talks that led to the release, on 5 and 6 March, of 1,182 Kuwaiti detainees held by the Iraqis. On 16 March, the Iraqi military requested permission to fly fighter aircraft. This led to a meeting at the exchange point between the Iraqi military and the CENTCOM chief of staff, Marine Major General Robert B. Johnston, at which time the Iraqi request was refused. Several days later, the Iraqis flew fixed–wing aircraft anyway, getting two shot down by coalition forces for their trouble.

The exchange point also received an Iraqi request, on 21 March, to be allowed to resume operation of the Rumaylah oil field, which lay within the area occupied by the coalition (fig. 1).

Not surprisingly, this request was denied, but Iraq Petroleum Company representatives were allowed to conduct a reconnaissance of the oil field, which had been heavily damaged during the air campaign.[7]

In addition to establishing the information exchange point north of Safwan, the corps was tasked to defend and patrol its portion of the MDL established by the 3 March negotiations. At first this was easy, given that the vast majority of the MDL lay within XVIII Airborne Corps' sector. In VII Corps, only the 1st ID, in the area of Safwan and Umm Qasr, had responsibility for any portion of the MDL. This quickly changed, however, as the XVIII Corps began redeploying, turning over the MDL to VII Corps.

On 8 March, the 1st Cavalry Division (CD) relieved the XVIII Corps' 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) in its sector along the MDL and, on 10 March, relieved the XVIII Corps'

24th ID as well, as both units began movement to redeployment assembly areas. The 1st CD was, in turn, relieved by the 2d Brigade of the 3d AD on 12 March to allow the 1st CD to also redeploy. The 1st CD moved to forward assembly area (FAA) Killeen on 13 March. As figure 1 shows, the VII Corps occupied a significant portion of the MDL by 13 March.[8]

From 15 to 24 March, a second series of reliefs in sector and unit movements occurred that completed the relief of XVIII Corps and left VII Corps in possession of the entire MDL (fig. 2). On 15 March, 2d ACR moved from assembly area (AA) Mexico to AA Virginia. On 20 March, the 3d AD relieved the 1st ID in the Safwan sector of the MDL. The 1st ID, in turn, consolidated in AA Mexico and then moved west to AA Allen on 21 and 22 March. On 21 March, 1st AD moved north and assumed a sector along the MDL, relieving elements of 2d Brigade, 3d AD. The 1st AD then expanded its sector westward on 23 March, relieving elements of XVIII Corps.

Also on 23 March, the 11th Aviation Brigade occupied As Salman Airfield and established an aerial screen along the western portion of the MDL with the 4–229th Attack Helicopter Regiment and the French 1st Combat Helicopter Regiment, which came under the operational control of 11th Aviation Brigade on 25 March.

Finally, on 24 March, the 2d ACR moved north from AA Virginia and relieved portions of XVIII Corps along the MDL, and elements of 1st ID moved from AA Allen into a sector south of 2d ACR, relieving XVIII Corps forces in that area. VII Corps now guarded the entire occupied area of Iraq—an area the size of the state of Kentucky.[9]

The corps' 1st British (UK) AD did not assume a portion of the MDL as it was in the process of redeploying, moving its initial elements to the port of Al Jubayl on 10 March, with its 7th Armored Brigade closing at the port on 16 March. The 1st (UK) AD headquarters followed on 23 March. By 7 April, only a battalion-size battle group remained from 1st (UK) AD.[10] Likewise, the 1st CD did not participate, as it was

in FAA Killeen preparing for redeployment.

While there were some violations of the MDL buffer zone by Iraqi ground forces, the Iraqi army never challenged the corps while it guarded the

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MDL. One reason for this was that remaining elements of the Iraqi army still loyal to President Saddam Hussein had their hands full, suppressing a full-scale insurrection that sprang up in the southern cities of Iraq during March. The remnants of Hussein's Republican Guard brutally repressed uprisings in towns near the MDL, to include Basrah and An Nasiriya. However, because of rules-of-engagement restrictions, VII Corps could not intervene.

The impact of all this on VII Corps was a flood of refugees and Iraqi army deserters into the corps' area starting in the middle of March, particularly in the Safwan area and at military checkpoints along Highway 8. VII Corps, in addition to inheriting responsibility for the indigenous population, notably in the towns of Safwan (about 11,500 people in and around the town), Ar Rumaylah (2,500), and As Salman (2,500), soon found itself caring for thousands of refugees as well.[11] The 1st Brigade of the 3d AD, commanded by Colonel William L. Nash, established a temporary refugee center south of the town of Safwan and watched it grow from 500 to 4,800 refugees from 24 to 26 March.[12] The

Figure 2. VII Corps Dispositions, 24 March 1991

population at this temporary refugee camp would eventually exceed 8,000.

A Civil Affairs (CA) team from the 404th CA Company, provided by Colonel Robert H. Beahm's 352d CA Brigade, assisted the 3d AD in administering to the civilians in the town of Safwan and its adjacent refugee camp. The 352d CA Brigade task organized its five assigned CA companies to provide teams to all of the corps' major subordinate commands and headquarters elements. These teams did yeoman's service in the post-cease-fire period, dispatching Medical Civic Action Program teams into the country-side, procuring and distributing food and water, helping to reestablish civilian infrastructure in towns such as Safwan and processing refugees seeking assistance or requesting asylum.

Another key player in the humanitarian effort was the corps' 332d Medical Brigade, commanded by Brigadier General Michael D. Strong III. Mobile Army surgical hospitals (MASHs) and other forward-deployed assets of the 332d Medi-

cal Brigade, along with medical personnel of the units along the MDL, treated thousands of patients, often saving the lives of people hurt by dud munitions or wounded during the Iraqi insurgency, or of infants near death from dehydration or diarrhea. In the village of Safwan, 3d AD and 807th MASH personnel reopened the town's medical clinic, stocking it with medical supplies and working side by side with local civilian health care workers. The 3d AD, with assistance from engineers and CA personnel, put the town's well and school back into operation.

The 1st AD experienced a wave of refugees into its checkpoints along Highway 8 similar to that experienced at Safwan by 3d AD. From 21 March to 3 April, at Checkpoint Bravo, for example, 3d Brigade of 3d ID, attached to the 1st AD for Operation Desert Storm, assisted by a CA team from the 418th CA Company, distributed over 3,000 cases of rations; thousands of pounds of bulk rice, flour and lentils; 427 cases of bottled water; and provided medical treatment to more

*While there were some violations of the MDL buffer zone by Iraqi ground forces, the Iraqi army never challenged the corps while it guarded the MDL. One reason for this was that remaining elements of the Iraqi army . . . had their hands full, suppressing a full-scale insurrection that sprang up in the southern cities of Iraq during March. The remnants of Hussein's Republican Guard brutally repressed uprisings in towns near the MDL. . . . However, because of rules-of-engagement restrictions, VII Corps could not intervene.*

than 500 refugees. Many of these refugees made their way to the refugee center at Safwan.

A large refugee concentration also grew at a camp administered by the Saudi army northeast of the town of Rafhah, just inside Iraq, at a point where a hard-surface road runs to the Iraq–Saudi border (fig. 2). This camp was in the 11th Aviation Brigade's sector. Eventually, more than 10,000 refugees would gather there.[13]

Neither the Kuwaiti nor Saudi government would allow Iraqi refugees into their countries; so except for the Saudi administration of the Rafhah camp, the refugees became a VII Corps problem. Along with thousands of refugees came thousands of Iraqi soldiers seeking to surrender. Their reasons for surrendering varied, but most were tired of fighting for Hussein and had no desire to kill their own

people while repressing the insurrection.

Thus, the corps rather unexpectedly had to continue to operate a major enemy prisoner-of-war (EPW) collection and processing system. Corps holding areas were established in Iraq to receive the steady flow of prisoners coming from the units along the MDL. From 1 March until 14 April, when the corps stopped accepting the surrender of Iraqi soldiers as a result of the permanent cease-fire agreement, VII Corps had taken 23,675 EPWs—slightly more than it captured during the 100-hour war.[14]

Not only did the corps have its hands full aiding refugees, processing EPWs and guarding the MDL, it also faced the massive task of destroying captured Iraqi equipment and supplies. The goal was to leave nothing intact for Hussein's army when the Jayhawk Corps withdrew from Iraq.

The impact of all this on VII Corps was a flood of refugees and Iraqi army deserters into the corps' area starting in the middle of March, particularly in the Safwan area and at military checkpoints along Highway 8. VII Corps, in addition to inheriting responsibility for the indigenous population, notably in the towns of Safwan (about 11,500 people in and around the town), Ar Rumaylah (2,500), and As Salman (2,500), soon found itself caring for thousands of refugees as well.

As the corps assumed more and more of the MDL and conducted a careful reconnaissance of the occupied area of Iraq, it quickly became evident that the destruction mission would be a major undertaking.

The corps formed Task Force Demolition on 2 March and gave it responsibility for the mission. The corps' 7th Engineer Brigade provided a team headed by the brigade operations and training officer, Lieutenant Colonel Mark Vincent, to the corps TAC headquarters.[15] This team coordinated demolition requirements with the 7th Engineer Brigade and the major subordinate commands and monitored the status of the demolition effort. The seven engineer battalions and one engineer company organic or attached to the divisions and the 2d ACR had responsibility for destroying equipment in the unit sectors, while the six engineer battalions with the 7th Engineer Brigade destroyed enemy equipment in the corps rear area. Seven explosive ordinance detachments supported the corps and focused on destruction of Iraqi munitions. From 2 March until the corps' final elements departed Iraq, starting on 15 April, explosions resounded all over the desert, and black smoke columns from burning Iraqi vehicles dotted the horizon. Task Force Demolition destroyed 2,234 combat vehicles (tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery and air defense systems), 2,646 wheeled vehicles, 966 ammunition dumps and 622 bunkers. The corps even destroyed an Iraqi gunboat. To the corps' credit, this massive demolition effort was accomplished without injury.[16]

Not all the Iraqi equipment was destroyed. At the request of various stateside intelligence and technical agencies, the corps found and evacuated key items of the latest Soviet equipment and ammunition for examination.

While no one from Task Force Demolition was

injured during the massive demolition effort, soldiers and civilians alike, unfortunately, were hurt or killed by unexploded munitions. Large numbers of dud submunitions from Air Force and Army bombs and projectiles littered the ground. Soldiers or civilians who ran over, stepped on or picked up these duds often paid a costly price. The corps distributed thousands of dual-language posters warning people of the dangers of dud munitions. A sizable effort was made to clear the populated areas around the towns of Safwan and Al Busayyah, which were littered with dud munitions and abandoned Iraqi ammunition.

The corps was also tasked to conduct a thorough reconnaissance of the entire occupied area of Iraq to ensure that no US military equipment or vehicles were left behind when US forces withdrew. A complex search, grid by grid, ensued.

Even with all these ongoing activities, the corps did not lose sight of training and readiness. Each major subordinate command opened one or more live-fire ranges in its area of operations, and the corps commander directed that subordinate commanders address training in their daily commander's situation reports.

As the MDL security mission carried on into April, the corps began withdrawing units from Iraq and moving them to AAs in the vicinity of King Khalid Military City (KKMC), Saudi Arabia, to prepare for redeployment. The corps commander established a first-in, first-out redeployment policy, meaning that, as much as possible, the first units to arrive in Southwest Asia would be the first to leave. Accordingly, along the MDL the 1st ID relieved the 2d ACR on 7 April and the 1st AD on 12 April.[17] This left, from west to east, the 11th Aviation Brigade, 1st ID, and 3d AD securing the MDL. At this point, additional forces could not be withdrawn if the corps was to keep the coalition forces' promise to hold every inch of captured Iraqi territory until the Iraqis agreed to a UN formal cease-fire.

Fortunately, just as the Jayhawk soldiers still in Iraq were beginning to wonder how much longer they would have to endure the desert, the Iraqis agreed to the UN cease-fire, and the

United States announced that its remaining forces would now withdraw into Saudi Arabia or, in the case of 3d AD, into a buffer zone established along the Kuwait–Iraq border. This buffer zone, part of the cease-fire agreement, extended 10 kilometers into Iraq, and five kilometers into Kuwait. A UN observer force

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The 1st AD experienced a wave of refugees into its checkpoints along Highway 8 similar to that experienced at Safwan by 3d AD. From 21 March to 3 April, at Checkpoint Bravo, for example, 3d Brigade . . . assisted by a CA team from the 418th CA Company, distributed, over 3,000 cases of rations; thousands of pounds of bulk [grains]; 427 cases of bottled water; and provided medical treatment to [over] 500 refugees.

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would relieve the 3d AD and then patrol the buffer zone. On 15 April, the 11th Aviation Brigade, 1st ID, 3d AD and the corps TAC began withdrawing from Iraq.

In addition to announcing the withdrawal from Iraq, the United States also promised to continue to provide security for Iraqi refugees, as there was considerable concern that they would suffer reprisals from Hussein's regime once Iraqi forces reoccupied southern Iraq. This raised a serious dilemma, as the Kuwait and Saudi Arabian governments refused to allow Iraqi refugees inside their countries, yet the coalition forces were required to leave Iraq as part of the cease-fire agreement. What would become of the Safwan and Rafhah refugee camps?

As an immediate measure, 3d AD was tasked to continue to safeguard and operate the refugee camp at Safwan. Since this camp was located in the buffer zone, this was not a problem. Once the UN observer force took over the buffer zone, however, there would be no guarantees for the refugees' safety, as the observer force was just that—observers. It would not be large enough, nor was it part of its charter, to prevent Iraqi

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forces from entering the buffer zone and conducting reprisals against the Safwan refugees.

At the Rafhah camp, the 11th Aviation Brigade was tasked to provide external security for the Saudi–administered camp. On 18 April, the 2d AD (Forward [F]), after pulling out of Iraq, was detached from 1st ID and given the mission of securing the Rafhah camp.[18] The 2d AD (F), commanded by Brigadier General Paul E. Blackwell, established headquarters at the Rafhah Airfield and formed an 895–man task force for the Rafhah mission that included a company of French marines.[19]

On 17 April, the Saudi government agreed to allow the Iraqi refugees into their country, thus providing a long–term solution to the refugee dilemma. The Saudis agreed to build and administer a new refugee camp just south of the existing Rafhah refugee camp, only the new camp would

be on the Saudi side of the border. Given this was a long–term project, VII Corps needed an interim solution. On 22 April, engineers under control of 2d AD (F) began constructing a temporary refugee camp next to the site where the Saudis would build a permanent camp. This temporary camp was a tent city, much like the existing Rafhah camp. The camp, established and operated by the 1–41 Infantry Battalion, assisted by a CA team from the 404th CA Company, was ready for occupancy on 25 April, to include stocks of food and water.[20]

From 28 April to 7 May, 8,430 Iraqi refugees at Safwan who wished to go to the Rafhah camp were flown, via US Air Force C–130 transport planes, from Safwan Airfield to Rafhah Airfield. registered by Saudi officials at a refugee processing point established by 2d AD (F) and transported, via truck and bus, to the new Rafhah

Truckload of Iraqi soldiers being transported to a 1st Armored Division prisoner holding area following the cease-fire.

The corps rather unexpectedly had to continue to operate a major EPW collection and processing system. Corps holding areas were established in Iraq to receive the steady flow of prisoners coming from the units along the MDL. From 1 March until 14 April, when the corps stopped accepting the surrender of Iraqi soldiers as a result of the permanent cease-fire agreement, VII Corps had taken 23,675 EPWs—slightly more than it captured during the 100-hour war.

camp. Concurrently, from 29 April to 8 May, 11,500 refugees at the old Rafhah camp were likewise registered by Saudi officials and moved to the new Rafhah camp. While this was taking place, a joint force of US military police and French marines provided security for the refugees, manning Observation Post 100 north of the original Rafhah camp in Iraq.[21]

On 9 May, with all refugees settled in the new Rafhah camp, VII Corps ceased its humanitarian aid mission. From 1 March to 6 May, VII Corps had distributed more than 1 million meals of various types and more than 170,000 pounds of flour, rice and beans. Baby food, juice, milk, tea and cooking oil were distributed. Corps engineers produced over 1.5 million gallons of potable water at local wells, and the corps hauled and distributed more than 640,000 bottles of water and 600,000 gallons of bulk water to the refugees and local populace. Medics and doctors at all levels treated 29,450 patients.[22]

More impressive than these figures were the

actions and attitudes of the Jayhawk soldiers involved in this massive humanitarian effort. As Franks proudly pointed out, "The same soldiers and leaders who a short time before had relentlessly attacked the enemy and destroyed the Iraqi army in sector turned to and accomplished the humanitarian mission with compassion, discipline and pride in being American soldiers. Doing both so well is a mark of who we are and what we stand for."

It now remained for 3d AD to turn over the buffer zone to the arriving UN observer force, more properly known as UNIKOM (United Nations Iraq–Kuwait Observer Mission). On 18 April, the corps commander, the 3d AD commander, Major General Jerry R. Rutherford, and the 1st Brigade, 3d AD commander, Nash, briefed the newly arrived UN commander, Austrian Major General Gunther Greindl, at Safwan Airfield on the corps' and 3d AD's dispositions. The briefing was followed by an aerial reconnaissance of the buffer zone.

Taking over the buffer zone included turning over the information exchange point at Safwan. As VII Corps forces withdrew from Iraq, a series of meetings with the Iraqis took place from 14 to

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Seven explosive ordinance detachments supported the corps and focused on destruction of Iraqi munitions. From 2 March [through] 15 April, explosions resounded all over the desert, and black smoke columns from burning Iraqi vehicles dotted the horizon. Task Force Demolition *destroyed 2,234 tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery and air defense systems; 2,646 wheeled vehicles; 966 ammunition dumps and 622 bunkers. The corps even destroyed an Iraqi gunboat.*

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20 April at the exchange tent, by then commonly referred to as "Checkpoint 99," to coordinate the Iraqi resumption of control in the Safwan area and along the Safwan–Baghdad highway (Highway 8, fig. 1) while avoiding clashes or contact with withdrawing VII Corps forces. Following this, on 24 April, the UN assumed control of the point.

The UN also wanted certain improvements made in the buffer zone that would assist it in executing its observer mission. The 3d AD prepared defensive positions, patrol roads and a signal site for the UN forces. On 6 May, UN forces occupied the buffer zone, and 3d AD began to withdraw into Kuwait on 7 May.[23]

In April, concurrent with the security mission along the MDL, the humanitarian effort and Task Force *Demolition* operations, the corps also began redeployment.[24] As already noted, 1st (UK) AD and 1st CD actually began redeployment in March. On 14 April, the 2d ACR began moving equipment to the port of Al Jubayl, followed by 11th Aviation Brigade on 18 April, 1st AD and 1st ID on 19 April, 2d AD (F) on 3 May and 3d AD on about 8 May.[25] The 1st Brigade of 3d AD was designated as the residual defense

force. The corps headquarters at KKMC tracked the status of redeployment daily. Finally, on 12 May, with more than 60 percent of the corps redeployed, the corps commander and the main body of the corps headquarters departed Saudi Arabia.

Redeployment involved a great deal of hard work. Once units closed in their redeployment AAs around KKMC, all vehicles had to be washed before movement to the corps' seaports of debarkation at Al Jubayl and Ad Dammam. As units left Iraq, all ammunition had to be downloaded and repackaged. Thousands of tons of supplies at the corps' logistics bases had to be moved to the ports or to storage areas at KKMC. Some units, specifically 1st AD, corps artillery and corps troops had to put equipment into storage at KKMC as part of POMCUS (prepositioning of materiel configured to unit sets) being established in Saudi Arabia. Thousands of commercially contracted Sea–Land and military-owned containers had to be repacked.

Tracked vehicles were then moved to the ports via heavy equipment transporter, while wheeled vehicles roadmarched. Flatbed tractor-trailers moved thousands of shipping containers to the ports. The corps artillery was tasked with the mission of operating the port support activity, much as 1st ID (F) had done during the deployment. At the ports, the sand-colored vehicles returning to Europe were again painted green. All equipment at the ports was given a final wash and subjected to a rigorous agricultural inspection to ensure cleanliness. Finally, equipment and vehicles were marshaled in final staging areas for loading on ships.

Soldiers flew out of the airport at KKMC or, if part of a convoy to the ports, flew out of King Fahd International Airport. All soldiers underwent a 100 percent customs check. A detail of soldiers then loaded duffel bags and rucksacks into aircraft holds. Most soldiers returned home via commercial chartered flights, with Military Airlift Command aircraft moving air cargo and some passengers.

On top of all these activities, the corps also took the time to assess what it had done during

At the request of various stateside intelligence and technical agencies, the corps found and evacuated key items of the latest Soviet equipment and ammunition for examination. . . . The corps was also tasked to conduct a thorough reconnaissance of the entire occupied area of Iraq to ensure that no US military equipment or vehicles were left behind when US forces withdrew. A complex search, grid by grid, ensued.

the 100–hour war. At his commanders' meeting on 28 February, Franks reminded all his commanders to conduct after–action reviews (AARs). The corps chief of staff, Brigadier General John R. Landry, conducted a series of staff AARs in March at the corps' main headquarters. On 11 March, the corps commander conducted an AAR with his commanders and corps staff at the corps TAC headquarters, using a sandtable reconstruction of the battlefield. Also, the US Army's Center for Army Lessons Learned sent teams to Southwest Asia to gather information on lessons learned.

While many of the campaign's lessons learned are still being analyzed, some general observations are possible.[26] In the area of logistics, the corps was justifiably proud of its ability to sustain a 140,000–man force over the vast distances and harsh climate of the desert. As the corps commander has pointed out, this success was the result of "brute force logistics"—just plain hard work—by the 24,000 soldiers of the COSCOM (corps support command). To make the logisticians' task easier in future conflicts, the COSCOM must be more mobile and have

a greater fuel–hauling capability to sustain offensive operations. Also, automated management systems for supplies and services need improvement. They were inadequate to the task, requiring a great deal of manual record keeping. Finally, we need to improve methods of training the COSCOM in peacetime, much as the Army has done for higher–level maneuver headquarters.

The desert war also validated the need for armed, armored reconnaissance at all levels, from battalion through corps. The reconnaissance formations need the firepower and armored protection, to include the main battle tank, to allow them to gather intelligence and to fight, when necessary, against a similarly equipped enemy.

During *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm*, soldiers often lived in austere conditions, but never wanted for basic necessities of food, water and shelter. There is some room for improvement, however, in providing such basic life support items as modern portable showers, efficient cooking stoves, vehicle–mounted water heaters, and lightweight, easy–to–erect squad shelters

*The Iraqis agreed to the UN cease–fire, and the United States announced
that its remaining forces would now withdraw into Saudi Arabia or, in the case of 3d
AD, into a buffer zone established along the Kuwait–Iraq border. This buffer zone . . .
extended 10 kilometers into Iraq, and five kilometers into Kuwait. A UN observer force
would relieve the 3d AD and then patrol the buffer zone.*

and tents, particularly for armored vehicle crews and maneuver units.

Another area to address is identification friend or foe (IFF). Unfortunately, as in all wars, some casualties resulted from air–to–ground and ground–to–ground friendly fire. Given an often nonlinear battlefield, with long–range engagements, often fighting at night or in reduced visibility, vehicle identification in the midst of combat was difficult. A technological solution, specifically a simple, user–friendly IFF device of some sort, is called for, as well as continued emphasis on vehicle identification in training.

While it is important to carefully consider, even in a victorious campaign, areas needing improvement, it is equally instructive to understand the reasons for the Jayhawk Corps' outstanding success. For one thing, the Army's newest systems performed admirably, to include the M1A1 tank, the M2A2 BFV, the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS), the latest series wheeled vehicles and the Global Positioning System to name a few. These systems are real war winners—reliable survivable and hard–hitting.

Another key to success was sound doctrine. AirLand Battle doctrine was understood and accepted at all levels of command. More important, commanders and staffs actively planned and thought in terms of the tenets of AirLand Battle. Physical agility was achieved through the rehearsal and perfection of large, fast–moving formations trained to execute battle drills as needed. Fire support and logistics elements learned to maneuver as part of these formations. Commanders and soldiers learned to move faster, and in larger formations, than they ever could at home station training areas.

French Marines and US MPs manning Checkpoint 100 in Iraq, 3 miles north of the Rafhah refugee camp, 4 May 1991.

[The UN] wanted certain improvements made in the buffer zone that would assist it in executing its observer mission. The 3d AD prepared defensive positions, patrol roads and a signal site for the UN forces. On 6 May, UN forces occupied the buffer zone, and 3d AD began to withdraw into Kuwait.

Mental agility was witnessed by the constant examination of possible branches and sequels to the basic attack plan, resulting in a series of planning sessions producing a variety of fragmentary plans, one of which, FRAGPLAN 7, was the basis for a key fragmentary order issued during the ground war. A successful reading of the battlefield by a wide array of intelligence collectors was of invaluable assistance in this process in that the corps knew what branches and sequels were most likely, given an accurate picture of Iraqi strength and dispositions.

The tenet of initiative was equally important and consciously applied. First, a theaterwide deception plan, coupled with the virtual nonexistence of an Iraqi intelligence collection system resulting from the theater air operations, helped achieve surprise, allowing the corps to seize the initiative at the outset. Second, the corps maintained this initiative through hard-driving, continuous operations from 26 to 28 February—a deliberate decision made by the corps commander to ensure that the surprised enemy had little chance to react or to escape.

The AirLand Battle tenet of synchronization was foremost in the corps commander's mind when he talked of the "three-division fist" that he would need to destroy the Republican Guard. Commanders at all levels were aware of the corps commander's intent to have three divisions and an ACR massed to simultaneously strike the Republican Guard with overwhelming force. An awesome mix of maneuver forces (10 brigade equivalents), artillery (16 tube artillery battalions and 10 MLRS batteries), attack helicopters (six battalions/squadrons) and close air support conducted a synchronized attack against the Republican Guard.

Finally, the enemy was attacked through the depth of his defenses, first by means of a very successful air campaign that destroyed much of the Iraqis' combat power and badly demoralized them. When the ground war commenced, air power continued to attack deep, and on those few occasions when the Iraqis tried to reposition forces, they paid a heavy price, as did those Iraqi forces attempting to flee north. The corps struck the enemy in depth as well, using close air

Iraqi refugees, flown by C-130 transport - from Safwan to Rafhah, Saudi Arabia, are processed through a 2d Armored Division (Forward) reception center before being transported to the Rafhah Refugee Camp, 4 May 1991.

The Saudi government agreed to allow the Iraqi refugees into their country, thus providing a long–term solution to the refugee dilemma. The Saudis agreed to build and administer a new refugee camp . . . on the Saudi side of the border. Given this was a long–term project, VII Corps needed an interim solution. . . . A temporary refugee camp [was constructed] next to the site where the Saudis would build a permanent camp.

From 1 March to 6 May, VII Corps had distributed more than 1 million meals of various types. . . . Baby food, juice, milk, tea and cooking oil were distributed. Corps engineers produced over 1.5 million gallons of potable water at local wells, and the corps hauled and distributed more than 640,000 bottles of water and 600,000 gallons of bulk water to the refugees and local populace. Medics and doctors at all levels treated 29,450 patients.

support, divisional and corps attack helicopters, and long–range artillery fires. No Iraqi was safe on the battlefield, regardless of how far he was from the front lines. Not only was our warfighting doctrine actively and successfully applied but also our training doctrine. Battle–focused training as espoused by US Army Field Manual (FM) 25–100, *Training the Force*, was conducted during this campaign. The corps' subordinate commands, after analyzing the mission and theater of operations, developed mission essential task lists and trained to them. Training made heavy use of rehearsals and battle drills, followed by AARs. At corps level, these techniques were used by both the commander and his chief of staff.

There was universal praise among commanders after the war for the Army training base's success in implementing the Army's training doctrine. Training provided at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California; at the Combat Maneuver Training Center, Hohenfels, Germany; and by the Battle Command Training Program was realistic, highly intense and, perhaps most important, honest. A unit or a staff coming from this training base had an accurate assessment of its strengths and weaknesses. Such training produced skilled and confident leaders and soldiers for *Desert Storm*.

Franks described them this way:

"The VII Corps leadership team was made up

of a whole generation of noncommissioned officers and officers who were trained by our Army to be confident, competent and to lead from the front. They're tough, tactically savvy and tactically street smart. They took their great soldiers and trained them, toughened them, cared for them and led them to victory."

This leads to the last, but most important, key to the Jayhawk Corps' success—its soldiers.

Thanks to the quality of the young men and women in today's Army and the high standards of discipline and training that they attain, the corps was able to take, as Franks put it, "superbly trained, equipped, disciplined and motivated soldiers" to the desert, adding that "the courage of our soldiers in taking the fight to the enemy, day and night, in bad weather, is the bottom line. This underlies everything else."[27] **MR**

NOTES

1. The Iraqi 10th, 12th, 52d and *Medina* Armored divisions, as well as the *Tawakalna* Mechanized Division, were destroyed, as were the 26th, 48th, 31st and 27th Infantry divisions defending in the first echelon.

2. Corps historian's notes. The author served as the VII Corps historian during *Desert Storm*, from 21 January until 26 June 1991. The corps commander's intentions or words as quoted here are based on personal observation, or upon a series of interviews conducted by the author with LTG Frederick M. Franks Jr. from 2 April to 26 June 1991.

3. The corps commander recommended the captured *Medina* Division headquarters as an alternative site for the negotiations. LTG Franks felt that this site, already well secured by the 1st Armored Division (AD), would give evidence to the Iraqis of the extent of their defeat and provide a great picture for the media of the extent of the destruction wrought on the Iraqi army. Army Forces US Central Command rejected the alternative site because it did not have good accessibility by road and because the commander in chief, Central Command wanted Safwan.

4. Executive Summary to 1st Infantry Division *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm* After–Action Report.

5. The author was present at Safwan Airfield 1 through 3 March. The description of the negotiation site is from the corps historian's notes.

6. Information concerning the operation of the information exchange was provided by MAJ Bernard J. Dunn, VII Corps Civil Affairs officer, to the corps historian on 30 May 1991.

7. The author traveled through these oil fields on 8 April. All the fixed facilities such as buildings and oil storage tanks were destroyed or heavily damaged. Hundreds of destroyed Iraqi vehicles littered the area, knocked out by the coalition air forces as they tried to flee north on the road network that runs through the oil fields.

8. VII Corps commander's situation reports 50 (7–8 March 1991), 52 (9–10 March 1991), 54 (11–12 March 1991), 55 (12–13 March 1991), and VII Corps FRAGO 166–91 (DTG 122130 March 1991).

9. This series of moves is documented in VII Corps commander's situation reports 57 (14–15 March 1991), 62 (19–20 March 1991), 63 (20–21 March 1991), 64 (21–22 March 1991), 65 (22–23 March 1991), 66 (23–24 March 1991), and VII Corps FRAGOs 176–91 (DTG 191700 March 91), 179–91 (DTG 201700 March 91), 184–91 (DTG 231600 March 91) and 185–91 (DTG 241500 March 91).

10. The final battlegroup would also redeploy, being replaced by a fresh battlegroup, the 2d Royal Anglican Battlegroup, which closed in theater on 10 April. The 1st United Kingdom (UK) AD headquarters was replaced by "British Forces Kuwait." VII Corps commander's situation reports 52 (9–10 March 1991), 58 (15–16 March 1991), 65 (22–23 March 1991) and 84 (10–11 April 1991).

11. Except as otherwise cited, information concerning the refugee problem and the VII Corps humanitarian effort was based on commander, VII Corps message DTG 091755Z MAY 91, Subject: VII Corps Humanitarian Assistance, and VII Corps message DTG 091737Z MAY 91, Subject: VII Corps Humanitarian Assistance Efforts. Information was also taken from the author's notes based on his visits to Safwan, 1st AD's Checkpoint Bravo and the Rafhah refugee camps.

12. VII Corps commander's situation report 69 (26–27 March 1991).

13. The Saudis assumed administration of this camp starting on 4 April. VII Corps commander's situation report 77 (3–4 April 1991).

14. The corps captured 22,183 Iraqi prisoners of war during the 100–hour war. These figures are from the VII Corps commander's briefing, "The 100 Hour War." The formal United Nations cease–fire agreement was signed and released at 120020(L) April 1991. According to VII Corps commander's situation report 87, the corps directed units to stop accepting the surrender of enemy prisoners of war effective 0510, 12 April 1991, although Iraqi soldiers were still allowed to disarm and be afforded refugee status.

15. The corps tactical command post (TAC), incidentally, continued to control current operations following the cease–fire. The corps TAC remained at the location in Iraq that it occupied at the time of the cease–fire until the remainder of the Corps departed Iraq on 15 April. The corps commander likewise remained at the TAC the majority of the time, continuing his habit of frequent visits to his subordinate commands.

16. Information on Task Force *Demolition* was provided to the corps historian on 30 May 1991 by the VII Corps engineer's office.

17. VII Corps commander's situation reports 80 (6–7 April 1991) and 85 (11–12 April 1991).

18. VII Corps commander's situation reports 91 (17–18 April 1991) and 92 (18–19 April 1991).

19. This task force included part of the 1–41 IN Bn, a detachment from the 404th CA Co., engineers from C/527 EN Bn, the 793d MP Bn with the 66th and 212th MP Cos., the 3d Co/RI Ma (French marines), and B/1–1 Avn Bn from 1st ID (which was stationed at Rafhah Airfield as a ready reaction force). Corps historian's notes.

20. VII Corps commander's situation reports 95 (21–22 April 1991) and 98 (24–25 April 1991), and VII Corps message DTG 091755Z MAY91), Subject: VII Corps Humanitarian Assistance.

21. VII Corps commander's situation reports 101 through 106 (27 April–3 May 1991) and corps historian's notes.

22. Statistics are from VII Corps message DTG 091755Z MAY 91, Subject: VII Corps Humanitarian Assistance.

23. VII Corps commander's situation reports 97 (23–24 April 1991), 109 (5–6 May 1991) and 110 (6–7 May 1991). See VII Corps historian meeting file for notes on the 18 April 1991 briefing.

24. The first 1,900 soldiers from VII Corps, representing all the major subordinate commands, actually redeployed following a formal departure ceremony held at Khobar Village, Saudi Arabia, on 8 March. Major redeployment for VII Corps did not commence, however, until 1st (UK) AD and 1st Cavalry Division left, followed by 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment and the others.

25. VII Corps commander's situation reports 87 (13–14 April 1991), 91 (17–18 April 1991), 92 (18–19 April 1991) and 106 (2–3 May 1991).

26. These observations are based on comments made at the corps commander's After–Action Review of 11 May, which the author attended, and the significant issues, lessons and limitations addressed in the corps commander's Executive Summary to the VII Corps After–Action Report for *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm*. These same sources apply to the discussion of what worked well and what needs fixing.

27. LTG Franks spoke these words at the conclusion of his Corps After–Action Review held at the corps TAC in Iraq on 11 March 1991.

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PITFALLS

in Combat Simulations

Major John L. Krueger, US Army

The use of combat simulations to conduct staff training exercises has been increasing as training budgets have been decreasing. The author looks at two of these battle simulation programs. He discusses what these simulations are not. He points out the training values of these systems are not the combat results, but the tactical reporting procedures, communication links and after-action reviews of each mission. Finally, he discusses the issues of gamesmanship and blaming the computer for poor performance as being detractors to the training value of these programs.

COMBAT simulations are valuable training resources whose importance will only grow in the future as training funds become constricted. Developing a thorough understanding of the capabilities and limitations of the various simulation systems will greatly improve the quality of simulation–driven exercises. I will confine the discussion here to staff training simulations, specifically two simulations within the Family of Simulation (FAMSIM): the Corps/Battle Simulation (CBS) and the Brigade/Battalion Simulation (BBS). Both of these simulations have similar operating characteristics and, interestingly, share common pitfalls.

Both CBS and BBS are microcomputer–based simulation systems that use distributed processing and high–speed graphics in a computer network that produces a real–time simulation of combat. The systems employ a matrix of weapons' effectiveness over many possible conditions for all weapon types modeled in the database. The systems track ammunition, personnel, weapons, fuel, water and rations. Roleplayers at computer work stations maneuver units, engage enemy units, perform combat support and combat service support functions and provide reports to their higher headquarters. A significant feature of both systems is that they employ a live, thinking opposing force.

The higher headquarters operates at a remote location in its standard command post (CP) configuration. Role players at the computer work stations feed reports to the CP via land line or FM radio. The commander and his staff in turn make decisions based on the reports and transmit orders back to the player cells. Both simulations can operate as a single–echelon trainer, or they can operate as multi–echelon trainers. A response cell for the headquarters above that being trained normally operates from the simulation center to provide continuity through the next higher headquarters.

The first thing we must understand about both CBS and BBS is that they are exercise *drivers*. They are not war games in which the desired end state is victory as determined by a favorable exchange ratio. Both simulations provide real–time, realistic combat results to stress the unit's command, control and communications (C^3). Units get wrapped up in the competition of fighting a war game and lose focus of the original training objectives.

Observations of several BBS–driven exercises at the Fort Riley, Kansas, Battle Simulation Center and several CBS–driven exercises at the Fort Hood, Texas, Battle Simulation Center revealed examples of common combat simulation pitfalls. Most people do not understand how combat simulations drive training exercises. What is the role of the simulation? We have found that through good pre–exercise training, players understand their role, but commanders often are the least likely to take the time to learn about what the simulation can provide. Unfortunately, commanders often short–change the train–up. Since the commanders set the tone for the training event, it is incumbent upon them to understand what the system can and cannot do. The commander's interest is readily obvious by the emphasis he or she places on train–up.

After–Action Reviews (AAR). The AAR is the single most important event of the simulation driven exercise. Too often, the AAR becomes an after–action critique where the facilitator dominates the discussion, which then revolves entirely around the tactical play that

occurred in the computer work stations rather than how well the staff performed its duties.

Seldom have I seen an exercise where the commander asks for an intermediate halt in the game play to go over a critical lesson with his

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Both CBS and BBS . . . are exercise drivers. They are not war games in which the desired end state is victory as determined by a favorable exchange ratio. Both simulations provide real–time, realistic combat results to stress the unit's C^3.

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staff. Both CBS and BBS provide the capability to stop, evaluate what went right or wrong and restart either at the stopping point or at some earlier point. Usually, the conclusion of a specific tactical mission is the stopping point. Commanders lose valuable lessons with this technique. A new staff would especially benefit from the process of stopping periodically to evaluate what has happened. In one BBS exercise, during the AAR, I observed at Fort Riley, the battalion staff had virtually no input during the AAR. Such an AAR leads me to question whether the battalion staff derived any training at all from the exercise. This leads to the next observation.

Training Audience. I have seen a pronounced focus on the tactical actions that occur within the work stations during exercises. In many instances, the systems are being used as tactical trainers. The system design for both CBS and BBS does not replicate the level of detail that would make the simulations useful for this purpose. Battalion and brigade staffs are the target BBS training audiences. Corps and division staffs are the target CBS training audiences. The simulations provide real–time, realistic combat results to which the appropriate staff must react, using normal staff procedures.

These systems are not maneuver trainers, but some units try to use them for this purpose. The nuances of maneuvering a tank platoon across terrain are best practiced in a field environment,

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computer work stations rather than how
well the staff performed its duties.*

where an error of less than a meter can mean the difference between throwing track and successfully completing the mission. The finest resolution either of these systems provides is 100 meters. This is fine, given the systems' intended function.

Both systems can assist training communications and reporting skills. In fact, the players operating from the computer work stations can derive a great deal of training benefit by focusing on how they report the battle to the higher headquarters. The main training audience remains the headquarters staff located outside the simulation center in its CP. The real action, so to speak, takes place from the time the role player keys his microphone to the point the commander and his staff transmit orders back to the role player. The game is unimportant except for the interactions it causes between both ends of the communications link and within the CP.

Do not use either system to test the capabilities and limitations of weapons or units. Although the system produces realistic combat results, there are hundreds, if not thousands of variables

not modeled, that could affect the real–world performance of a given unit or weapon. In some cases, the weapon systems' capabilities derive from peacetime tests and may not accurately portray the true capability. Some weapons are more capable than modeled; others are less capable. Some variables are subjective and may or may not reflect reality as each commander knows it. Some of the synergistic effects of combat multipliers are absent because they are not yet modeled. While both CBS and BBS are relatively accurate in replicating technical capabilities of the systems within the data base, we must remember that it is the people who operate those systems that determine their effectiveness against a given opponent. For example, a T–72 tank is very effective against an M1A1 in BBS, but our real-world experience in Southwest Asia demonstrated how ineffective a T–72 can be in poorly trained and poorly motivated hands versus an M1A1 in well–trained, highly motivated hands.

Training Objectives. Commanders often do not clearly define their training objectives before an exercise. "Conduct a deliberate attack" is not an appropriate training objective; it is a tactical mission that will force the staff to accomplish specific tasks. Those staff tasks are what ultimately become the training objective. Examples of good training objectives are:

● Train tactical reporting procedures.
● Train battle–tracking in the tactical command post/tactical operations center.
● Train logistic reporting and planning.

These are only a few of the possibilities, and they are all C^3 tasks. CBS and BBS are staff training devices. If a well–trained simulation center staff understands the objectives, it can facilitate accomplishing those objectives and keep the exercise focused. Otherwise, unnecessary wheel-spinning becomes the order of the day, resulting in frustration for the unit and poor training. Too often, the hidden agenda behind these exercises is to test tactical theories and plans for the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California, or the unit's contingency plan. CBS and BBS are not good devices for this purpose, and commanders should be careful not to use them this way.

Many times, commanders simply do not see how important it is to define objectives before the exercise. Clearly defined objectives allow the systems manager to better advise the commander on structuring his exercise. Time spent defining objectives is time well spent and time saved later.

Level of Play. Commanders repeatedly attempt to force the level of computer play down to squad and sometimes individual vehicle for both CBS and BBS. Normally, the appropriate level of replication on the system is two levels below the headquarters being trained. There are some exceptions that are acceptable, for example, scouts and specialized elements such as ground surveillance radar, but keep these to a minimum. There are two major reasons for this. First, too many units on a work station overload the keyboard operator. More often than not, the operator forgets he even owns assets because he is keeping track of too many. In other words, his span of control is too great.

Second, the more units that are in play, the slower the system becomes. This is because the system continuously makes line-of-sight checks, moves units and conducts combat for every individual unit represented. This involves an enormous number of calculations. Every computer has its limitations. In its most simple explanation, a computer adds and subtracts. That is all it is capable of, but its speed makes it look like it is doing much more. At some point, it cannot keep up with demands. As operators, we can reduce this potential problem by aggregating units wherever possible. If an individual unit does little toward affecting reporting and staff-actions, roll it into one that has an impact. The systems manager should be able to assist the commander in structuring the data base in the most efficient manner.

Damage Assessments. There is a gross misuse of battle damage assessment (BDA) in these staff trainer simulations. BDA is a seldom-stated, but often prime, objective in exercises. How many "kills" and "losses" a unit achieves in a simulation are irrelevant if the staff learns valuable lessons about its internal operations.

> ***Both systems can assist training communications and reporting skills. In fact, the players operating from the computer work stations can derive a great deal of training benefit by focusing on how they report the battle to the higher headquarters. . . . The game is unimportant except for the interactions it causes.***

> ***Too many units on a work station overload the keyboard operator. More often than not, the operator forgets he even owns assets because he is keeping track of too many. In other words, his span of control is too great. [Also] the more units that are in play, the slower the system becomes.***

Commanders often foster this by berating role players for killing too few of the enemy or for losing units to enemy fire. This is silly and wrong. Kills are irrelevant because units in these simulations, like most other simulations, never tire, never lose morale, never get lost or confused and continue to fight to the last man and last bullet. The only value of BDA, as provided by the system, is to compare reports received by the higher headquarters with what the computer reported to the player cells. Compare the reports and discard the computer-generated BDA. The highlight of BDA in this context is the staff and commander perceiving, through the reports sent from the work stations, a different situation than what actually occurred. In this regard, both CBS and BBS faithfully duplicate a problem that has plagued commanders since the beginning of warfare—inaccurate reporting.

Nondoctrinal Actions. By this, I do not mean those actions that may violate doctrine, but which, under the circumstances, make sense. Rather, I refer to the gamesmanship that work station players, and even the CP, attempt in order to produce a favorable tactical outcome on the computer—actions that the unit would not do in a live, tactical environment.

[CBS and BBS] systems are not maneuver trainers, but some units try to use them for this purpose. . . . An error of less than a meter can mean the difference between throwing track and successfully completing the mission. The finest resolution either _ these systems provides is 100 meters [which] is fine, given the systems' intended function.

For example, combining headquarters tank sections to make tank platoons, leaving tank companies, and sometimes even battalions, without a headquarters is a frequent BBS gamesmanship technique. An argument posed by some players is that they are collocating the headquarters sections for coordination. In fact, the players then maneuver the new configuration exactly like a platoon, even to the extreme of moving it beyond any reasonable distance from the original units. Collocating headquarters is not synonymous with combining the assets to create new maneuver units. Another example frequently seen is the use of "expendable" units such as Stinger sections and supply assets to draw fire and spot enemy units.

Staff and Commanders in the Player Cells. Commanders and principal battle staff members frequently visit computer work stations and spend too much time there. An argument used by some is that they are simulating being in their command vehicle behind the lead unit. While it is realistic to expect commanders and staff officers to meet with lower echelons in

the field, this is not well represented by the presence of the commander or staff officers in the computer work station. The view within the work station is too perfect to properly simulate a commander or S3 (operations and training officers) being up front with the lead unit. This perfect intelligence then skews the actions the commander and his staff take in response to a given situation.

If a commander or the S3 must meet with the work station officer in charge (OIC), he or she should do it away from the work station. The OIC should be able to explain the current situation as he or she sees it, using a map. Neither CBS nor BBS can simulate carnage, confusion or noise, and their impact on the unit's ability to perform its mission. These are the environmental factors that the higher commander normally assesses in person during a real battle. Looking at the computer screen does nothing to simulate these factors and is a poor substitute.

The real reason commanders get involved in the work station is to get inside the OPFOR (opposing forces) commander's decision cycle. Let us be honest about the hidden agenda. Running the show from a computer is not the correct way to address this process.

Blaming the Computer. All system problems and quirks should be transparent to the training audience. A common problem is for the player cells to experience difficulties or even tactical reversals and announce over the radio net that the "computer is screwing up." The battle staffs in the CPs then sit back and wait for the technicians to fix the computer, rather than perform appropriate staff actions for the current tactical situation. Computers sometimes "burp," and technical problems do arise. However that is no excuse for stopping meaningful training. A well-trained simulation center staff should be able to create "work-arounds" for most technical problems, which will appear realistic to the staff in the CP. This ensures smooth exercise flow, but requires cooperation on the part of all parties within the simulation center, including the OPFOR commander, the work station OICs and the simulation center

staff. This brings me to a final key point, which is no less important for being discussed last.

Simulation Center Staffing. There are several possible staffing alternatives for battle simulation centers. In fact, the staffing of these centers is a worthy topic of study by itself. I will not discuss these alternatives in great detail here, but I will comment on the alternative that seems to be the Army's preferred method of staffing. A design goal of both systems was reducing the military manpower overhead required to run an exercise. Manpower overhead, significant manpower overhead for continuous operations, is an unavoidable cost of doing business.

In the effort to reduce the burden on military manpower, contractor-run systems are becoming the norm. This option offers continuity of technical expertise, provided the same contractor can retain the contract year after year. There is also concern over contractor responsiveness. If there is a level of friction and distrust between Department of the Army civilians and military personnel the interaction of contractors and military personnel often produces amplified friction and distrust. I have seen a marked distrust by the using units' chain of command for simulation center chiefs who are not branch-qualified maneuver arms. The absolute worst staffing solution is to assign personnel with pending chapters or other administrative actions, or marginal performers as staff within a battle simulation center.

The personnel who staff the simulation center, whether civilian contractor, government service civilians or military, must be technically competent, highly motivated and aggressively proactive to make the system operate to its fullest potential. A knowledge of current weapon systems, tactics and enemy doctrine, combined with a thorough knowledge of what the simulation system can replicate, is necessary for at least

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one member of the staff. Too often, there is a disconnect between the commander and the technicians, resulting in the loss of valuable training opportunities. Hopefully, as the value and importance of combat simulations grow, there will be personnel authorizations developed that better support the systems.

Computer-driven battle simulations are valuable tools that cut the cost of training staffs. Their importance will increase in the near future as budget cuts take a deeper bite out of training funds. It is vital that commanders at every level develop a better understanding of the systems that are currently fielded for training staffs. This better understanding will help commanders avoid the common pitfalls in combat simulations and help ensure that their staffs receive the best possible training. **MR**

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Decentralized Command

Translating Theory Into Practice

Colonel James M. Dubik, US Army

Unit commanders want to be able to allow their units to operate with a minimal amount of interference. Units that train this way during peacetime perform well when faced with combat situations. The author offers his views on what it takes for a unit commander to use a decentralized method of command successfully. He lists and explains five conditions that must be present before this can happen.

MILITARY leaders who read Carl von Clausewitz's *On War* are reminded over and over again that combat requires them to take decisive action under the extreme conditions of uncertainty, fear, primordial violence, danger, emotion and friction. In fact, one of the purposes for writing *On War* was to present a theory of war that would educate and guide future military leaders. To this end, Clausewitz lists, in the chapter titled "On Military Genius," those traits a military leader should develop to prepare for executing his duties under combat conditions. Courage, strength of body and soul, powers of intellect, decisiveness, intuition, strength and presence of mind, fortitude of mind and character, strength of will, energy, staunchness, endurance, self–control, balance, stability, consistency, firmness, openness to other points of view, imagination, unity and power of judgment, vision—Clausewitz describes each in detail and explains why, given the context in which the leader must judge, decide and act, the leader ought to develop that trait.[1] Nowhere, however, does Clausewitz discuss what the conditions of combat require of organizations.

This oversight is an important one because not only do individual leaders decide and act, so do organizations. Therefore, the natural question that arises is this: How should a leader structure his organization so that it will act effectively in the conditions of combat? To this end, the concept of decentralized command is most helpful because it recognizes that commanders must not only develop themselves but also their subordinate leaders and units. The decentralized command concept views leadership and training activities as a whole—a collective means leading to one goal—a unit capable of winning in the conditions of combat.

However, to develop a unit capable of using a decentralized method of command takes time, effort and a specific environment in which to flourish. A decentralized method of command cannot be adopted simply by doctrinal decree or by simple command directive.[2] "It is not enough to allow subordinate commanders wide latitude and then demand that they fill it with their ini-

Commanders must understand that to command and control their units using a decentralized approach requires a training and education process, a common outlook, mutual trust and a uniform perspective in tactical operations. . . . Field commanders have the responsibility to reinforce, clarify and demonstrate how to properly use what his subordinates have learned in the school system. Several leader development forums must be established and synchronized.

tiative," according to Martin van Creveld, for "to do so they must first be properly trained and then provided with the right organizational means."[3] Commanders must understand that to command and control their units using a decentralized approach requires a training and education process, a common outlook, mutual trust and a uniform perspective in tactical operations.[4] Thus, Richard Simpkin in *Race to the Swift* reminds those who wish to develop this kind of command method in their units that "the root of directive control lies in the sharing of ideas and interpretations by minds well–attuned to one another. . . . The be–all and end–all . . . is mutual trust and respect."[5]

This article will identify those preconditions that must exist before a commander at any level can use a decentralized method of command successfully. For purposes of focus, however, this article will use the battalion as its model. Specifically, for a battalion commander to use a decentralized method of command successfully, the following preconditions must exist:

• Battalion leaders—from platoon sergeant up—must have a common approach to analyzing and solving tactical problems.

• The battalion staff and subordinate units down to squad level must execute their assigned tasks quickly and to standard.

• Leaders must be proficient in making decisions, acting and using initiative *within*

the battalion commander's intent.

● The leaders and soldiers in that battalion must trust and respect one another.

● The battalion must use the same *modus operandi* in garrison, as well as the field.

As is always the case, however, a commander cannot stop at academic injunctions. He must ask more specific "how–to" questions. For example, "What constitutes proper training and education?" What are the "right organizational means"? How does one create a "common outlook," a "uniform perspective" and "mutual trust and respect"? How does one "attune minds"? Further, once asked, a commander must:

● Use the answers as goals in the training of his unit and its leaders.

● Then develop and execute logical, achievable means to these ends.

If the five preconditions listed above do not already exist, then it becomes the commander's responsibility to create the environment in which these preconditions can arise. This role—the commander as creator of an environment—cannot be overemphasized. The preconditions required for decentralized command do not result from spontaneous generation. They are *made* by the efforts of the commander through his leadership and training programs.

Leaders of the Battalion

A common approach to analyzing and solving tactical problems is a must from platoon sergeant up.

Why platoon sergeant? Because, as a battalion commander, your intent must be understood and acted upon two levels down, the platoon, and the platoon sergeant advises the platoon leader and acts as the platoon leader when the former is absent or becomes a casualty.

Platoon sergeants and above, then, must share in the common approach a battalion commander seeks to develop, the basis of which must be doctrinal. Commanders cannot assume that leaders are thoroughly trained by service schools. Field commanders have the responsibility to reinforce, clarify and demonstrate how to properly use what his subordinates have learned in the school system. Several leader development forums must be established and synchronized.

Officer professional development (OPD). Too often commanders do not get from this program all that they can. Part of the reason is that the sessions are often held with all officers present, with a poor junior officer detailed to present a class on "the attack," for example. A different approach seems possible, one that more narrowly aims at specific strata within a battalion's officer corps. Using this approach, a battalion commander could conduct an OPD for the lieutenants, company commander tactical seminars, staff OPDs, field grade discussions, as well as the standard "everyone together" classes. This approach offers major advantages:

● Content can be tailored and packaged for a specific audience. Lieutenants, for example, need a different level of specificity than do field grade officers; company commanders are interested in different aspects of a particular issue or tactical maneuver than are platoon leaders; field grade officers often need less background information and can handle a higher level of abstraction.

● The commander can address different issues with each group. It may well be, for example, that as a whole, the lieutenants in the battalion are weak in one area, the company commanders require sustainment reinforcement in a second area and field grade officers must discuss a third issue.

Senior noncommissioned officers at the Sergeants Major Academy, Fort Bliss, Texas. NCOs learn the basic skills of battle-planning and tracking at the Battle Staff NCO Course but rely on tactical exercises to develop the required expertise.

[While an] NCO program ... is run (and quite properly so) by the battalion's command sergeant major, the contents must be synchronized with those of the officer's program in an important way—both programs must be mission–essential task list related. The contents of both programs must come from a common analysis.

Using a multiechelon approach to OPDs, the commander—who, as a general rule, should be the primary instructor for most OPD sessions— can convey his thought process, explain his intent, describe his approach, correct misunderstandings or problems or sustain strengths in such a way as to communicate with each leader at his particular level and to meet the specific leader and organizational needs of the battalion. Below is charted one possible example of this approach in action.

Of course, this kind of approach takes time. The program depicted would require six separate

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Lieutenant OPD	Conduct of search and attack at platoon level; supervising precombat inspections
OPD (all)	Occupying defensive positions; operating with the commander's intent
Commanders' Tactical Seminar	AAR Company EXEVAL missions— defense, movement to contact and raid
Field Grade Program	Read *Passion for Excellence* by Thomas J. Peters and Nancy K. Austin: Supervising staff planning

sessions during a three-month period. However, this disadvantage speaks to priority. We all know that we make time for those items we consider important.

A noncommissioned officer (NCO) program. While this program is run (and quite properly so) by the battalion's command sergeant major (CSM), the contents must be synchronized with those of the officer's program in an important way—both programs must be mission–essential task list (METL) related. The contents of both programs must come from a common analysis. Subjects for leader development classes can come from tasks completed— leader, collective or individual—that need either sustainment or improvement, or they may be chosen because of training that is coming up in the future. Again, I suggest a multilevel approach. The first level is one that finds the battalion CSM talking only to first sergeants (1SGTs); the second, the CSM teaching all platoon sergeants; the third, company 1SGTs heading up squad leaders.

> **The battalion's leaders should come together to discuss a particular issue—an after–action review brief by a unit just returning from the NTC or JRTC and a discussion of leadership prior to the arrival of a new COHORT package are two examples that immediately come to mind. These sessions are also opportunities for a commander to build that common approach to problem solving necessary for decentralized command.**

Why emphasize the battalion commander and CSM doing so much instruction? First, two of the important reasons for conducting OPDs and NCODPs are to convey intent that is two levels down and to develop a common mind–set. The easiest way is to have the commander and CSM, themselves, convey the information. Second, rather than ask why they should be the primary instructors, I ask *why not?* The battalion commander and the CSM are the unit's most senior officer and NCO, the most experienced leaders in the battalion. Each should be sharing his experiences and lessons learned (positive and negative) with his subordinates. Too often we think that our subordinates will "pick up what we mean by watching what we do." Not so. Learning rarely takes place implicitly. If a commander or CSM wants his subordinates to learn a particular task, he must set up the conditions for that learning to take place—explicitly.

One might think that such a program is too centralized and contrary to US Army Field Manual (FM) 25–100, *Training the Force.* Quite the opposite. The subject matter for the OPDs, NCODPs and the LDPs (leader development programs) to be discussed below are as bottom–driven as top–driven. During each level's training meeting, leaders ought to identify those items they think should be discussed in the professional development forums and at which level would be the most appropriate. In this way, the subjects discussed will be linked to a METL task—individual, collective or leader. This input

is then added to the assessment that the battalion commander and CSM have made. The result is the final topic list.

Leader development. Often it is the case that all the battalion's leaders should come together to discuss a particular issue—an after–action review (AAR) brief by a unit just returning from the National Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, California, or Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), Little Rock Air Force Base and Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, and a discussion of leadership prior to the arrival of a new CO–HORT (cohesion, operational readiness and training) package are two examples that immediately come to mind. These sessions are also opportunities for a commander to build that common approach to problem solving necessary for decentralized command.

As important as leader development is, another very effective way to develop and reinforce a common approach to solving tactical problems is on–site coaching. Talking to platoon leaders and company commanders during a planning phase; using the preoperational backbrief as another teaching opportunity; issuing operation orders (OPORDs) in a field location overlooking the ground on which you will fight; and participating in AARs, not to present a critique, but to teach—each is a chance for a battalion commander to press home his ultimate objective of getting all his subordinates' problem–solving methods attuned to one another. In short, the battalion commander and his CSM should be always in the "teaching mode."

Professional development and on–site teaching are not the only ways in which a commander can build commonality of problem solving in his unit. Readings, training meetings and leader briefbacks all constitute other very useful opportunities. Commanders can assign military theory, history or biography readings—the data base of our profession—in conjunction with a professional development class or as a separate assignment to specific officers or groups. The battalion training meeting—in either the assessment phase, guidance for upcoming training or discussion of leadership—provides another

Officers conducting a briefing during a terrain walk.

teaching platform. Finally, the commander can create opportunities when he backbriefs his battalion's leaders after his quarterly training brief to the commanding general, following a major operation, training exercise, deployment or any other significant events in the unit's life.

Before proceeding to the second precondition, one caution must be expressed. That is, the desire to develop a common approach among the leaders of a battalion to solving tactical problems must not translate into rigid thinking. The result cannot be a unit that has one technique that it applies to any given situation. The goal is to create a common *approach* to analyzing and solving tactical problems, not a common solution.

Execution to Standard

Creating units and staffs that can execute assigned tasks quickly and to standard requires emphasizing precision in drills and practicing unit standing operating procedures (SOPs), using correct and complete troop–leading procedures and following the Army's training doctrine.

In addition to the drills outlined in Army manuals, squads and platoons must be experts in other tasks that are common to many tactical situations, for example, breach drill, bunker drill, trench drill, building entry and clearing techniques and landing zone/pickup zone (LZ/PZ) procedures. These tasks, and others like them, require that squads and platoons develop precise SOPs that are taught and known to every member of the unit and that are practiced over and over again. Each soldier must know the drills and SOPs, as well as leaders. This knowledge and the repeated practice contribute two very important capabilities to a battalion wanting to use a decentralized method of command. First, squads and platoons will attain the kind of quick reaction necessary in maneuver theory. Units will not need lengthy orders. They will know, and be able to execute, their drills and SOPs. Second, the precision and discipline that result from knowledge and repeated practice of drills and SOPs will produce confidence in higher commanders that, even when out of communication, subordinate units will execute to standard.

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The drills and SOPs that are often left unattended are those that apply to battalion staffs. In this area, the battalion executive officer (XO) is a most important trainer. The staff, following the training program directed by the battalion XO, develops SOPs for the staff planning and

The drills and SOPs that are often left unattended are those that apply to battalion staffs. In this area, the battalion executive officer (XO) is a most important trainer. The staff, following the training program directed by the battalion XO, develops SOPs for the staff planning and decision-making process—at least one for deliberate planning, one for planning under time constraints and perhaps one for planning during a deployment sequence.

decision-making process—at least one for deliberate planning, one for planning under time constraints and perhaps one for planning during a deployment sequence. These SOPs must be augmented by those of each staff section. Regardless of the conditions, each staff section and the staff as a whole must function effectively. Like squad and platoon SOPs, staff SOPs must be known and practiced by each leader in the section. The assistant operations and training officer (S3), the operations NCO, the intelligence NCO, the support platoon leader—each must be able to act as the staff principal. This ability adds depth to the staff in case the principal is gone or becomes a casualty. It also adds speed to staff planning in that staff subordinates are able to anticipate what the principal needs during the planning sequence. As the primary staff trainer, the battalion XO ensures that the staff practices and rehearses its SOPs under a variety of conditions and a variety of "principals."

A further assist in the process of executing assigned tasks to standard is precision in following troop-leading procedures. This precision is particularly important at squad and platoon levels, yet it is exactly these levels that are the most problematic. These junior leaders often find themselves in "time crunches" where they think that they do not have enough time to follow the steps taught to them. The battalion commander's experience is particularly helpful in this regard. He can offer helpful hints to platoon lead-

ers as to how to use their time wisely; can explain the difference between "haste" and "speed" and that conducting an operation without taking some time, however minimal, to go through the correct troop-leading steps results in the former, not the latter; and he can structure training events that force squads and platoons to practice their troop-leading skills.

Precombat inspections and backbriefs are two items that leaders should include in the final step of their troop leading but often do not—again most often claiming lack of time to be the mitigating factor. However, these two items are most important not only to the troop-leading process but also to decentralized command in general. They are important to troop leading in that these are the quality control checks that leaders should build into their systems. By conducting a precombat inspection, a platoon leader will verify that the unit has everything it needs to conduct the mission at hand, that it is in working order and that the soldiers understand the unit's mission and their part in it. Precombat inspections also increase the likelihood of the operation's being conducted to standard.

Backbriefs—of squad leaders to the platoon leader and company commanders to the battalion commander—are also a quality control check built into a unit's troop-leading procedure. The backbrief, especially when attended by all key leaders, is the senior commander's way of making sure that his subordinates understand the mission and his intent and have made a plan complete and coordinated enough to get the job done. Backbriefs also increase the confidence of senior commanders that their subordinates understand the mission completely and will accomplish it even if they are out of communication, find that the conditions changed, or their leader becomes a casualty. Finally, backbriefs ensure that each of the key leaders in a battalion knows what the others are doing and how their actions fit into the "big picture." In these ways, backbriefs add to the probability that the units will execute to standard.

Drills, SOPs and troop-leading procedures must become habits so ingrained that even when

leaders and units become wet, tired, cold, hungry and confused, the habits endure. These kinds of habits are "internal control measures" that help command and control a subordinate unit as much as graphic control measures and radio communications. To create these kinds of strong habits, a battalion commander must use training time wisely, for training is the method of habit development. The conditions a commander sets for his unit's training are the petri dish, if you will, in which the right habits develop and grow—or do not.

Therefore, the conduct of training is a most important matter. Battalion commanders must ensure that each training event is properly focused on the fewest number of tasks possible and is prepared for in fastidious detail.

Only by choosing the fewest number of tasks rather than the most will a commander ensure that his subordinates will have adequate time to conduct the requisite talk–throughs and walk–throughs that are the first steps in transmitting to each member of a unit the SOP concerning the task at hand. Once soldiers and subordinate leaders understand, the unit—whether it be squad, platoon, company or battalion—can begin training at the "run" speed. Even here, however, the training plan must include enough time to properly evaluate the training; redo it under similar conditions if deficiencies occur; or train under more difficult conditions—day and night—if the unit reaches proficiency. Finally, leaders should conduct the ultimate test of their units—seeing if they can perform the task without the leaders. This last test should be the normal result of using MILES (multiple integrated laser engagement system). However, not all units have sufficient sets of MILES; therefore, the senior leader must "kill off" leaders at various times in the planning, preparing and executing phases of the task. In this way, the unit will not only see if it really understands its SOPs, it will also help develop "budding leaders."

While subordinate units are conducting training as described above, the battalion XO should be training the staff in decision–making processes, backbrief and OPORD briefings, syn-

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chronizing and integrating battle operating systems, displacement and other tasks. The commander participates in this training in at least two ways. First, by discussing beforehand, with the XO and S3, how the training will be conducted; what the "teaching points" will be; and what conditions will be created to ensure the teaching points will emerge, he will transmit his intent to these two most important officers. Second, the commander should be present at the appropriate time to issue guidance, receive briefings or listen to backbriefs. These times are important teaching opportunities for the commander to further explain how he operates, what he expects of subordinates and how he expects tactical problems to be solved. These times are also important in making sure that the staff SOPs are developed in consonance with the battalion commander's personality and style. Finally, they are important because by seeing his staff conduct multiple iterations of its SOPs, as is done in the line units, the commander will gain confidence that, even in his absence, staff planning and coordination will be done to standard.

Operating *Within* the Commander's Intent

I have emphasized "within" because too many leaders believe that decentralization means giving a subordinate leader a job and leaving that leader alone to do it however that leader wants. Wrong. Seldom will subordinate leaders have total freedom. The more usual case is that the leader is given the mission along with a set of constraints, within which he can accomplish it in whatever way he is able. One

> **Commanders must present their intent in such a way that it describes, in as few words as possible, the results, the commander wants to achieve or effects the commander wants to have on the enemy. The commander's intent should not be a long, drawn-out description of how the commander sees the battle unfolding—that is the concept of the operation. . . . The commander's intent is supposed to function as a control measure; it guides the subordinate leader without stifling his initiative.**

of these constraints is his commander's intent. Decentralization is freedom, not license.

While subordinates are obliged to operate within their commander's intent, commanders also have obligations to express their intent and develop their subordinates' ability to operate within it.

First, commanders must present their intent in such a way that it describes, in as few words as possible, the results the commander wants to achieve or effects the commander wants to have on the enemy. The commander's intent should not be a long, drawn-out description of how the commander sees the battle unfolding—that is the concept of the operation. Both are important. The commander's intent is supposed to function as a control measure; it guides the subordinate leader without stifling his initiative. That is, if a subordinate finds himself out of touch with his higher headquarters or that the conditions on the battlefield have presented him with an opportunity he can only take advantage of immediately, then the subordinate can use his best judgment to alter his plan and still help achieve the outcome his senior desires. Understanding of the intent guides the behavior of the subordinate leader.

Second, organize training so as to teach subordinates how to make these kinds of decisions. A commander must build ambiguity and uncer-

tainty into the training conditions. After a unit has completed its talk–through, walk–through and initial run–through training, the conditions must get tough. Objectives should not be precisely where briefed; information about the enemy must be very sketchy or incorrect; the senior commander must "die" at a critical decision point; the radio must "go out." These kinds of tough conditions, after a unit has gained initial proficiency, must be introduced regularly into training. Only by doing so will a battalion commander make sure that his subordinates will be used to making decisions and acting on their own initiative—within his intent. Of course, the battalion commander must be present at some of the AARs, so he can explain the importance of these kinds of ambiguous training conditions. Unit performance, good or bad, may become part of leader–development discussions after training.

Third, in the conduct of operations, the commander must set aside time during troop–leading procedures for briefbacks and rehearsals at every level. These items are even more important than writing a complete and "school–proof" OPORD. Briefbacks ensure that the commander has transmitted his intent clearly; that subordinate leaders understand the intent and their part in executing it; and that subordinate leaders know what is going on in other units and in other parts of the organization in support of executing the intent. Briefbacks should occur all the way down to squad. Rehearsals reinforce briefbacks. Rehearsals could include such procedures as a "human chess set" walk–through with battalion leaders during which the unit reviews the main plan and the most likely contingencies. This kind of rehearsal gives everyone an opportunity to see how each subordinate unit mission fits into the overall plan. Platoon leaders and platoon sergeants, with their radio operators, should participate in battalion rehearsals. Participation to this level ensures understanding of the battalion operation two levels down, allows all leaders to ask questions, further reinforces the commander's intent and identifies difficulties in execution. Radio operators, since they are such an

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important part of the unit, get to see firsthand how the operation is planned. This further cements the likelihood of mission accomplishment even if leaders become casualties. A second kind of rehearsal includes squads or platoons "clumped" around their leaders who, having participated in the human chess set rehearsal, explain the overall plan to their soldiers. These type rehearsals and others like them help transmit the commander's intent and increase the probability of mission accomplishment under conditions of uncertainty and lack of communication.

Last, commanders must orient their award system to recognize those leaders and soldiers who display initiative. Initiative to accomplish an assigned mission under the conditions of uncertainty should be one of the most important criteria for receiving an award. This criterion should be applied down to soldier level. Such an approach institutionalizes the importance the organization places on initiative. When a commander gives awards like this, soldiers and subordinate leaders quickly "get the word" that the unit they are in encourages initiative.

Proficiency in making decisions within one's senior commander's intent under fast–moving, ambiguous conditions can only come from education and experience. The education comes from commanders reinforcing, in their professional development programs, what each of us learns in the school system. Experience comes from commanders setting the right training conditions, then making sure the correct displays of judgment and initiative are rewarded.

Trusting Leaders and Soldiers

Trust and respect are absolutely vital to the development of the kind of climate necessary to command in a decentralized way. Simpkin goes so far as to say, "The be-all and end-all of directive control is mutual trust and respect leaving the subordinate free to act as he thinks fit in furtherance of his superior's intention."[6] I would add that from trust and respect grows confidence. That is, soldiers gain confidence in themselves, their buddies and their leaders, and leaders gain confidence in their subordinates and their soldiers when each trusts and respects the other. This is the "chain of trust" of which Simpkin talks. How does a commander create the conditions from which confidence will grow?

By formulating the question as I did above, the first important point about confidence comes to light. Confidence is not "issued," nor is it "due," nor is it in any way "automatic." Commanders can create confidence in two ways:

- Treating soldiers with dignity and respect.
- Training under tough, *well-coordinated*, realistic conditions.

These are necessary and sufficient conditions in that neither is sufficient itself; both must be present for trust, respect and confidence to grow.

About the first source of confidence much is written. I will not duplicate that here. Suffice to say, however, that no commander will gain the confidence of his soldiers if he treats them badly, denigrates their importance, keeps them in the dark, does not establish systems in which they can contribute or does his subordinates' job. Nor will a commander win confidence by saying one thing and doing another. Commanders must share hardships, demonstrate proficiency at what they expect their soldiers to do and be active listeners. In sum, commanders must lead as the Army expects them to lead.

The second source again leads us to the importance of training, *and training correctly*. In this light, training is seen as the catalyst that brings individuals together and forms them into cohesive teams. By overcoming challenges thought to be too difficult, soldiers gain respect for themselves. Respect and trust in their buddies' capabilities develop by seeing them succeeding at the same difficult task. For example, respect and trust grow when infantrymen see medics administering intravenous medication to soldiers whose MILES cards require such treatment, or when soldiers conduct live-fire exercises with their leaders participating as both tactical leaders and safeties. Then as soldiers—together, under the direction of their leaders who talk, crawl, walk, then run them through training and coach them until they get it right—master increasingly more difficult collective tasks, respect and trust grow into confidence and respect in their "team" and their leaders. All this results, *if* training is conducted correctly.

In this regard, time again enters the picture. The commander must ensure that he plans only the number of tasks that can be mastered in the time allowed. Further, each soldier must know and understand the part he plays in executing a collective task, and he must know his unit's SOP concerning executing that collective task. This knowledge, when practiced slowly under easy conditions at first, then under ever-harder conditions, will change to proficiency. Confidence evolves in the process of soldiers seeing their leaders care enough about their welfare that training is:

- Planned, prepared, executed and evaluated in such a way as to focus on soldier and unit proficiency.
- Conducted in such a way that the soldier knows what is going on; that his leaders have the time to teach him what to do and how to do it well before he is expected to perform and lead his unit, if his leader becomes a casualty.
- Conducted on tough, realistic objectives with an OPFOR out to win.
- Structured to integrate all the skills necessary to keep as many soldiers alive as possible— casualty treatment and evacuation, resupply and maintenance—not just "combat" tasks.

Under conditions such as these, soldiers know that they are developing the skills and habits during training that they will need in combat;

they know they are training as they will fight. These are the conditions that develop trust and respect for their leaders and instill confidence.

Too often, we think of training only in terms of "meeting standards" on the tasks chosen, or "checking the block" on as many METL tasks as possible in the time allocated. Such attitudes miss the main point of training—building the kind of soldier and unit proficiency from which confidence grows. Soldiers who have confidence in themselves, their buddies, their equipment, their units and their leaders win wars. Training is supposed to build that proficiency and confidence. Yet it can do so only if it is conducted correctly.

Training Standards

A unit cannot operate centralized in garrison and decentralized in the field. A commander is mistaken if he believes that such a conceptual shift is possible. Subordinates who, in garrison, are used to deferring decisions until consulting with, and receiving approval from the battalion commander will not suddenly be able or willing to make the judgments required of them in training or in combat.

Commanders are provided two incentives for developing a decentralized method of command in their units. First, the nature of combat requires it. Units with an overcentralized command habit, while they might succeed in the garrison activities of inspections, briefings, demonstrations, and the like, cannot win under the conditions of combat—uncertainty, friction, chance, danger, primordial violence and emotion. Why? For one thing, the centralized leader simply cannot be everywhere during combat. For another, the unit that waits for "word from higher" to act is a unit that will be frozen in inaction during combat. Events will simply overtake their ability to respond.

The second incentive is a mandate from FM 100–5, *Operations*, requiring commanders to develop units that operate decentrally. "In the chaos of battle," FM 100–5 says, "it is essential to decentralize decision authority to the lowest practical level because overcentralization slows

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action and leads to inertia. . . . Decentralization demands subordinates who are willing and able to take risks and superiors who nurture that willingness and ability in their subordinates. . . . [Leaders] must thoroughly understand the commander's intent." [7] The Army's keystone manual emphasizes, as this article has attempted to point out, that a decentralized method of command evolves during well–planned, well–executed training. "Commanders," the manual states unequivocally, "must . . . take time to train subordinate leaders and staff members, building their confidence and requiring them to exercise initiative. This is best done by training them to react to changes which require fast, independent decisions based on broad guidance and mission orders. Such practices enhance the morale, confidence, and effectiveness of small units and improve the performance of higher levels of command as well." [8] Decentralized command

Trust and respect are absolutely vital to the development of the kind of climate necessary to command in a decentralized way. Simpkin goes so far as to say, "The be-all and end-all of directive control is mutual trust and respect leaving the subordinate free to act as he thinks fit in furtherance of his superior's intention." I would add that from trust and respect grows confidence.

must be the method of choice. The commander must shape his unit's garrison systems to reinforce the kind of system he needs to win on the battlefield. The two systems must complement one another. Further, each precondition requires that commanders institute specific programs, policies or actions that lead to realizing each of the preconditions. In other words, commanders must view their leadership and training activities as a whole, as the collective means leading to one goal—designing a unit capable of winning in the conditions of combat, a unit which, among other things, is capable of using a decentralized method of command. Each program, policy or action is individually important, as each member of an orchestra is important—not only individually but also collectively.

Of course, following a program as outlined above is not easy in the "real world." A unit's leaders, officers and NCOs come from different backgrounds and experiences. Personnel turbulence sometimes seems to make a unit a kind of never-ending revolving door. Sometimes the leadership environment set by senior leaders is overly centralized and generally not conducive to development of a decentralized method of command. Finally, all commanders operate in the world of competing priorities and limited time. In sum, there are many "distracters" that argue against being able to develop the kind of program necessary to create a climate from which decentralized command can grow. My only answer is this: Commanders make time for the things they and their seniors deem important. If developing the kind of leaders, soldiers and units that win in the conditions of combat is not important, if commanders cannot find the time to create the five conditions required for the kind of command system our doctrine calls for, then perhaps we ought to reevaluate our priorities. While none of the obstacles mentioned will ever be eliminated, none are "show stoppers" either, if a commander is serious about designing a unit capable of winning in the conditions of combat. The result is a unit and leaders capable of using a decentralized method of command. **MR**

NOTES

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2. LTC John L. Silva, "*Auftragstaktik:* Its Origin and Development," *Infantry* (September–October 1989):6.
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4. MAJ John T. Nelson II, "*Auftragstaktik:* A Case for Decentralized Combat Leadership," in *The Challenge of Military Leadership,* ed. Lloyd J. Matthews and

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5. Richard E. Simpkin, *Race to the Swift,* (New York: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1985), 230.
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7. US Department of the Army Field Manual 100-5, *Operations* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1986), 15.
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Continuity and Change in the New World Order

Wallace J. Thies

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The Cold War is over, and the budgets are being reduced. The author offers historical precedents that suggest the United States has not learned the correct lessons from past defense reductions. He points out that despite the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the breakup of the Soviet Union, there are regions in the world that are vital to the United States.

IN 1946, General Carl Spaatz posed the question, "Why should we have a Navy at all? There are no enemies for it to fight except apparently the Army Air Force."[1] With the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, similar questions are being raised about the Army. Before the recent failed coup that signified the collapse of Soviet communism, all of the services in the United States were engaged in a dramatic restructuring aimed at reducing their size by one–third to one–half by the year 2000.[2] The transformation of the former Soviet Union from an "evil empire" to a supplicant pleading for emergency food aid has added urgency to the arguments of those who question the wisdom of spending billions to defend against a country incapable of feeding itself, much less invading its neighbors.[3]

It is not an exaggeration to suggest that the Army is about to be torn apart and put back together during the next five years. The reward for winning the ground war against Iraq in such stunning fashion will be the deepest cuts in personnel strength since the rush to demobilize during 1946 and 1947. The Active and Reserve components will decline by approximately 500,000 soldiers over the next four years, and the number of Army personnel in Europe will decline from about 215,000 to approximately 92,000. The other services will also shrink, but the burden of future cuts will fall more heavily on the Army than the Navy or the Air Force.[4] The defense of Europe against the now–dissolved Warsaw Pact appears to many Americans as "an outrageous misallocation of national treasure."[5] In contrast, sea control, power projection and

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rapid deployment—the traditional missions of the Navy and the Air Force—offer a natural complement to the policing functions implicit in the Bush administration's proclamation of a new world order.

The events of the past few years have left the future of the Army more clouded than at any time since the disengagement from Southeast Asia at the start of the 1970s. Crucial decisions are being made not in an atmosphere of calm deliberation, but in a rush to accumulate enough budgetary savings to stave off pressure from Congress and the public for even deeper cuts. How

> *The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe and the virtual collapse of central authority in the Soviet Union have created significant doubts about the mission by which the Army has defined its organizational essence for the past 20 years—the defense of Western Europe against a Soviet-led invasion.*

large should the Army of the future be? How should its units be equipped? What contingencies should it be prepared to meet? These issues are being settled largely by default, as Congress and the Bush administration cut the deals needed to muddle through another fiscal year.

This article attempts to look beyond the current euphoria about the end of the Cold War and the emergence of a new world order. Mounting pressures for substantial cuts in the Army's force structure rest on the crucial premise that military threats to national security, the Soviet threat in particular, have greatly diminished. There are, however, important historical precedents that suggest deeply ingrained tendencies in American politics toward exaggerating the importance of apparent turning points and trends in international affairs and devaluing the worth of forces in being capable of dealing with a wide range of contingencies. Before deciding what parts of the Army we can do without, we would do well

to recall our less–than–stellar record of learning from the past and predicting the future.

How Not to Identify Turning Points and Trends.

The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe and the virtual collapse of central authority in the Soviet Union have created significant doubts about the mission by which the Army has defined its organizational essence for the past 20 years—the defense of Western Europe against a Soviet–led invasion. The pursuit of that core mission has produced an Army organized around heavy armored divisions, filled with sophisticated high–tech weaponry. The recent sharp decline in the subjective probability of war in Europe has suggested to many that the Army should de–emphasize preparation for high–intensity, high–tech warfare in favor of alternative tasks such as low–intensity conflict, interdicting drug smuggling and providing disaster relief.

Before concluding that the Fulda Gap mentality that dominated Army thinking during the 1970s and the 1980s should be jettisoned completely, there are some sobering reminders from the past that should be factored into thinking about Army strategy and force structure. During the 1920s, the newly formed Soviet Union was virtually written off as an important actor in international politics by British and French statesmen, largely because it seemed inconceivable that a country so ravaged by World War I, then by civil war, and led by a band of disreputable revolutionaries could recover from such a shattering experience. Less than two decades later, the British and the French found themselves on the losing side of a contest with the Germans to gain the still disreputable, but increasingly powerful, Soviet state as an ally in the war that was about to break out in Europe. Their fear of the consequences of a frontal assault on German fortifications subsequently led the British and French to toy with the notion that the way to defeat the Germans was by attacking the Soviets in Finland.[6] Hitler, too,

Soviet tanks pull into Leipzig, Germany, after the US Third Army pulled back into its postwar occupation zone. 2 July 1945.

The Soviet Union has appeared most threatening during those periods when its internal politics seemed especially baffling to Western observers. Part of the reason why so many in the West believed that Stalin's threats and bluster were backed by a standing army of 4 million, organized into 175 full–strength divisions, at a time when the Red Army was probably only about one–half that size, was the difficulty of penetrating the veil of secrecy that surrounded the actions and intentions of the Soviet leadership.

was contemptuous of Soviet power, a mistake for which he paid dearly later in the war.

British, French and German officials were not the only ones who underestimated the resilience and ingenuity of their Soviet counterparts. John Lewis Gaddis notes that the new technology developed during World War II "had the paradoxical effect of reassuring American military planners about the Russians because they had so little of it: their Navy was little more than a coastal defense force, their air force had no capability for long–range bombing; and there seemed to be no imminent prospect of their building an atomic bomb."[7] General Leslie R. Groves, who headed the Manhattan Project, thought it would take the Soviets up to 20 years to develop an atomic bomb.[8] An Army Air Force study concluded that it would take even longer for the Soviet Union to threaten the United States: "Our Allies of today might be leagued against us tomorrow," but it would likely take from 20 to 100 years for a "Eurasian nation to grow into an aggressive–minded power."[9] As late as July 1945, General Henry H. Arnold, commander of the

Army Air Force, ruled out the Soviets as a serious threat to the West because of the primitive nature of their military power.[10] The more likely danger, in the eyes of American military officers, would come from a resurgent Germany or Japan than from a technologically backward Soviet Union.[11]

It is also helpful to recall that the Soviet Union has appeared most threatening during those periods when its internal politics seemed especially baffling to Western observers. Part of the reason why so many in the West believed that Stalin's threats and bluster were backed by a standing army of 4 million, organized into 175 full–strength divisions, at a time when the Red Army was probably only about one–half that size, was the difficulty of penetrating the veil of secrecy that surrounded the actions and intentions of the Soviet leadership.[12] The Soviet Union appeared even more dangerous during the mid to late 1950s—the period of the bomber and missile gaps—precisely because most observers were unsure of what the Soviets had already accomplished and even more uncertain of

> *US foreign policy should surely strive to continue the reconciliation with the Soviet Union that began during the 1980s. Defense policy, however, must be rooted in the recognition that great power cooperation is difficult to sustain because both parties are likely to fear asymmetries in the way in which the benefits are shared between them.*

what they might accomplish in the future.

The Soviet Union that emerged from the turmoil of the Bolshevik Revolution and later Stalin's purges during the 1930s is not the only country that has come back to haunt those who consigned it to irrelevance because of a seemingly irreversible decline. It was fashionable among academics writing during the 1970s to characterize the United States as an "ordinary country" whose moment of greatness had passed.[13] During the early 1980s, it was fashionable to question whether Western democracies had the stamina and discipline necessary to hold their own in a prolonged contest with their Eastern rivals.[14] The scholarly rage at the end of the 1980s was "declinism" and the imminent end of the American century.[15] The manner in which the United States has been transformed from the ordinary country of the 1970s to the sole superpower of the early 1990s is suggestive of the extent to which hyperbole and selective memory substitute for rigorous analysis in discussions of contemporary international relations.

It is thus a mistake to believe that the decay of the Soviet empire means that the principal threats to American security in the future will come from anti–American regimes in the Third World, antidemocratic insurgents, drug traffickers and terrorists. These are all serious problems, but even taken together, they are unlikely to equal the challenge posed by the enormous potential power at the disposal of whoever rules the territory of the former Soviet Union, or even its Russian core. Like other states, superpowers encounter periods of turbulence abroad and decay

within, but unlike other states, their recuperative powers are generally much greater. How many observers of the near collapse of the Red Army in 1941 would have dared to predict that less than a decade later the Soviet Union would have pulled itself virtually to the top of the international heap, one of two bipolar rivals locked in a global struggle with the United States? How many people living in the United States in 1975 (the year Saigon fell to the North Vietnamese) or 1979 (the year the US Embassy in Tehran was seized by Iranian militants and the embassies in Libya and Pakistan were sacked by mobs) would have predicted that less than two decades later, their country would be hailed as the victor in the Cold War and the only true superpower?

US foreign policy should surely strive to continue the reconciliation with the Soviet Union that began during the 1980s.[16] Defense policy, however, must be rooted in the recognition that great power cooperation is difficult to sustain because both parties are likely to fear asymmetries in the way in which the benefits are shared between them. A prudent observer of international relations would think long and hard before concluding that the US–Soviet rivalry has run its course. The Europe that currently looks so peaceful, so safe and so promising may yet look vastly more dangerous before the current decade ends.

How Not to Prepare for Future Wars.

Americans have been arguing with one another over how to prevent future conflicts at least since the end of World War I, but what stands out in retrospect is the gap between expectations and reality. The Army that played a vital role in staunching the German spring offensive in 1918 was virtually disbanded during 1919 and 1920. The 1920s were also a decade during which a new international order was supposedly under construction, and large standing armies were viewed as a throwback to an earlier, discredited era. It was accepted by both internationalists and isolationists, albeit for different reasons, that the Great War had been an impor-

In September 1939, the month that war broke out in Europe, the Active Army numbered only 174,000 men. Including reserves, the Army ranked 19th in the world— behind Portugal but ahead of Bulgaria. Exercises were conducted with trucks bearing signs marked "tank," and tripods substituted for real artillery pieces. The reinstitution of selective service in 1940 permitted a modest expansion, but even so, the Army a year after the outbreak of World War II [had] only six divisions.

tant turning point and that security in the future would require a decisive break with the immediate past. For partisans of the League of Nations, the crucial task was to extend the rule of law from domestic to international affairs.[17] For isolationists, it was to ensure that the events of 1917–1918 remained an aberration rather than an established line of policy.[18]

As described by Samuel P. Huntington, conflicts over US defense policy during the interwar years thus pitted "a military service and a few satellite groups" against "civilian isolationists, pacifists, and economizers." The cast of characters opposing a larger military effort varied from one issue to the next, but what remained constant was the "broad and deeply ingrained antimilitary sentiment which had characterized American society since the eighteenth century." The Army "lost its fight for universal service after World War I, [and] throughout the 1920s clashed with educational, labor, and religious groups over ROTC [Reserve Officers' Training Corps] and with other groups over industrial

mobilization preparations." "The Navy and the shipbuilding industry fought a lonely battle with the dominant groups in both political parties over naval disarmament."[19] Bereft of civilian support, neither service was able to prepare effectively for the coming conflagration.

A new world order was being forged during the interwar years, but it was not the one expected by either side in the debates over internationalism versus isolationism and preparedness versus disarmament. In September 1939, the month that war broke out in Europe, the Active Army numbered only 174,000 men. Including reserves, the Army ranked 19th in the world— behind Portugal but ahead of Bulgaria. Exercises were conducted with trucks bearing signs marked "tank," and tripods substituted for real artillery pieces.[20] The reinstitution of selective service in 1940 permitted a modest expansion, but even so, the Army a year after the outbreak of World War II "consisted of only six divisions, badly equipped, with a skeleton cadre of a few thousand officers."[21] As late as September 1941,

Florida National Guard vehicles are guided onto rail cars at the port of Zeebrugge, Belgium, during a REFORGER exercise.

As long as Europe consists of one potentially very powerful state and many smaller ones, the principal foreign policy interest of the United States will continue to be that of stiffening the will of the smaller states and reassuring them that it is safe to stand up to Soviet demands because they can count on US support. To do this well will require the presence, in Europe, of Army units capable of fighting effectively and backed by a capability to reinforce quickly.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt was considering a plan to reduce the size of the Army in order to free additional equipment for Lend–Lease aid to Britain.[22] The divisions that might have prevented the loss of most of Europe and much of Asia to Germany and Japan were not created until 1942 and 1943, after the Axis powers had already overrun much of the world.

The emergence of a bipolar world at the end of the 1940s gave rise to a very different pattern of conflict over the size of the defense budget and its allocation among the services. Prior to World War II, the principal opponents of greater military spending were a coalition of civilian groups—pacifists, isolationists, believers in the efficacy of world opinion and economic sanctions—opposed in principle to large forces in being. The Army and the Navy "seldom fought each other and virtually never helped each oth-

er. . . . Each service struggled along in its own world with its peculiarities and preoccupations, its own friends and enemies." The services engaged in *pro forma* joint strategic planning that produced little conflict between them because neither was prepared to countenance immediate claims on scarce resources for the sake of enhanced cooperation with the other.[23]

After 1945, the principal opposition to each service's efforts to evolve a doctrine and force structure suitable to the Cold War came not from isolationists and pacifists but from the other services. Bipolarity suggested that there was "only one significant contingency for all the services. Each felt that it had to justify its existence in terms of its future importance in a general war with Russia.[24] Agreement on the nature of the threat, however, did not mean harmony among those charged with preparing to meet it. Preparedness was politically popular but so too were balanced budgets and lower taxes. With the exception of the Korean War years, the civilian leadership of the Truman and Eisenhower administrations worked hard to place a ceiling on military spending.[25] Their determination to restrict defense spending for the sake of a balanced budget created a competitive political environment within which the only way that one service could gain more funds for itself was by attacking the programs and plans of another service. Budgetary feast for one meant budgetary famine for the others.

The budgetary competition was waged primarily by means of competing doctrinal pronouncements. The Air Force stressed the primacy of strategic bombing and the relative unimportance of ground and sea forces. The Army and the Navy countered with the doctrine of balanced forces: "air, sea, and land forces would all have important roles to play in the future total war and hence all three should be properly maintained in peace."[26] The more heated the competition for funds, the more vitriolic the rhetoric employed by the participants. An Air Force general publicly described the Marines as "a small bitched–up army talking Navy lingo." "Power–hungry men in uniform" was the reply

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offered by a Marine general.[27]

What is most striking about the post–World War II interservice rivalry, aside from the disparaging comments made by the services' spokesmen about their comrades–in–arms, is the gap between the roles and missions envisaged by the services and the challenges they were called on to meet. The services were agreed that the next war would be total in nature and most likely would begin with a Soviet attack on western Europe.[28] "We can be certain," General George C. Marshall wrote in his final report as Army chief of staff in 1945, "that the next war, if there is one, will be even more total than this one." Brigadier General G. A. Lincoln told a House Military Appropriations subcommittee in 1947 that "Armed forces and the nature of war, if war comes during the next few years, will in general be similar initially to the closing phases of World War II."[29] Army doctrine after World War II thus predicted that the next war would be another titanic struggle fought by mass armies, with the most likely arena of conflict being Europe. The reality was occupation duty in Germany and Japan, counterinsurgency in Greece and limited war on the Korean Peninsula.

The combination of the end of the Cold War and the triumph of US arms in the war against Iraq suggests that the 1990s are likely to witness both of these patterns of conflict over budgets and force structure, but this time played out simultaneously rather than in separate time frames. On the one hand, the prospect of a new world order, with its suggestion of unprecedented levels of multinational problem solving and cooperation among states, seems likely to result in a new round of conflict between the services and civilian groups seeking deep cuts in the defense budget in order to fund pressing domestic needs. On the other hand, if expenditures for operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm are not included, the defense budget has been declining in real terms since fiscal 1986. As the decline continues, all of the services are likely to find themselves under pressure to develop missions and supporting programs that elicit enthusiasm within the executive branch and on Capitol

Hill, and that can provide a foundation from which to compete for a larger piece of a shrinking budgetary pie. Each service's vision of what its

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missions and essential programs should be may be politically feasible when viewed in isolation from the activities and aspirations of the other services, but the missions and programs of all the services together will almost certainly not be politically feasible.

Therein lies the formula for political gridlock that suggests a recurrence of past failures to prepare effectively for future conflicts. The greater the budgetary shortfall, the greater the likelihood that the services will attempt to justify their existence by resurrecting the post–World War II doctrinal controversy over the form of military power most likely to dominate in future wars. The more the services compete for a share of a shrinking defense budget by means of doctrinal claims and innovative research programs intended to make themselves distinctive in the eyes of those controlling the purse strings, the more they are likely to stimulate opposition from civilian groups convinced that the new world order has rendered such activities increasingly obsolete. The more the services attempt to accommodate civilian idealists and economizers by justifying their existence in terms of a residual Soviet threat, the more they deprive themselves of the flexibility needed to meet the unexpected challenges that invariably arise from states and groups bent on doing harm to US interests overseas.

What Next?

The foregoing suggests that the next several years are likely to witness another prolonged and intense debate about US defense policy. Past debates have exaggerated the importance of turning points and trends in the conduct of international relations and neglected the threat posed by unconstrained power in an anarchic environment. The early indications are that the arguments employed during the 1990s will be no more enlightened than those used during previous go-rounds.

Those who argue that relatively little has changed as a result of the ouster of communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the retreat of Soviet power continue to identify the danger of a Soviet invasion as the principal threat to European security and the primary justification for a US military presence in Europe.[30] Neoisolationists, in contrast, argue that Soviet troubles at home, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the prohibitively expensive costs associated with invasion and attempted conquest have brought an end to the Soviet threat and made intra-European war "subrationally unthinkable."[31] The current debate is flawed by the tendency of both sides to identify security threats with invasions and attempted conquest, which is not always conducive to clear thinking about threats, strategies and supporting policies.

Unless and until Europe unites, it will continue to be populated by several middle, and many small, powers sharing a continent with a fallen superpower. Soviet power has declined relative to the levels of the 1980s, but even a shrunken Soviet Union is likely to remain a formidable military rival. When relatively small states share a continent with a much larger power, they usually attempt to prevent quarrels from reaching the point of hostilities. They calculate the likely outcome; conclude that resistance is futile; and adjust their behavior accordingly. A coalition of middle and small powers might well be the military equal of a much larger state, but coalitions of small states tend to shatter in the face of a hostile, larger power. This occurs because each member is reluctant to sacrifice itself so that the

others may live. Hence, small states are tempted to take refuge in neutrality in the hope that they will be the last to be eaten; and that by the time their turn comes, their adversary will have developed indigestion.[32]

As long as Europe consists of one potentially very powerful state and many smaller ones, the principal foreign policy interest of the United States will continue to be that of stiffening the will of the smaller states and reassuring them that it is safe to stand up to Soviet demands because they can count on US support. To do this well will require the presence, in Europe, of Army units capable of fighting effectively and backed by a capability to reinforce quickly. The purpose of maintaining such a presence is to convince traditional friends and allies that war is, and will remain, unlikely, and thus, the burden of avoiding war does not depend solely on their ability to placate the Soviet Union and accommodate its demands.

Outside Europe, the principal task facing the United States during the 1990s will be to resist the temptation to seek a rich reward—in the form of an excessively generous peace dividend—for the decades of effort required to win the Cold War.[33] The rush to demobilize after the two world wars suggests a natural tendency to relax one's efforts on the morrow of victory. The greater the exertions required, the more grandiose the hopes entertained after victory has been achieved. The combination of victory in the Cold War and victory in the war against Iraq thus portend a powerful reaction against the inflated defense budgets of the Reagan years.

The higher the hopes for relief from the competitive and conflictual side of international politics, however, the greater the psychological vulnerability of those who suddenly discover that it is once again necessary to confront states and statesmen prepared to use force to get their way. As early as 1947, the Truman administration had coolly calculated that defense of South Korea was not a vital foreign policy interest of the United States.[34] The belief that the United States had no vital interests at stake on the Asian mainland was one cause for the steady decline in

The belief that the United States had no vital interests at stake on the Asian mainland was one cause for the steady decline in the strength and effectiveness of the units on occupation duty in Japan. The bill came due three years later in the form of the setbacks encountered during the . . . Korean War and the quadrupling of the defense budge . . . as the services strained to rebuild the divisions and squadrons that had been dismantled a few years earlier in a fit of national absent–mindedness.

the strength and effectiveness of the units on occupation duty in Japan. The bill came due three years later in the form of the setbacks encountered during the early months of the Korean War and the quadrupling of the defense budget during the early 1950s, as the services strained to rebuild the divisions and squadrons that had been dismantled a few years earlier in a fit of national absent–mindedness.[35]

The psychological vulnerability problem suggests that attempts to carve a peace dividend out of the defense budget by writing off parts of the world as strategically unimportant is more likely to result in a self–inflicted wound than in long–term budgetary savings. The Iraqis have been ejected from Kuwait, but it is premature to conclude that the world is finally free of states and statesmen who believe that invading their neighbors offers a convenient solution to political, economic and social problems. For the Army in particular, this suggests an additional reason for having high–tech armored divisions but without sacrificing the flexibility offered by rapidly deployable light infantry and airborne divisions.[36]

Skepticism about the prospects for a new world order must, nonetheless, be reconciled with the imperatives of American politics, which currently revolve around endless budget deficits, unmet domestic needs and an electoral cycle that makes difficult the pursuit of solutions that cannot be achieved within a year or two at the most. Cuts in the defense budget need not be harmful, provided they are guided by a clear sense of what is vital and what is not—any organization that spends $300 billion per year will always have some leeway to cut without harming vital national interests.

Where, then, should the budget axe fall? The strong possibility that the international political environment, which currently seems so promising, will look much more dangerous a few years hence should raise warning flags about plans for sharp cuts in the number of Active and Reserve Army divisions. Instead of a drastic restructuring, a better way to cut the defense budget would be to forego the pursuit of new generations of weapons and equipment, which invariably cost far more than the items they are intended to replace, in favor of incremental improvements to

> *Cuts in the defense budget need not be harmful, provided they are guided by a clear sense of what is vital and what is not—any organization that spends $300 billion per year will always have some leeway to cut without harming vital national interests.*

existing designs. *Desert Storm* suggested that US weapons and equipment are already the most advanced in the world, and the turmoil in the Soviet Union makes it unlikely that Soviet technology will catch up anytime soon.[37] We also have allies capable of designing, developing and building sophisticated weapons and equipment. Added savings could be realized by sharing the burden of creating next–generation weaponry with allies rather than trying to do it all ourselves.

In sum, a strong case can be made that the implications of the new world order for US defense policy are strikingly modest.[38] International politics is still competitive and prone to interstate violence. Statesmen have not yet been transformed into angels; Europe remains central; and high–tech weaponry is being disseminated throughout the Third World, with ominous implications for the future peace and stability of important regions such as the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. It would be wonderful if the end of the Cold War also meant the end of anarchy, invasions and wars of all kind, but there is a long historical record that suggests that high hopes in this regard are much more likely to be unfulfilled than realized. **MR**

NOTES

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3. See, for example, Hobart Rowen, "U.S., World Events Justify Revision of Budget Accord," *Washington Post*, 22 September 1991, H1.
4. BG Dan Christman, "Structuring the Future Force," paper presented at the 29th Senior Conference, United States Military Academy, West Point, New York, 6–8 June 1991, 1; Stephen Alexis Cain, *Analysis of the FY 1992–93 Defense Budget Request* (Washington: Defense Budget Project, 1991), 3–4.
5. Scott Lilly, executive director of the Congressional Democratic Study Group, quoted in Rowen.
6. Eleanor Gates, *End of the Affair: The Collapse of the Anglo–French Alliance* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1981), 37–42.
7. John Lewis Gaddis, *The Long Peace* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 27–28.
8. Gregg Herken, *The Winning Weapon* (New York: Vintage Books, 1982), 98–99. See also Gaddis, 28.
9. Quoted in Perry McCoy Smith, *The Air Force Plans for Peace, 1943–1945* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), 80–81. See also Gaddis, 28.
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11. Gaddis, 28; Michael Sherry, *Preparing for the Next War* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1977), 53, 84–87, 168.
12. Matthew Evangelista, "Stalin's Post–War Army Reappraised," in *Soviet Military Policy*, ed. Sean M. Lynn–Jones, Steven E. Miller and Stephen Van Evera, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989), 283–311. See also Wallace J. Thies, "Learning in U.S. Policy Toward Europe," in *Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy*, ed. George Breslauer and Philip Tetlock, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), 164–69.
13. *America as an Ordinary Country*, ed. Richard Rosecrance, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1976).
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15. Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (New York: Random House, 1987). See also Evan Thomas, "Is America In Decline?" *Newsweek*, 22 February 1988, 62–63.
16. For the most recent account, see Don Oberdorfer, *The Turn: From the Cold War to a New Era: The United States and the Soviet Union, 1983–1990* (New York: Poseidon Press, 1991).
17. Robert Divine, *Second Chance: The Triumph of Internationalism in America During World War II* (New York: Atheneum, 1971), 6–28.
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21. Richard Smoke, *National Security and the Nuclear Dilemma*, 2d ed., (New York: Random House, 1987), 26–27.
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23. Huntington, 370–71.
24. Ibid., 373.
25. Ibid., 33–113; Warner Schilling, "The Politics of National Defense—Fiscal 1950," in Warner Schilling, Paul Hammond and Glenn Snyder, *Strategy, Politics and Defense Budgets* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962).
26. Huntington, 374.
27. Ibid., 369.
28. Ibid., 43; see also Thies, "Learning in U.S. Policy Toward Europe," 164–73.
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30. See, for example, the testimony of General John Galvin before the House Armed Services Committee, 2 March 1990, quoted in D. Michael Shafer, "Whither the Army: A New Role for a New World Order," paper presented at the 29th Senior Conference, US Military Academy, West Point, New York, 6–8 June 1991, 8.
31. John Mueller, *Retreat From Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War* (New York: Basic Books, 1989), 240; Shafer. 8.
32. For example, Belgium's abrogation of its alliance with France in October 1936. The Franco–Belgian alliance is discussed in more detail in Robert Rothstein, *Alliances and Small Powers* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), 65–127.
33. The lure of the peace dividend is discussed in more detail in Thies, "A Twenty–First Century Army."
34. Gaddis, 168.
35. Thies, "A Twenty–First Century Army," 63–65.
36. Shafer reaches a similar conclusion, although for different reasons.
37. The case for slowing work on next–generation systems is developed in detail in Gordon Adams and Lawrence Korb, et al., *Responding to Changing Threats: A Report of the Defense Budget Project's Task Force on the FY 1992–FY1997 Defense Plan* (Washington: Defense Budget Project, 1991), 24ff.
38. This point was suggested by Shafer, 5–6.

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COMMANDER's
SURVIVAL GUIDE
TO AUTOMATION MANAGEMENT

Captain Michael C. Dorohovich, US Army

As the Army continues to expand its use of computers and office automation systems, effective managment of this asset is essential. The author offers a common sense approach to automation, by asking four basic questions prior to expending money for a system. He provides some suggestions on improving computer maintenance. Finally, he offers a method when considering automation training requirements.

ARE you without a clue on how to effectively manage your unit's automation effort? Do you find yourself wondering if your automation expert has your unit headed in the right direction to get the most for the dollars you spend on computers, software, and so forth? Have you started to view automation, not some other army, as the real enemy that you face? If you answered yes to any of those questions, this article provides a few tips on how to gain a tactical advantage over that highly feared foe, the computer.

With the rapid changes in automation at brigade level and below, many commanders face what may appear as a complicated new arena to understand and manage. In the last five years, computers have gone from a tool used only by the highest echelons of the Army to a way of life all the way down to company level. Computers are not unique to the Signal Corps; commanders in all types of units now have automation management responsibilities. However, your role as a commander of automation assets is not nearly as difficult as you might think. No, I am not implying that you can ignore automation and assume it will magically work without any effort on your part. Just remember a few simple tips, and you can wisely control your unit's automation effort.

> *Far too often, individuals spend many hours developing and maintaining data bases with information that serves no real purpose. . . . [An NCO] at our higher headquarters worked for months to develop a program for tracking TMDE. The program worked well . . . but the data base required countless hours of effort to keep it current. Besides, the same information was readily available [elsewhere].*

I consider what I call a commonsense approach to automation as the most important aspect for a commander to understand. Simply ask, "Will automating a particular function save time or manpower?" If not, then do not change the way you are currently conducting business. Far too often, individuals spend many hours developing and maintaining data bases with information that serves no real purpose. For example, I can recall a case where a noncommissioned officer at our higher headquarters worked for months to develop a program for tracking TMDE (test, measurement and diagnostic equipment). The program worked well,

provided quick information on TMDE, and the individual was proud of his work. But the data base required countless hours of effort to keep it current. Besides, the same information was

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Computer–generated slides often take hours to prepare and the cost of [plastic viewgraph sheets]. . . can quickly deplete a unit's self–service supply budget. Your subordinates will strive to provide the types of briefings that they believe you want; thus, make sure you can really afford the manpower and expense before high–tech slides become the standard for all briefings in your unit.

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readily available by calling the battalion property book officer or checking the calibration printout provided by our local maintenance facility. The benefit of that program did not justify the effort required and was clearly not commonsense automation. As a commander, you must apply the commonsense rule to every computer program used in your unit.

Another dangerous result of the proliferation of computers into the Army inventory lies in the high–tech briefing syndrome. Computer–generated viewgraph slides look very professional and are great for many types of briefings. The catch is that they are time–consuming and expensive to make. We survived for years with briefings using handwritten slides. They were easy to prepare, update and, if written with a nonpermanent marker, they could be erased and reused. Computer–generated slides often take hours to prepare and the cost of the plastic sheets for the viewgraphs can quickly deplete a unit's self–service supply budget. Your subordinates will strive to provide the types of briefings that they believe you want; thus, make sure you can really afford the manpower and expense before high–tech slides become the standard for all briefings in your unit. In other words, use the commonsense automation test for briefing charts too!

Validating Automation Needs

The next step to effective automation management is knowing your real needs, nothing more and nothing less. Your computer expert usually wants the most modern hardware and software available; place yourself in the role of the honest broker.

It is easy to buy standard equipment and software packages with no specific plan for their use. As a result, most units have closets full of computer items just stored away and never used. Not every computer requires a video graphics array color monitor, modem, laser printer and every type of software on the contract. Actively involve yourself in the process of determining your actual automation needs. You do not need a detailed understanding of how each piece of equipment or software works. Just keep your mission requirements in mind and make your computer expert answer the following simple questions:

- Does it save time or manpower?
- Will it provide a new capability?
- Is this new capability really necessary?
- Will we use it frequently enough to justify the expenditure?

If the answer to any of the questions is no, then it fails to pass the commonsense automation test.

On the subject of hardware, scrutinize laptop computer purchases very closely. Laptops are more portable than desktop computers; however, they do have limitations. Their small LCD (liquid–crystal display) screens are difficult and stressful to look at for extended periods of time. The LCD screens remain somewhat sensitive to extreme temperatures. In some locations, laptop computers are more difficult to get repaired. Validate a genuine need for a laptop before purchasing it rather than a desktop computer.

Software upgrades fall under another area for potential waste. Do not automatically purchase an updated version of a program just because it is available. Most popular programs are updated every few years; yet, the upgrades often amount to minimal change. Take time to determine if your current version does everything necessary, and if it does, do not waste money to buy the upgraded version. The cost of computer equip-

Virus–checking/vaccinating programs are effective in most cases. While no program is guaranteed 100 percent effective, this purchase remains a worthwhile investment. The majority of virus–checking programs scan the system each time the operator turns it on. If a computer acquires an infection, you need to know as soon as possible to prevent further loss of data and to avoid spreading the virus to other computers.

ment is simply too high to purchase things just in case you may need them later.

Do not relax once you have identified your actual automation needs and have approved capability requirements (CAPRs) waiting for available funds. During the wait for funds (often months or years), much can change. I mentioned the fact that manufacturers periodically update software; the same thing happens with hardware. When you finally receive funds to purchase the item you need, take time to ensure that what you are ordering is still the most current version. Earlier, I discussed the evils of buying unnecessary upgrades to something that you already have. It is a different situation when you are ordering something new. Chances are that the vendor will send exactly what you order, even if it is an older version. The newest type is often available at the same, or even a reduced, cost. If the cost of the most current version is higher, then the commonsense rule applies again.

Winning the Repair and Maintenance Battle

The high cost of computers does not end with the purchase. Repair costs for this type of equip-

ment continue to soar. Like any other piece of Army equipment, preventive maintenance (PM) prevails as the key to reducing the repair bill. One effective way to ensure proper PM is to invest in a small computer maintenance/repair course for a member of your unit. In many locations, a basic course is available for just slightly more than the cost of one computer repair call, and it teaches a novice enough to make a significant difference. Most computer repairs involve nothing more than cleaning keyboards, replacing fuses, changing batteries or reseating circuit boards. All of these repairs are quick work for someone with just a one– or two–day maintenance course. Also, consider the benefit of having a soldier trained in basic computer maintenance and repair if you deploy to a location far from your current contract maintenance source.

In the event that you have a computer that frequently malfunctions, keep in mind that one of the most common causes of circuit board malfunctions in personal computers (PCs) is improper grounding. When office wiring is old and a three–pronged outlet is not available, most of us do not think twice about using an adapter that bypasses the ground. However, this significantly

increases the potential for problems in PCs. *Never* accept it as a viable alternative to connecting a computer to a grounded outlet.

Dirt is another significant factor in computer malfunctions. Unless contract restrictions or security reasons prevent such action, ensure that the inside of every computer is dusted at least once each year. This action requires some degree of caution for the safety of the individual and the equipment. Limit internal cleaning to the central processing unit (CPU). The inside of the

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Do not automatically purchase an updated version of a program just because it is available. Most popular programs are updated every few years; yet, the upgrades often amount to minimal change. Take time to determine if your current version does everything necessary, and if it does, do not waste money to buy the upgraded version.

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monitor represents a potential for serious shock, even when disconnected from the electrical outlet. Thus, do not allow subordinates to open up monitors for any reason. When disconnected from the electrical outlet, a CPU is easily and safely cleaned with a static–free brush and a vacuum cleaner. Dust often collects in the area near the fan unit in the rear of a CPU and causes overheating. In extremely dusty locations, more frequent cleaning may be needed.

Finally, establish three maintenance–related standing operating procedures in your unit and ensure the chain of command enforces them. These three necessities are:

● Prohibit eating and drinking around computer equipment. Next to dust, food and beverage damage is easily the second most common reason for malfunctions with keyboards.

● Prohibit all smoking around computer equipment. The smoke leaves a residue inside and outside of the equipment.

● Require subordinates to change internal CPU batteries instead of paying for your main-

tenance source to replace them. Changing a battery is as simple as it sounds.

A Healthy Computer

Computer viruses are another key potential source for unnecessary downtime. Three ways to beat this problem are to explicitly prohibit the use of personal software on government computers, investing in virus–checking software and backing up all data (just in case).

Every government computer user knows that personal software is not authorized on official systems. Every computer novice understands the legality problem with bootleg software. Yet, the use of personal and bootleg software appears to continue as common practice in nearly every unit. Commanders must take a firm stand on this subject. In fact, many virus cases involving Army PCs are the result of using unauthorized software that carried a virus.

Virus–checking/vaccinating programs are effective in most cases. While no program is guaranteed 100 percent effective, this purchase remains a worthwhile investment. The majority of virus–checking programs scan the system each time the operator turns it on. If a computer acquires an infection, you need to know as soon as possible to prevent further loss of data and to avoid spreading the virus to other computers. Some of the computer viruses are date– or time–activated; thus, if you have a program to scan for the problem before it is activated, you have a better chance of preventing data loss.

In the event that the previous two ideas fail to prevent a virus, you must have a backup plan. Preferably, you must periodically back up important data. It seems that we all have trouble finding time to make backup copies of disks; at least until the first time we experience the loss of key information at what always seems to be the worst possible moment. Then, we all tend to find time to back up disks.

Scrutinizing Automation Training Needs

Do not forget to consider automation training needs when you request any new computer equipment. Software classes often cost a lot.

While alternatives do not exist for some types of automation training, carefully scrutinize all course requests. Almost without exception, software manufacturers include manuals with their products. Many of the programs routinely purchased by the Army have effective tutorial programs included as part of the basic software package. Yet, we continue to spend astronomical amounts of money each year sending individuals to software training. Many of those same individuals have previously operated a similar type of program (for example, another word processing program). Thus, the transition to a new program should not be unreasonably difficult.

The majority of software produced today is fairly user–friendly, so learning most programs just takes a little initiative. Make the user try the tutorial program or read the book prior to investing in a software class and save your limited training funds for those in real need such as individuals with no prior computer experience. Some data base and graphics programs are fairly difficult and are exceptions to this rule, but, in the majority of cases, we use Army computers for word processing with easy–to–learn programs. Never lose sight of the following commonsense checks to Army automation:

- Will automating a particular function save time or manpower?
- Does that briefing really justify the time and costs associated with computer–generated slides?
- What will this new type of computer equipment do for the unit, and is it worth the cost?
- Do we need the mobility of a laptop, and does it justify the limitations when compared to a desktop?
- Does that software upgrade provide a new capability that we need?
- Did our needs change in the time between

Repair costs for this type of equipment continue to soar. Like any other piece of Army equipment, PM prevails as the key to reducing the repair bill. One effective way to ensure proper PM is to invest in a small computer maintenance/repair course for a member of your unit. . . . Consider the benefit of having a soldier trained in basic computer maintenance and repair if you deploy to a location far from your current contract maintenance source.

CAPR approval and the availability of funds?

- Did the available products change in the time between CAPR approval and the availability of funds? If so, is there a better deal out there now?
- Can we save money by sending an individual to a small computer maintenance/repair course, and what makes up our computer maintenance program?
- How are we protecting against computer viruses?
- Is that software class worth the cost, or is there a more cost–effective way to train the individual?

The ideas provided in this automation survival guide are by no means all–inclusive. They represent a starting point for you as the commander. Simply ask the right questions, much like you already do in almost every other area of your command. Few commanders are expert mechanics; yet, nobody is afraid of the motor pool. Do not let your automation expert convince you that his area is too difficult to explain to you in layman's terms. The commonsense approach can help tame the automation "beast" and harness its enormous power. *MR*

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The RUDDER in the STORM

George Washington as Senior Leader

Major William O. Odom, US Army

In this case study of General George Washington's leadership during the Revolutionary War, the author first discusses Washington's vision and how that guided him through various actions during the war. The article then describes Washington's historical, operational and organizational perspectives and how they assisted him in his decision—making process. Finally, the author recounts Washington's greatest attributes as a leader: setting the example; teaching his subordinates; and developing teamwork.

ONE WOULD not expect a general who loses all but two battles in the course of an eight–year war to be a model of senior military leadership and command. Such a performance, however, characterizes the military record of General George Washington during the American Revolution. While Americans have revered the "Father of Our Country" for over two centuries, most have focused on Washington as a national symbol of republican virtue, not on Washington the great military leader. In fact, Washington's battlefield performances have rarely drawn praise of any kind. Some historians have gone so far in their dismissal of the Ameri-

can military performance as to insist that the Americans did not win the Revolutionary War at all, claiming instead that the British lost it. Despite the tendency to reduce the significance of Washington's military contributions, two facts remain: Military resistance effectively decided the war, and Washington was the central figure in the American war effort. While Washington's battle record is difficult to defend, the quality of his leadership is unassailable. Indeed, his ability to hold his army together under great duress and ultimately lead it to victory after repeated defeats underlines his remarkable leadership and command skills.

This article is a case study of Washington's leadership performance during the American

Revolution. Its purpose is to describe and analyze a great general's vision in terms of his perspectives, imperatives and attributes in order to better understand the concept of vision and its components. The study employs a portion of the US Army's doctrinal framework for leadership described in US Army Field Manual (FM) 22–103, *Leadership and Command at Senior Levels*. Because Washington achieved his vision under the worst possible conditions, his noteworthy success warrants close examination. The study consists of five parts:

- A description of Washington's vision.
- An explanation of the relationship between his vision and his perspectives.
- An analysis of methods used to fulfill the imperatives.
- A discussion of Washington's attributes and their contribution to his success.
- Concluding remarks that summarize and assess Washington's performance as a senior leader.

By studying Washington's example, we can better understand the concept of vision and its components, as well as learn from the example of an extraordinary senior leader.

— Vision —

Vision is the senior leader's personal concept of what the organization must be capable of doing at some future point. The vision transcends mission statements and short–term goals and objectives. It sets the azimuth and boundaries for all organizational activities. In battle, commanders use the intent paragraph of an order to express their vision; in peacetime, they commonly describe their vision in command philosophy letters. The goal in either situation is to create organizations in which the whole is greater than the sum of the parts by using vision to focus and synergize the effort.[1]

Washington's vision for the American Army steered his strategy and actions throughout the American Revolution. He sought to defeat the British army with a conventional force in conventional battle. In the 18th century, this meant an army capable of delivering effective

> **[Washington] sought to defeat the British army with a conventional force in conventional battle. In the 18th century, this meant an army capable of delivering effective volley fire and maneuvering in formation in the heat of battle. . . . Guerrilla warfare and terrorism were the alternatives to conventional methods of war. However, Washington believed that the major European powers would view these unconventional approaches as acts of desperation, more typical of rebels and criminals than freedom fighters. He needed a standing army.**

volley fire and maneuvering in formation in the heat of battle. He believed that such a victory was necessary to demonstrate the power and legitimacy of the American cause. Guerrilla warfare and terrorism were the alternatives to conventional methods of war. However, Washington believed that the major European powers would view these unconventional approaches as acts of desperation, more typical of rebels and criminals than freedom fighters. He needed a standing army. Washington knew that discipline and training formed the bedrock for such an army, and that its creation and sustainment required long–term enlistees. These requirements ran counter to Colonial American military traditions. These traditions, developed in response to the unique needs of frontier defense in the North American wilderness, stressed the superiority of short–service citizen militias and unconventional tactics. Despite this opposition, Washington clung to his vision for the American Army and ultimately triumphed. To understand how Washington could have developed a vision that seemed so blatantly inappropriate for American colonists requires further examination. An analysis of Washington's vision provides

> **Washington's operational perspectives reflected his study of British military organization and practices and his experiences in frontier warfare with the Virginia Regiment. His adoption of conventional British organization and practices for the Virginia Regiment demonstrated his faith in their military system, although he also incorporated some unconventional practices into the regimental training plan ... [such as] marksmanship training, counterambush techniques and movement in difficult terrain.**

interesting insights into both his personal leadership style and the relationship between vision and its components.

— Perspectives —

Perspectives define the senior leader's base of knowledge. They are the product of study, training and experience. The Army's doctrinal framework recognizes three types of perspectives, or knowledge, on which leaders base their vision and decisions: historical, operational and organizational. The historical perspective provides leaders with an understanding of the constants of military activities and, to a lesser extent, broadens operational knowledge by providing examples of successful solutions to past problems. The senior leader develops an operational perspective through study of current doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures. A well–developed organizational perspective enables leaders to understand the limitations and capabilities of their units. Taken together, these "perspectives provide senior leaders and commanders with the personal confidence to know that the vision is correct or needs changing to conform with the situation."[2] Washington's perspectives provide some clues to

the source and nature of his vision.

Historical Perspective. Washington's limited perspectives have drawn more criticism than any other aspect of his military leadership. He had no formal military training, nor had he ever led more than 1,000 men at one time before taking command of an army of 10 times that number. He had read little military history, perhaps no more than Julius Caesar's *Commentaries* and Marshal de Saxe's *Reveries*, and these two works provided conflicting views on the conduct of war. Caesar's work emphasized destruction of the enemy army through decisive battle; Saxe advocated a more limited style stressing maneuver and siege warfare. Washington, lacking a broader historical perspective in which to anchor his decisions, was the product of an "ambiguous" strategic heritage. But, considering the paucity of military literature available in the American Colonies and the ill–defined state of the profession of arms, Washington's historical perspective was no less adequate than that of many of his European contemporaries. European Enlightenment thought, with its appeal for a return to classical republican ideals, undoubtedly influenced Washington, swaying him toward Caesar in his choice of military methods.[3] His historical perspective supported his vision of decisive battle fought by conventional forces.

Operational Perspective. Washington's operational perspectives were much broader, yet still characterized by the limiting experiences of primitive Colonial warfare and isolation from European military developments. He educated himself in current doctrine by consulting veterans and studying leading manuals of the day, notably Humphrey Bland's *Treatise of Military Discipline*, the bible of the British army.[4] He preferred the British ways of war because, despite American success with Indian tactics, the fact remained that the principal weapons of the day— the musket and bayonet—were most effective when employed by a formation of soldiers.

Washington advanced his practical military education during his service with the Virginia militia and by seeking assignments with British

A young George Washington in the uniform of a British Colonial colonel.

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forces on duty in the Colonies. While serving as British General Edward Braddock's aide during the ill-fated march to Fort Duquesne in 1754, he kept detailed notebooks on the conduct of operations and issuance of orders for accomplishment of the daily routine. Despite witnessing the disastrous British failure at the Battle of the Monongahela and the shameful retreat of the redcoats, he retained a high opinion of the British army and Braddock.[5]

Washington's operational perspectives reflected his study of British military organization and practices and his experiences in frontier warfare with the Virginia Regiment. His adoption of conventional British organization and practices for the Virginia Regiment demonstrated his faith in their military system, although he also incorporated some unconventional practices into the regimental training plan. His emphasis on marksmanship training, counterambush techniques and movement in difficult terrain borrowed from the example of British regulars such as Henry Bouquet and John Forbes, commanders who also had learned from the frontier experience. However, the primary focus remained emulation of the British standard. Regardless of the nature of terrain, the type of enemy and tactics employed, a disciplined and trained force would usually defeat a rabble. This belief was the

essence of the British system and had brought the British victory after victory on fields of battle all over the world. Washington agreed that discipline was the soul of an army and that conventional tactics decided battles. Although he shifted his preference from British to French military methods during the Revolution, this did not change his fundamental belief in the superiority and necessity of conventional warfare.

Organizational Perspective. Washington's organizational perspectives also helped shape his vision. He understood the capabilities and limitations of his forces from the outset of the war. He commanded two basic types of forces, militia and regulars. The militia were short-service troops recruited, equipped and led by the states. The regulars served longer terms in the Continental Army under national control. His views on the relative merits of these types of forces drove his decision to rely on a permanent standing army as the backbone of the American forces.

The uneven performances of the militia forces were a constant source of anguish to Washington. His earlier experiences with the Virginia militia created his disdain for short-term enlistees, and their performance during the Revolution confirmed his lack of confidence in their abilities. He cited their indolence, failure to muster, lack of weapons, disobedience, lack of march discipline, expense, failure to care for equipment and tendency to desert in the face of danger among the many reasons for diminishing their numbers in favor of a larger permanent army.[6]

The militia were not without value, although clearly Washington had no use for such forces in a conventional battle. Their ill effect on the discipline of the American regulars was such that he preferred they stay away entirely. The shortcomings of militia forces were not inherent in the quality of the individual; in fact, the militia generally attracted better-educated and healthier men than the Continental Army. But, because of their reluctance to fight beyond the boundaries of their homelands and the short duration of their enlistments, the militia were

always an unpredictable lot. The rigors of the long march and deprivations of extended field duty were too much for an undisciplined and poorly trained soldier to endure. And the militia men never stayed with the army long enough to develop soldierly qualities expected of the far–ranging Continentals. However, the militia were quite reliable for internal defense, and that is how Washington chose to use them. He recommended taking advantage of their knowledge of their home areas and, in some cases, marksmanship skills to harass enemy forces.[7] Employment of the militia as a "home guard" or economy force capitalized on their strength and kept them and their bad habits away from the Continentals.[8]

The creation and preservation of a disciplined, respectable standing army was essential to achieving Washington's vision. He believed that only a conventional force could meet both the psychological and military requirements of the budding revolution. Psychologically, the national Army served as a symbol of American unity. Its mere existence as a whole, identifiable body kept the cause alive, and this dimension of the conflict was even more important than battlefield victory. Washington was "infinitely less afraid of military defeat than of doubt and disunity within the patriot cause."[9] Ultimately, however, battle would decide the issue, and Washington believed that only a professional force could ensure victory. He dismissed popular preferences for reliance on militia on the basis of extensive personal experiences. His experience fighting with the mixed militia–regular force at Boston and the frustrating dissolution of the army upon the expiration of enlistments prompted Washington to write:

"No dependence could be in a Militia or other Troops than those enlisted and embodied for a longer period than our regulations heretofore have prescribed. I am persuaded and as fully convinced, as I am of any one fact that has happened, that our Liberties must of necessity be greatly hazarded, If not entirely lost, If their defence is left to any but a permanent standing Army, I mean one to exist during the War."[10]

> The Army's purpose was to win American independence by defeating the British army. Keeping that purpose at the forefront was a difficult task in the face of the prolonged inactivity, retreats and avoidance of battle that characterized Washington's strategy.... The Army's revolutionary zeal reached its lowest ebb following its demoralizing retreat from New York in 1776. Washington responded to the crisis with surprise attacks on enemy forces at Trenton and Princeton. The victories reversed waning enthusiasm for the patriot cause and reinstilled the Army with a sense of purpose and pride.

Later, in opposition to short enlistments and use of militia, he wrote that "such an Armament, as we had good reason to expect would be sent against us, could be opposed only by Troops [e]nlisted during the War, and where every Action would add to their experience and improvement. . . ."[11] "To place any dependence upon Militia, " he added, "is, assuredly, resting upon a broken staff."[12] The creation and preservation of a conventional standing army as both a symbol of the cause and his most potent military weapon shaped Washington's vision.[13]

Base of Knowledge. Washington's perspectives molded his vision. Whether he possessed the depth and breadth of perspective to develop the best vision for the American Army is subject to debate. By modern standards, his historical knowledge was negligible and his operational and organizational perspectives were unimpressive. For his time, however, he possessed exceptional operational and organizational knowledge and his lack of a more extensive historical perspective was not atypical. Washington's familiarity with the enemy, environment and the capabilities and limitations of Colonial troops provided him with operational

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and organizational perspectives superior to those of most military men on either side of the conflict. Moreover, only two American generals, Horatio Gates and Charles Lee, could claim more military experience. Congress chose Washington to lead the American Army not only because his Southern origins would nationalize the struggle, but also because he was among the best qualified Americans. His vision was the product of well-developed perspectives.

—— Imperatives ——

The imperatives of senior-level leadership are to provide purpose, direction and motivation to an organization. Clearly defined statements of purpose enable units and individuals to focus their actions, endure hardship and take the initiative in the absence of specific guidance. Senior leaders provide direction by setting goals and standards, developing teams, ensuring discipline and training the organization. Senior leaders motivate units and individuals by building cohesion through mutual trust, belief in a morally correct cause and sustainment of a positive command climate.[14]

Purpose. Washington realized early in his military experiences that American soldiers performed best when they understood the purpose of their activities. The Army's purpose was to win American independence by defeating the

British army. Keeping that purpose at the forefront was a difficult task in the face of the prolonged inactivity, retreats and avoidance of battle that characterized Washington's strategy of erosion. The Army's revolutionary zeal reached its lowest ebb following its demoralizing retreat from New York in 1776. Washington responded to the crisis with surprise attacks on enemy forces at Trenton and Princeton. The victories reversed waning enthusiasm for the patriot cause and reinstilled the Army with a sense of purpose and pride. Washington added to the momentum by personally appearing before each regiment to praise their performance and renew their commitment to the cause. A surge of reenlistments greeted his efforts in a personal tribute to the commander in chief.[15] Thereafter, Washington struck the enemy at every opportunity in order to remind the Army of its purpose.

Direction. Washington faced an equally daunting challenge in his effort to direct the Army toward becoming a professional force capable of defeating British regulars. The "army" he found at Boston lacked order, discipline and training. He inherited a mixture of militia and volunteer units with different organizations, weapons, equipment, rank structures and drill systems. Short enlistments and the deep-rooted militia system worked against Washington's efforts to mold a professional standing army. Nevertheless, he established the foundation for such a force at the beginning of the war and remained steadfast in his efforts to steer the Army toward professionalism.

Bringing order and discipline to the Army was the new commander in chief's first order of business. In keeping with his vision, he adopted organizations and practices modeled on those in the British army. He formed standardized regiments of 728 men organized into eight companies. Brigades consisted of six regiments. Later, he would add artillery, engineers, light infantry and cavalry to the Army. To promote order, he rigorously enforced congressionally approved Articles of War. Not surprisingly, the American Articles of War, developed by Washington while

Washington points out the condition of his
troops to his staff, Valley Forge, 1777–1778.

Washington frequently appealed to the soldiers' higher senses of duty, honor and country, but never lost sight of the . . . [need to provide] adequate care for the soldiers. At Boston, his top priority was to improve the health, supply system and wages of the soldiers. These problems were so significant . . . that at one point, [he] pulled his most competent field commander, Nathanael Greene, out of the line to take charge of the quartermaster function.

still at Philadelphia, were nearly identical to those in the British army. He immediately established rules to improve field sanitation, control access to and movement in the camp and standardize the daily routine.[16]

Washington knew that a strong officer corps was the vital organ of command without which his attempts to provide direction would falter. Without competent and committed officers, he could neither train nor discipline his army. To create and accentuate the gap between officers and enlisted men, he authorized distinctive insignia to identify officers and severely punished soldiers who failed to obey orders. Within his

limited powers to influence officer selection, he dismissed incompetent and corrupt officers and encouraged those who showed leadership potential. Few Americans possessed the leadership and command skills so badly needed by the new Army, and merely donning distinctive insignia failed to fill the void. The dearth of skilled military men drove Washington to seek assistance from foreign officers.[17]

In supporting the recruitment of European officers, Washington's actions ran counter to prevailing attitudes. Many Americans resented the appointment of foreigners to high positions. Washington held to his unpopular convictions

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because he firmly believed that he needed the technical expertise and experience of such men if he was to create a respectable, professional army. In particular, he sought engineers, artillerists and a drillmaster.

Foreign officers contributed significantly to the achievement of Washington's vision, but perhaps none more than Baron Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben. Washington charged von Steuben with training the American Army to European standards and making administrative reforms during the winter encampment at Valley Forge. The astute Prussian drillmaster modified European training methods to accommodate the independent–minded American soldiers. He simplified drill procedures and took pains to explain the reason for each exercise. Von Steuben noted that Americans learned much more quickly if they understood the purpose of the many drills and maneuvers. By the summer of 1778, the American Army had improved its rate of march and could maneuver and fire in formation. In developing a core of soldiers with skills comparable to their British counterparts, Washington had set the standard for his Army and had taken a major step toward achieving his vision. He retained von Steuben as inspector general to ensure that the Army upheld the new standards.[18]

Washington correctly noted that discipline was the soul of an army. He was a firm disciplinarian and strongly believed in the effectiveness of flogging. He quickly obtained congressional approval to increase the maximum number of strokes from 39 to 100 and liberally used the punishment. Washington dealt harshly with mutinous soldiers. When the New Jersey Line of the Continental Army mutinied in 1781, he surrounded their encampment with loyal troops. He then executed the three leaders of the mutiny, using a firing squad composed of the next 12 most prominent leaders.[19] Hanging, running the gauntlet, riding the wooden horse and fines were among the punishments administered in the American Army.[20] These punishments seem unnecessarily harsh by modern standards, but were not unusual in those harder times. Washington's approach to discipline, particularly his reliance on the lash, may not have been the best means of instilling discipline in a popular army, but it accorded with his vision of an American Army that mirrored its British opponent.

Motivation. Motivating the American Army posed special challenges. While the overarching causes of freedom and independence provided the broad rationale for enduring hardship and sacrifice, American soldiers still needed immediate and re ...r encouragement to sustain their will to fight. Washington frequently appealed to the soldiers' higher senses of duty, honor and country, but never lost sight of the primacy of self–interest and survival in humans. First among these requirements was adequate care for the soldiers. At Boston, his top priority was to improve the health, supply system and wages of the soldiers. These problems were so significant during the war that at one point, Washington pulled his most competent field commander, Nathanael Greene, out of the line to take charge of the quartermaster function.[21]

Washington believed that the Army's self–image was a critical aspect of its performance. His actions from Boston to Yorktown highlight his appreciation of the relationship between motivation and performance. At Boston, he refused to accept a letter from the British commander

because it addressed him as a private citizen rather than as an army commander. Understanding the Army's capabilities and limitations following the retreat from New York, he sought to instill pride and prevent the Army's humiliation by carefully choosing his battles. He attacked whenever permitted by his defensive strategy. His refusal to accept General Charles Cornwallis' sword from an underling at the surrender of Yorktown crowned his effort to foster a sense of pride and professionalism in his army.

Washington attempted to motivate his troops by using many standard martial incentives. He tried to bolster morale with distinctive uniforms, flags, music and badges. His efforts were not entirely successful, however. The blue and buff Continental uniforms never arrived in sufficient quantity or quality to outfit the Army. He created the Badge of Merit to honor distinguished service and service stripes to reward length of service, but they came too late in the war to have the desired effect. Despite the mixed results of this approach to motivating soldiers, it was consistent with Washington's vision of a professional army.

Personal influence was a far more effective means of motivating soldiers in the American Army. Chaplains and officers were key players. Washington, capitalizing on the importance of religion in early America, emphasized the use of chaplains to maintain morale and bolster support for the cause. However, chaplains were in short supply, so the principal motivators were the officers. Foremost among them was Washington himself, whose personal example was but one of his contributions to troop motivation. He also engaged in an active propaganda campaign to vilify the British and laud American accomplishments. He achieved remarkable results if the writings of his soldiers are a fair indicator. A message from, or personal appearance by, Washington elicited enthusiastic responses. One study of morale in the Army concluded that, without Washington, "morale would have collapsed and the revolution would have failed."[22]

Washington provided purpose, direction and motivation to the American Army to the best of

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his ability. Fluctuations in troop strength, the difficulty of enforcing discipline in a "people's army" and the lack of a competent officer corps in the early years hindered his ability to achieve his vision. Still, he constantly strove to keep the organization moving toward becoming a professional force. He always reminded the Army of its purpose, actively directed it toward the European model and motivated the force by instilling a sense of pride and accomplishment.

—— Attributes ——

Attributes define a leader as seen by members of an organization. Unit members view the leader as a standard-bearer, developer and integrator. As the standard-bearer, the senior leader establishes the ethical framework for organizational

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activity. His example of commitment and morality sets the standard for unit and individual conduct. As a developer, the senior leader teaches, coaches and trains. As an integrator, he creates the conditions for success by constantly focusing on the unit mission and relating organizational activities to the attainment of the leader's vision.[23] A senior leader's attributes form the foundation upon which the credibility of the vision rests. A leader who fails to demonstrate personal commitment or fails to make the vision the ultimate priority can never expect the full confidence and support of his subordinates.

Standard–bearer. Washington's performance as the standard–bearer for the American Army was his greatest contribution as a senior leader. He led his men in every sense of the word. He was strong, nimble, healthy, vigorous and possessed great stamina. He rode for up to an hour every morning for exercise and in his eight years as commander in chief, he left the Army but twice—and then only after the victory at Yorktown for brief visits to Mount Vernon. Moreover, he never suffered from serious illness throughout his service. Physically, he looked and acted like a commander.[24]

Washington's personal example of devotion to the American cause and commitment to the creation of a professional American Army never wavered. On the day the newly appointed general assumed command, he set the example for sacrifice and commitment by turning his back on comfortable plantation living and refusing payment for his services.[25] From that day forward, he constantly lived with the Army in the field, believing that "to share a common lot and partic-

ipate in the inconveniences... [was to him] a fundamental principle."[26] His demanding schedule is further testimony to his professionalism and commitment. Typically, he rose before dawn and remained at work into the late evening hours. Working meals were common. Administrative details and meetings occupied much of his time. He required the services of seven aides to keep up with his extraordinary workload.[27]

When time was available, he used it to improve his military skills. Washington learned quickly. He studied the latest manuals, sought advice from more experienced men and learned from his mistakes. His battle record reflects the growth of his skill. He progressed from a near–disastrous defeat in New York to a minor defeat at Brandywine creek to a narrow defeat at Germantown to a draw at Monmouth Court House to victory at Yorktown.[28] His commitment to improving his knowledge of the profession of arms set the example for his subordinates.

Washington's most visible contribution as the standard–bearer was made on the battlefield. His courage inspired his troops. Many diaries and letters of Revolutionary War soldiers cite Washington's conspicuous bravery under fire and cool resourcefulness in desperate situations. At Harlem Heights, Princeton, Germantown and Monmouth Court House, he was, perhaps recklessly, in the thick of the fighting. At Princeton, he rode to within 30 yards of the British line to rally American soldiers who had broken before British bayonet charges. By all accounts, his personal combat leadership had a profound impact on the performance of his army. Throughout the war, he led from the front. As late as the final battle at Yorktown, he dug a portion of the trenchworks and fired the first cannon.[29]

Washington's most important contribution, however, was his character. Two aspects deserve special mention: his constancy and his indomitable will. Simply put, he never wavered and he never gave up. He pursued his goal with a tenacity and resolve that one historian has described as "almost a ruthlessness."[30] No adversity could diminish his belief in the righteousness of the cause and the ability of his army to win the final victory.

He underlined this confidence with his calm, restrained manner. He was in perfect command of himself—never shaken and always dignified.[31]

As the standard–bearer for the American Army, Washington personified the qualities he sought in the envisioned organization: strong, devoted, hard–working, courageous, skilled, virtuous and, most important, possessing the indomitable will to win. These attributes, more than any other aspect of Washington's leadership, carried the American Army through to the achievement of his vision. One historian aptly summarized: "When all other sources of inspiration failed, the army's bravery and determination were sustained by his example."[32]

Developer. Although Washington's example, by itself, instructed subordinates in the art of leadership and command, the commander in chief was also an active developer of men. He viewed himself as a teacher and strove to impart his knowledge and experience to his officers. The advice he offered to them in 1775 illustrates the point: "When Officers set good Examples it may be expected that the Men will with zeal and alacrity follow them, but it would be a mere phenomenon in nature, to find a well disciplin'd Soldiery where Officers are relax'd and tardy in their duty; nor can they with any kind of propriety, or good Conscience, sit in Judgment upon a soldier for disobeying an order, which they themselves are everyday breaking."[33] Such advice was typical and reflected Washington's view of officer leadership as the critical component in the creation of a professional army.

From the outset, Washington worked to develop a competent officer corps. In addition to his efforts to distinguish officers, he took a direct interest in their performances. At Boston, he began the habit of taking his afternoon meal with the officers of the day as a means of keeping in touch with junior officers. He frequently impressed upon them the need to act with dignity at all times, avoid familiarity with the troops and lead by example. He directed his officers to familiarize themselves with French military manuals and to study their art with diligence and commitment.[34]

> **Washington provided purpose, direction and motivation to the American Army to the best of his ability. Fluctuations in troop strength, the difficulty of enforcing discipline in a "people's army" and the lack of a competent officer corps in the early years hindered his ability to achieve his vision.**

He showed trust in his subordinates by giving them wide latitude in the conduct of operations. Washington was not a micromanager. He rarely second–guessed the decisions of others, believing that their proximity to the problem usually placed them in a better position to formulate a solution. This decentralized mode of operation sometimes resulted in military blunders, but the demonstration of trust and valuable learning experience helped compensate for the loss.

Integrator. Washington also excelled as an integrator. His ability to develop teams and create the conditions for success were largely a function of his genius in the art of managing men and administrative skills. He built his team of bold, competent, committed and loyal officers. He selected talented men such as Greene, Henry Knox, Anthony Wayne, the Marquis de Lafayette, Alexander Hamilton and von Steuben to fill key positions. By frequently consulting his officers and carefully considering their views before making important decisions, he built commitment and a sense of sharing in the Army. He not only recognized talent, but "brought out the best in others by appealing to their sense of pride and duty."[35] Contemporary writings are replete with examples of those near Washington praising the commander's leadership qualities and pledging their undying support on his behalf. Washington's teams bonded so well that, after the war, they established the Society of the Cincinnati, an organization devoted to preserving the memory of their shared experiences. This accomplishment is especially

notable given the great diversity among his troops and their regional orientations.[36]

His methodical and energetic approach to the administration of the Army was also critical to its success. Indeed, most of Washington's work consisted of attending meetings and writing. Although not a polished communicator, he expressed himself clearly, logically, concisely and frequently, as evidenced by the 25 volumes of his wartime correspondence.[37] On balance, Washington's administrative performance contributed more to achieving his vision than his actions in battle. In this role, he truly created the conditions for success by skillfully managing the resources required to attain victory.

Washington sought to create an organization capable of defeating the British army in conventional battle. His perspectives, developed before and confirmed during the war, largely explain the source and nature of this vision. He steered the Army by providing purpose, motivation and direction in a manner that constantly focused it on the achievement of the vision. Ultimately, however, his success depended on his attributes as a senior leader. The leader's example is always an important component of leadership; in a desperate struggle, it transcends all others. It becomes the embodiment of the vision—a living display of everything individuals and units are to become on the road to achieving the vision. George Washington's character overshadowed deficiencies in his military skills and his lack of experience. It also compensated for the frustrating difficulties of providing purpose, direction and motivation to a force with high personnel turbulence by providing a source of stability and focus in a fluid environment. Like a rudder in a storm, his character enabled him to sustain the vision in the face of defeat and carry the American Army to its ultimate victory at Yorktown—a conventional victory won by a conventional army and the achievement of his vision. **MR**

NOTES

1. US Department of the Army Field Manual (FM) 22–103, *Leadership and Command at Senior Levels* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office [GPO], 1987), 7–9.
2. Ibid., 11.
3. Ira D. Gruber, "America's First Battle: Long Island, 27 August 1776," in *America's First Battles 1776–1965*, ed. Charles E. Heller and William A. Stofft, (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1986), 4.
4. *Writings of George Washington*, ed. John C. Fitzpatrick, 39 vols., (Washington, DC: GPO, 1931–1944), 1:255. Hereafter cited as *GW Writings*.
5. Don Higginbotham, *George Washington and the American Military Tradition* (Athens, GA: The University of Georgia Press, 1985), 14–15.
6. Ibid., 23–24; *GW Writings*, 1:492–94, 499–504 and 2:16.
7. *GW Writings*, 12:19.
8. James T. Flexner, *George Washington in the American Revolution (1775–1783)* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1967), 193; *GW Writings*, 11:236.
9. Flexner, 533.
10. *GW Writings*, 6:5.
11. *GW Writings*, 6:165.
12. *GW Writings*, 6:110–11.
13. Flexner, 294–96. Certainly, the idea of fighting an unconventional war using guerrilla forces had occurred to Washington. Both military and political reasons explain his rejection of guerrilla warfare in favor of conventional organizations and tactics. A guerrilla army could not represent one people and their cause as well as a unified army. Also, disciplinary incidents were difficult enough to control in a structured army; indiscriminate guerrilla bands might well have lost the crucial war for public opinion by plundering in the name of independence. The bloody clashes between Whigs and Tories in the Southern campaigns of 1780–1781 gave some indication of what could have taken place throughout the country.
14. FM 22–103, 13–15.
15. Russell F. Weigley, *History of the United States Army* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1967), 39–41; Higginbotham. 75.
16. John E. Ferling, *The First of Men: A Life of George Washington* (Knoxville, TN: The University of Tennessee Press, 1988), 126; Richard H. Kohn, "American Generals of the Revolution: Subordination and Restraint," in *Reconsiderations on the Revolutionary War*, ed. Don Higginbotham, (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1978), 107; Higginbotham, *George Washington and the American Military Tradition*, 51–52.
17. Ferling, 127.
18. Charles Royster, *A Revolutionary People at War: The Continental Army and the American Character, 1775–1783* (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1979), 240.
19. Weigley, 59,63.
20. Lynn Montross, *Rag, Tag and Bobtail: The Story of the Continental Army. 1775–1783* (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1952), 44–45.
21. Higginbotham, *George Washington and the American Military Tradition*. 89–90.
22. Allen Bowman, *The Morale of the American Revolutionary Army* (Washington, DC: American Council on Public Affairs, 1943), 104.
23. FM 22–103, 9–11, 16.
24. Marcus Cunliffe, "George Washington: George Washington's Generalship," in *George Washington's Generals*, ed. George Athan Billias, (William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1964; reprint, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1980). 3–4; Ferling, 259.
25. Cunliffe, 3–4.
26. Montross, 348.
27. Ferling, 254, 258.
28. John R. Alden, *George Washington: A Biography* (Baton Rouge. LA: Louisiana State University Press. 1984), 304–6; Ferling, 265; Higginbotham. *George Washington and the American Military Tradition*. 119.
29. Alden, 145; Bernhard Knollenberg, *Washington and the Revolution: A Reappraisal* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1941), xi; Cunliffe. 3–4; Higginbotham, *George Washington and the American Military Tradition*, 73–74.
30. Ferling, 115.
31. Ferling, 115; Barry Schwartz, *George Washington: The Making of an American Symbol* (New York: The Free Press, 1987), 164 In private letters, he occasionally expressed doubt and frustration, but he always appeared optimistic in public.
32. Schwartz, 168.
33. Higginbotham, *George Washington and the American Military Tradition*. 16, 70–71.
34. Ferling, 127.
35. Garry Wills, *Cincinnatus: George Washington and the Enlightenment* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company, Inc.. 1984), 106.
36. Higginbotham, *George Washington and the American Military Tradition*. 76–77; Schwartz, 254; Ferling, 72.
37. Cunliffe, 3–4, 16; Schwartz, 25.

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Military Support of the National Drug Control Strategy

Colonel Joseph L. Bergantz, US Army

The war on drugs is being fought on a daily basis throughout the United States. The author looks at the role the military should play in this war, first examining the legality of using the military for this role and pointing out what duties the Congress has assigned to the Department of Defense. He then discusses the justification for military involvement in the drug war. Finally, he offers his views on how the military forces can assist the other drug and law enforcement agencies in waging this war.

PRESIDENT George Bush has declared war on drugs. It seems logical that if a "war" on drugs is being waged, then certainly the military should play a major role in that war. However, before jumping to that conclusion, several key questions should be answered. First, should the military even be involved? Second, if involved, what is the proper military role? And last, but not least, what are the constraints on military involvement? To answer these questions, one must examine the military contribution to achieving a National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS). Once convinced that the military should be involved, the next step is to develop a logical Military Drug Control Strategy (MDCS) that supports the national strategy. The purpose of this article is to analyze our current drug control strategies, point out shortcomings and make specific recommendations for improvement. With this purpose in mind, it is important to understand the latest legislation and guidance pertaining to drug control.

Pursuant to the Anti–Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Bush issued his original NDCS in September 1989. Since that time, two subsequent companion volumes have been published, with the latest dated February 1991. This latest doc-

> *Both Congress and the administration feel strongly on this matter. . . . Clearly, drugs attack the physical and social health of the American way of life. Thus, recent national policy, congressional law, national will and, most important, national security demand military involvement in drug control.*

ument follows closely and expands the concepts of the previous two, focusing not only at the federal level, but also at the state and local levels. Furthermore, both the supply and demand sides of the drug equation receive increased attention internationally, as well as domestically. Colombia's former president, Virgilio Barco Vargas, recently stated that "the only law that drug traffickers do not violate is the law of supply and demand."[1] In this context, a well–balanced drug control strategy must attack both supply and demand. However, the military can most affect the supply side of the equation.

Congress, through statutes, has assigned to the Department of Defense (DOD) the duties of:

- Acting as the lead agency in the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs to the United States.
- Integrating US command, control, communications and intelligence (C^3I) assets dedicated to drug interdiction into an effective communications network.
- Approving/funding state governors' plans for expanded use of the National Guard in

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A current strategy should be developed that focuses on the present and one to two years in the future. This strategy looks at near–term objectives (ends), based on existing resources (means) and reasonable concepts of operation (ways).

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drug control within state borders.[2] As a result of this congressional action, the military now has a de facto drug control mission.

In answer to the question, "Can the military legally be given this mission?" current policy permits the military a support role to law enforcement agencies. This is possible because the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, which regulates the use of military forces in civilian law enforcement, was amended in 1981, allowing the military to:

- Loan equipment, facilities and people to law enforcement agencies.
- Operate equipment to monitor and communicate movement of air and sea traffic.
- Participate in interdiction support operations if a joint declaration of emergency exists.

However, the military may not conduct searches, seizures or arrests; nor may it participate if readiness is adversely affected.[3] Thus, the stage has been set to legally permit increased military involvement due to relaxation of previous restrictions.

Since the legal question is satisfied, now let us ask, "Should the military be involved?" The answer is "Yes." Military involvement is justified, when looking at drug control in the national context, for several reasons. Drug trafficking

poses a national security threat, and in its role as protector of the national interests against such threats, the military should definitely be engaged. Since a national strategy has been developed to address this threat, the military, as one of the elements of national power, should likewise develop a supporting strategy. Furthermore, for certain missions and roles, the military has unique capabilities (for example, strategic intelligence assets for intelligence gathering, analysis and dissemination). Also, the Armed Forces are functionally organized to augment law enforcement agencies in interdicting illicit drugs via aerial, land and maritime transit with Air Force, Army/Marine and Navy/Coast Guard forces, respectively. In addition, military forces have the necessary operational and logistic capabilities in place to interdict drugs on the high seas and outside US land borders and territorial air space. And finally, the intangible element of national will is now calling for employment of the military.[4]

Supporting the Drug War. Both Congress and the administration feel strongly on this matter. Congressmen Les Aspin and Dan Nichols have claimed, "In recent years, it has become abundantly clear that international drug trafficking is a national security matter."[5] Bush has stated that our nation's number one concern is the drug problem.[6] Clearly, drugs attack the physical and social health of the American way of life.[7] Thus, recent national policy, congressional law, national will and, most important, national security demand military involvement in drug control.

To ensure proper execution of the military role in drug control, our military strategy must dovetail with, and support, the national strategy. The military strategy must have identifiable objectives (ends) that protect national interests; strategic concepts (ways) that describe how the job will get done; and resources (means) that describe what it will take to support the concept.[8] These three elements of military strategy must be kept in balance. The further out of balance any one element becomes, the greater the risk that the strategy will fail. Another facet of military

A Texas guardsman assists Customs Service personnel during an inspection of goods entering the United States.

Military involvement is justified, when looking at drug control in the national context, for several reasons. Drug trafficking poses a national security threat, and in its role as protector of the national interests against such threats, the military should definitely be engaged. Since a national strategy has been developed to address this threat, the military, as one of the elements of national power, should likewise develop a supporting strategy.

strategy is its two–dimensional existence in time: the *current* strategy is here and now, while the *mid–range* strategy looks 10 years ahead.[9]

The latest volume of the NDCS has taken the first step toward a two–dimensional time approach by including a mid–range strategy. However, the NDCS is not written in the classical sense, that is ends, ways and means. Rather, it is more or less a detailed policy statement with specific measurable goals. Thus, the goals equate to ends, while the ways and means are left to the discretion of Congress and the various departments.[10]

A fully supportive MDCS would enhance the likelihood of the president's achieving his desired end state for the year 2000. The MDCS would further detail the ends, ways and means to obtain that goal. Another benefit from such a detailed approach is that it facilitates defining the rationale for required resources, hence becomes a natural tie–in to the budget process.[11]

Along with this mid–range strategy, a current strategy should be developed that focuses on the present and one to two years in the future. This strategy looks at near–term objectives (ends), based on existing resources (means) and reasonable concepts of operation (ways).[12]

Thus, it appears that the NDCS is evolving slowly toward a traditional ends/ways/means strategy, with a two–dimensional time element. Although the NDCS may never become a strategy in the "classical" sense, it remains an extremely important document in its own right. Thus, as the NDCS begins to gel, a MDCS can be developed to blend with it.

The development of the MDCS has progressed somewhat slowly. Possibly, this is attributable to a reluctance among the services to take on another mission during times of dwindling budgets and force structure. In addition, the Armed Forces were focused most recently on operations *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm*

for a significant period of time.

In retrospect, the $150 billion annual drain on the US economy due to drugs, plus the $60 billion to $80 billion cost associated with absenteeism, medical expenses, inefficiency, and so

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The most important area militarily is intelligence, since possibly the greatest resource the DOD can bring to the table is its intelligence network, ranging from the tactical, through the operational, to the strategic level.

Since drug traffickers have developed sophisticated intelligence networks of their own, counterintelligence efforts should be waged against them. . . . Intelligence support for psychological operations could enhance acceptance of drug control programs in source countries.

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forth, exceeds the monetary cost of *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm*.[13] Thus, the relative importance of the drug problem is undeniable. Therefore, the military, along with supported law enforcement agencies, must become proactive in developing a comprehensive MDCS based on the model described above. As an added incentive, Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney has elevated the drug control mission priority of selected specified and unified commanders.[14]

In examining the current military strategy, both the ends and the means are fairly straightforward to develop, while the ways are much more difficult. In progressing to the mid–range military strategy, more time and effort will obviously be required, since the ends, ways and means projected to the turn of the century will be much harder to define. It is not so important that the mid–range strategy be exactly correct; but rather, that it provides at least broad guidance for programming and budgeting and presents desired and reasonable objectives with general concepts for achieving them. Such a strategy can be

updated annually or more often, if necessary.

As mentioned earlier, certain broad objectives have been determined for the military, in the form of congressional mandate and the NDCS:
- Take the lead in detecting/monitoring illegal transit of drugs.
- Integrate C^3I assets for drug control.
- Approve/fund state governors' plans for expanded use of the National Guard in drug control.

C^3I and information management systems are inextricably linked to each of these three military duties, either explicitly or implicitly.

Therefore, to succeed, the military must upgrade available C^3I and information management assets or procure new equipment/manpower as needed. However, the trend, for the past three years, has been to underfund these programs. For example, intelligence has received roughly .9 percent of the total national drug budget during that period.[15]

Military Intelligence. Ironically, the most important area militarily is *intelligence*, since possibly the greatest resource the DOD can bring to the table is its intelligence network, ranging from the tactical, through the operational, to the strategic level. Unfortunately, Fiscal Year 1992 drug control funds requested for intelligence efforts are $114 million, compared to $108 million the previous year. This reflects a modest growth rate (only a 6 percent increase) and appears grossly inadequate.[16]

With the drawdown of forces, many intelligence assets are now available to be diverted to drug interdiction hot spots. For example, an Army intelligence aerial exploitation battalion in Germany, instead of being deactivated, could be diverted to the Caribbean, Panama, El Paso or wherever needed. Initial funding to maintain such units on active duty could be shifted from other counterdrug accounts such as the Drug Enforcement Administration. In the meantime, DOD could program and budget for these units through the normal budget cycle.

Both tactical and operational intelligence efforts should be enhanced significantly by judicious funding increases such as proposed

above. In fact:

"It is both tactical and operational intelligence which are most keenly sought, since they are most clearly and immediately linked to outcomes by which enforcement agencies are evaluated—successful investigations, prosecutions, and interdictions."[17]

While tactical and operational intelligence successes are important, it is likely that strategic intelligence is most important. For it is strategic intelligence that would give "detailed information: on structure and performance of drug markets; on economic, political and social features of source countries that constrain their responses to the drug problem; and on efforts of different policy mixes on the behavior of both markets and countries."[18]

All too often, we are fooled by successes at tactical or operational levels. Many times, such successes are only minor setbacks to the drug traffickers, who are quite resilient with resources and personnel. Also, strategic intelligence would give national decision makers the complete picture so that they could make better–informed decisions when setting national drug policies and priorities. Therefore, funding for strategic intelligence should be boosted at once.

Two additional areas exist where increased intelligence efforts could bear fruit. First, since drug traffickers have developed sophisticated intelligence networks of their own, counterintelligence efforts should be waged against them.[19] Second, intelligence support for psychological operations could enhance acceptance of drug control programs in source countries.[20] In both cases, DOD has unique units for conducting such operations that have not yet been tapped. Prudent use of such units could help further define the military role, as well as minimize coordination efforts, since DOD has been assigned C^3I responsibility.

The last recommendation to improve intelligence concerns the establishment of a National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC). Such an agency is crucial since no organization currently exists that integrates, analyzes and disseminates intelligence from all levels and re-

Georgia guardsmen fly Mohawks during drug surveillance operations.

There are many other areas in which the military can help support the drug control effort. Some of these involve the demand side of the drug equation such as providing correctional facilities, rehabilitation and training programs in the military and DOD schools.

ports to national–level decision makers. Thus, strategic intelligence will never reach its full potential until such an organization is operational. The establishment of the NDIC has progressed slowly due to a logjam between Congress and the Bush administration. However, efforts are continuing to establish an NDIC in Johnstown, Pennsylvania.[21] Once this organization is on line, it is crucial that sufficient operational funding be programmed and budgeted for it.

To a certain extent, the areas of C^3I management are receiving needed attention. For example, the military is already making great strides in acquiring radio and telephone communications equipment that will be both interoperable among the agencies and secure. In addition, command and control relationships are being streamlined, and satellite communications terminal capabilities are being addressed.[22]

In examining information management, DOD has taken positive steps to achieve interconnectivity between different user data bases. This promotes information sharing in a more timely manner. Thus far, DOD has linked the El Paso Intelligence Center, Joint Task Force

> *In retrospect, the $150 billion annual drain on the US economy due to drugs, plus the $60 billion to $80 billion cost associated with absenteeism, medical expenses, inefficiency, and so forth, exceeds the monetary cost of Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Thus, the relative importance of the drug problem is undeniable.*

Command centers and US Customs Service C³I centers East and West.[23]

While much has been accomplished with these efforts, there still remains a great deal to do. These areas, in addition to intelligence, should be given increased emphasis in both the current and mid–range MDCS and funding should increase accordingly.

There are many other areas in which the military can help support the drug control effort. Some of these involve the demand side of the drug equation such as providing correctional facilities, rehabilitation and training programs in the military and DOD schools. However, the

military's contribution to supply–side reduction can produce the greatest results.

The military definitely should be involved in the drug war. Though still evolving, a proper military role in the war can, and will, be established over time. A logical method for determining this military role is to first develop an MDCS with the traditional elements—ends, ways and means—and the two time components (current and mid–range). Furthermore, the constraints placed on military involvement by the revised Posse Comitatus Act and DOD guidance must be carefully articulated by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and then clearly recognized by the military commands involved.

As the military successfully converges on its MDCS, a proper role in drug control will be a natural byproduct. A well–thought–out MDCS will enhance fighting the drug war, not only through *efficiency* resulting from increased emphasis on C³I and information management but more important through *effectiveness* attained through involvement of strategic intelligence and creation of an NDIC. Only by optimizing both efficiency and effectiveness can we ultimately win the drug war. *MR*

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"Ike" Takes Charge

Lieutenant Colonel Cole C. Kingseed, US Army

The first six months of 1942 were not pleasant for Brigadier General Dwight D. Eisenhower. Summoned to Washington, D.C., by US Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall to serve on the War Department General Staff, Eisenhower was not pleased at the prospect of spending another war behind a desk. He had missed combat action in World War I because he was commanding a training camp for the fledgling tank corps at Camp Colt, Pennsylvania. Aside from a brief tour as an infantry battalion commander in 1940, he had spent the majority of his career as a staff officer. Writing to his old friend George S. Patton Jr., Ike voiced his frustration and stated that it had been a personal disappointment *to come to Washington.*[1] Still, Eisenhower knew war was too serious a business to worry about anyone's personal preferences for combat duty. If the chief of staff needed him in Washington, he would do his duty.

Despite Ike's personal dissatisfaction with his desk job, the time he spent at Marshall's side was critical to his professional development. From the outset, Marshall tested and entrusted his subordinate with increasing responsibility. An examination of the War Department's official records and Eisenhower's personal papers suggests that Marshall, like General Douglas MacArthur before him, soon saw Eisenhower as the best officer in the US Army.[2] Ike's close association with Marshall in 1942 not only witnessed his transition from a Pacific strategist to a grand strategist but also prepared him for the historic role he was to play in the ultimate Allied victory.

Eisenhower arrived in Washington in the immediate aftermath of Pearl Harbor and joined the War Plans Division of the War Department as deputy chief for the Pacific and Far East. Marshall's selection of Eisenhower was based on the evaluation of Eisenhower by those whom Marshall respected, Marshall's own impressions gained during the Louisiana Maneuvers and Eisenhower's knowledge of the Philippines, where he had served as MacArthur's senior aide from 1935 to 1939.[3]

No sooner had Eisenhower arrived than Marshall assigned him the task of determining what the Army's general line of action should be in the Pacific.

Asking for a couple of hours to collect his thoughts, Eisenhower returned to his desk. At dusk, he returned to Marshall and succinctly outlined a course of action that included the use of Australia as a base of operations. He advised Marshall to begin a program to expand the facilities there and to secure the lines of communications from the West Coast to Hawaii and, then, on to Australia.[4] Marshall concurred and told Eisenhower to take the necessary steps to save the garrison in the Philippines. Eisenhower had passed his initial test with the chief of staff.

During the next several months, Marshall quietly groomed Eisenhower for positions of increased responsibility. Eisenhower was exactly the type of officer whom the chief of staff wanted in the War Department. As Marshall informed Eisenhower in their

June 1942

Major George J. Mordica II,
US Army Combat Studies Institute, USACGSC

Monday 1—German bombers conduct air attack on Canterbury, England, in retaliation for British raid on Cologne, Germany.

Mexico declares war on Germany, Italy and Japan.

Thursday 4—The decisive Battle of Midway is fought 4 to 6 June, marking a turning point in the war in the Pacific.

Friday 5—The United States declares war on Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania.

Sunday 7—Japanese forces land on North American territory by invading the western Aleutian Islands of Attu and Kiska.

Tuesday 9—The village of Lidice is obliterated as revenge for the assassination of SS commander for Czechoslovakia, Reinhard Heydrich.

All formal resistance in the Philippines ends.

Friday 12—US bombers based in Egypt raid the African Ploesti oil fields.

Saturday 13—The British Eighth Army suffers a staggering defeat from Field Marshal Erwin Rommel in North Africa.

Wednesday 17—Rommel completes isolation of the Tobruk garrison.

Sunday 21—Tobruk falls to Rommel, leading to his promotion by Adolf Hitler to field marshal on the 26th.

Monday 22—The Continental United States is attacked for the first time since the War of 1812, as a Japanese submarine shells Fort Stevens, Oregon.

Wednesday 24—Major General Dwight D. Eisenhower is appointed commander of the European Theater of Operations, US Army (which supersedes the US Army Forces in British Isles).

Rommel's forces continue offensive to Sidi Barrani, Egypt, with British forces in withdrawal.

Thursday 25—General Sir Claude J. E. Auchinleck takes command of the British Eighth Army, relieving General Neil M. Ritchie.

Friday 26—All British forces ordered to pull back to El Alamein, near Alexandria, Egypt.

Sunday 28—Germans launch main summer offensive in the Soviet Union, from Kursk toward the Don. The Soviets lose ground at Sevastopol.

Tuesday 30—The Soviet High Command orders the Black Sea Fleet out of Sevastopol and issues an evacuation order.

initial meeting, "Eisenhower, the Department is filled with able men who analyze their problems well but feel compelled always to bring them to me for final solution. I must have assistants who will solve their own problems and tell me later what they have done."[5]

Shortly thereafter, Eisenhower met a second test when Marshall, knowing how desperately Ike wanted a field command, informed him that promotions were going to the commanders in the field, not staff officers serving in the War Department. Never known for a mild temper, Eisenhower exploded. "General, I'm interested in what you say, but I want you to know that I don't give a damn about your promotion plans as far as I'm concerned. I came into this office from the field and I am trying to do my duty. I expect to do so as long as you want me here. If that locks me to a desk for the rest of the war, so be it!"[6]

Even Marshall was taken aback, but Eisenhower's fiery outburst only confirmed what Marshall had come to expect from his subordinate—complete candor and devotion to duty. Promotion, incidentally, did come on 27 March. Eisenhower discovered that Marshall had personally recommended his promotion to major general to President Franklin D. Roosevelt. In his recommendation to the president, Marshall informed Roosevelt that Eisenhower was not really a staff officer but his operations officer, a sort of deputy commander in charge of coordinating grand strategy.

The promotion followed Eisenhower's appointment as chief of Operations Plans Division (OPD) on 23 March. The OPD was specifically charged with the preparation of plans and policies and supervision of activities concerning the strategic employment of the Army of the United States. It also constituted the command post for the strategic direction of the Armed Forces in the various theaters of operations.[7] As Marshall's chief operations officer, Eisenhower soon became more aware of Marshall's strategic commitment to an amphibious invasion of Germany from England. By 25 March, Eisenhower had completed a rough plan of the subsequent invasion of Europe. In a memorandum to Marshall, Eisenhower outlined the critical steps to be taken in the development of what he termed the coordinated viewpoint to major tasks of the war.[8]

Confirming his transition from a Pacific strategist to a global strategist, Eisenhower proposed that the principal target for the United States' first major offensive should be Germany, to be attacked through Western Europe. Marshall made several revisions and submitted the final draft to the president, who strongly endorsed the proposal. Armed with the memorandum, Marshall then traveled to England to secure an overall agreement of the plan with the British and to discuss the US buildup plan (code–

named BOLERO) with Major General James E. Chaney, commanding general, US Army Forces in British Isles. Chaney was charged to prepare for the possible establishment of US Army Air Forces, United Kingdom, in anticipation of a subsequent invasion of the Continent.

When Marshall returned from an inspection visit to England, he asked his chief of the OPD to study the type of organization needed for the headquarters he proposed to establish in London. Not only did Eisenhower outline the organization, but he also prepared a secret memorandum for Marshall in which he discussed the type of officer to serve as commanding general, US Forces.

As a first condition, the designated commander ought to enjoy the fullest confidence of the chief of staff in order that he might efficiently, and in accordance with the basic ideas of the chief of staff, conduct all the preparatory work essential to its successful initiation. Next, he should be an officer who would fit perfectly into the final organization—no matter what that might be. If Roosevelt directed Marshall to proceed to London and take command of a subsequent invasion force, the officer previously serving as commander should be one who could fit in as a deputy or as a chief of staff.[9] Consciously or

unconsciously, Eisenhower was describing himself, for he, more than anyone else, had Marshall's complete confidence and understood the intricacies of the latter's strategic thinking.

Perhaps Marshall had already decided on Eisenhower's appointment because the chief of staff immediately dispatched Ike to England, ostensibly to observe BOLERO preparations.[10] Left unsaid was Marshall's deep suspicion that BOLERO was not progressing in accordance with his expectations. From Eisenhower's perspective, the reason for his visit, which lasted from 23 May to 3 June, was an uneasy feeling that either the General Staff did not understand Chaney and his staff in England or Chaney did not understand Marshall.

Ike's visit confirmed his own and Marshall's worst fears. Upon his return, Eisenhower noted in his files, "Our own people are able but do not quite understand what we want done. It is necessary to get a punch behind the job or we'll never be ready by spring, 1943, to attack. We must get going!"[11] Clearly frustrated at what he had seen in England, Eisenhower quickly revised his earlier memorandum in which he had outlined the organizational framework for a European Theater of Operations (ETO). Handing the memorandum to Marshall, Eisenhower urged him to read it

carefully because it was likely to be an important document in the further waging of the war. Marshall's reply was characteristically succinct, "I certainly do want to read it. You may be the man who executes it. If that's the case, when can you leave?"[12]

On 11 June, Marshall designated Eisenhower as commanding general, ETO, with headquarters in London, effective 24 June 1942. Ike flew to England on 23 June with a directive "to prepare for and carry on military operations in the [ETO] against the Axis forces and their allies."[13] In keeping with his new position, Eisenhower was promoted to Lieutenant General on 7 July.

In retrospect, Marshall's selection of Eisenhower seemed a foregone conclusion. For six months, he had quietly groomed Eisenhower for command. During that time, Ike had met every challenge and passed every test Marshall had thrown his way. Only a lieutenant colonel two years earlier, now Lieutenant General Eisenhower held the principal Army command in the decisive theater of the war. In promoting Eisenhower to his post in England, Marshall set Eisenhower on the road to the supreme command in Europe and his personal rendezvous with destiny. **MR**

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Insights

Army Support Force Generation: The Baskin–Robbins Analogy
Captain John M. Britten, US Army

Recent mobility studies by the joint staff and Office of the Secretary of Defense have again illuminated the fact that the differences between the US Army and US Marine Corps extend beyond hair style; there are also significant differences in missions and in the way each service generates support force requirements. Because these differences weigh heavily on budget, force deployment, war gaming and strategic mobility decisions, understanding them is becoming increasingly important. The following may help explain the sizable Army logistic tail in an era of force reduction.

If my wife looked out the window at the park across the street, noticed the great number of people sweltering in the heat and decided to take advan-

All References to commercial enterprises are for purposes of analogy only and are not intended to convey any impression that the Department of the Army favors, sponsors or recommends a particular company. As a continuing policy, the Department of the Army does not endorse any seller or product.—Editor.

tage of the associated money–making potential that afternoon, she might take a package approach similar to that of the Marine Corps. She would act decisively and move very quickly. She would drive to the post exchange (PX) and buy an ice–cream machine, a bag of salt, a nut grinder, a syrup dispenser and a large Styrofoam cooler. On the same trip, she would go next door to the commissary and buy ice, a bag of nuts, chocolate syrup and enough ingredients to make a day's worth of ice cream. This complete ice–cream package would fit handily in the station wagon, minimizing the number of times the children would need to be transferred in and out of their car seats. At home, she would quickly set up shop and begin selling cones and sundaes without making a return trip to the crowded commissary.

The Marine Corps also uses a package approach to deploy and sustain its forces. Stationed on large, pre–positioned ships (station wagons), a Marine expeditionary force (MEF) furnishes a packaged array

of tanks and armored personnel carriers that provide an immediate, deterrent and lethal capability. Supporting artillery, aviation, air defense and engineer assets assure effectiveness of the force while maintenance companies, signal companies and truck companies support the combat operation. Sufficient food, water, ammunition and other consumable supplies are stocked to sustain the operation for 60 days. The MEF package supports the Fleet Marine Force mission "to serve with the fleet in the seizure and defense of advanced naval bases and in the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign."[1]

Now, suppose I become so impressed with my wife's initiative that I decide to start an ice-cream stand business of my own which, at the same time, would support my wife's continued efforts. Starting a business is much more complicated than selling ice cream for an afternoon. It involves greater commitment, more planning and, most important, long-term sustainment. I would determine the strategic locations and optimum number and types of ice-cream stands that would ensure maximum profit. I would carefully consider personal tastes: in one sector of the park, sherbet cones might sell better; while in another, sundaes might be more popular. My plan would include supporting my wife's foothold, as well as my business's long-term success and sustainment.

This concept of *tailoring forces* to meet objectives is one of the major differences in Army and Marine Corps force planning. The Marines need to move fast to establish a foothold and support the naval campaign (such as securing port facilities in Kuwait); accordingly, there is little time to tailor their efforts. The Army, on the other hand, must take advantage of the initial lessons learned by the Marines in their operation, and must plan and optimize its force mix to accomplish the ultimate military objective (such as driving Iraqi forces from Kuwait).

After carefully assessing the number, types and locations of the ice-cream stands to best accomplish my mission, I would go to the PX and buy several ice-cream making packages, similar to the one my wife purchased. I would get them on the ground quickly to deter neighborhood competition and to reinforce her original foothold. Then, I would have the real challenge to sustain each of my vendors. I would need to buy a truck to deliver ice, salt and bulk ingredients to each vendor.

This exemplifies another major difference between Army and Marine Corps sustainment. While MEFs rely on pre-positioned war reserves to sustain their operations for up to 60 days, Army forces deploy with only three to seven days of sustainment

but must quickly establish lines of communication to sustain operations for as long as they are needed.

To accommodate the greater commitment and scale my business would involve, I would need to provide a cash register, telephone and security guard at each ice-cream stand. Further, it would be necessary to provide support to the landscape such as supplying trash cans and paving a driveway for the truck to use. Back home, I would need to build a warehouse to stockpile supplies and buy a large freezer to store ice. As I became more committed, I would hire mechanics to fix the ice-cream machines and begin stocking parts. This would require more trucks, which, in turn, would require more parts, which would require more trucks, and so on.

The new infrastructure would facilitate buying, in large quantities, those commodities necessary for the mission and, therefore, would be more efficient and economical. Incidentally, the original ice-cream machine my wife purchased, still in operation, would be sustained by the more efficient business infrastructure. It would become increasingly difficult for the neighborhood entrepreneurs to compete with my trucks.

The Army challenge is similarly diversified and becomes increasingly complex as the operation expands. When an Army division deploys, it has three to seven days of sustainment and the bare minimal support forces needed to operate independently. Each division will normally receive a tailored "slice" of corps and theater support assets that would include finance companies, signal companies, military police companies and graves registration teams (Styrofoam coolers and other things). In tailoring support force requirements, the Army must consider not only those support units needed to sustain the combat units but also those necessary to sustain support units (trucks for parts for trucks, and so on), the theater (trash cans, driveways, ports . . .), and the Marines and US Air Force, when their pre-packaged support is consumed.

Support force planning is further complicated by the fact that different combat intensities generate different requirements (forces in reserve use less ammunition than forces in intense combat). To accomplish this, the Army has developed a process and has a team of operation research analysts, computer programmers and military experts at the US Army Concepts Analysis Agency (CAA), Bethesda, Maryland. The process is depicted in figure 1. Here is how it works.

Army support force generation begins with guidance from a sponsor (such as a commander in chief [CINC], the deputy chief of staff for operations and plans, or others), who specifies the theater, defines

Figure 1. Army Support Force Planning Process

the threat and lists the combat forces necessary to counter the threat. The CAA team conducts a computer war game analysis to simulate a fight between the postulated friendly and enemy forces. Using force ratios and kill probabilities, the simulation predicts forward edge of the battle area move-

Identity of major ground combat units

Unit locations

Forward stationed units

Forward edge of the battle area trace

Map of the theater

Length and number of time periods

Percent of construction by construction tasks per time period

Tons and location of pre-positioned equipment

Facility assets by location

Extent of maintenance to be done in theater

Stockage policy

Consumption rates

Transportation network

Medical evacuation policy

Enemy prisoner-of-war capture rates

Interservice support

Figure 2. Tailorable Planning Factors

ment, casualties, tank and armored personnel carrier losses, ammunition expenditures, combat intensity and the number of days of combat. Concurrently, with the war game analysis, the military experts at CAA use the sponsor's guidance to tailor planning factors unique to the given scenario such as supply data, transportation data, pre-positioned equipment and engineer support requirements. A list of these tailorable planning factors is provided in figure 2.

The CAA experts also meet annually with functional area experts to establish allocation rules (for example, each armored division requires two turret maintenance detachments. The output of the war game analysis, planning factors and allocation rules are combined in the computer-driven Force Analysis Simulation of Theater Administrative and Logistic Support (FASTALS) model.

The FASTALS model is the major Army tool for generating support force requirements. The key output from FASTALS is the Time-Phased Force and Deployment List (TPFDL), which gives a line-by-line list of the units that are required to support the simulated operation. An example of a TPFDL for my ice-cream business for City Park is depicted in figure 3.

Armed with the list of requirements provided in the TPFDL, I would then *match* the list with the assets I already have. I could then apportion my procurement funds to make up the shortfalls. For example, if FASTALS indicates that I need a second refrigerated truck unit, I would program money to buy it.

Conversely, if I had more truck units than required, I could reallocate truck money to other requirements. Now imagine that my company won a contract to take over ice–cream sales at Busch Gardens. I would

City Park TPFDL

Description	Requirement (RQT)						
	Day 1	Day 2	Day 3	Day 4	Day 5	Day 6	Total RQT
Refrigerated truck unit	1	1	1	2	2	2	2
Dry cargo truck unit	1	1	2	2	3	3	3
Waste disposal unit	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
Finance/accounting unit	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Security unit	1	1	1	2	2	2	2
Maintenance unit	1	1	1	1	2	2	2
Security unit	1	1	1	1	1	1	1

Figure 3. Time–Phased Force and Deployment List (TPFDL)

program all available data and assumptions into the FASTALS model and produce a TPFDL to support the operation initially. As I became more and more aware of the scope of the operation, I could continuously update FASTALS to determine requirements for the long term.

Similarly, the Army uses the FASTALS–generated TPFDL and conducts a match process to determine shortfalls and overages. The results are then used to prioritize programmed funds. In the event of crisis, FASTALS is updated continuously, and the results are used by CINCs to prioritize support unit delivery dates. During operations *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm*, CAA ran the FASTALS model more than 30 times to analyze changes in the combat

force, mission, reduced threat estimation and the CINC's concept of the operation. The Marine Corps does not have (and probably does not need) this capability.

Just as I need a truck and a warehouse to support my ice–cream business while my wife needs only a Styrofoam cooler, the Army support force requirements are necessarily greater and more complex than those of the Marine Corps. While the Marine Corps can plan on a convenient task–organized package to support its unique mission, the Army must rely on assessing trade–offs among different mixes and types of forces in different theaters.

The FASTALS model, when applied with common sense, is effective in predicting Army support force requirements. At any rate, FASTALS demonstrates the need for the large Army logistic tail, and it may even provide insight into why Baskin–Robbins can consistently deliver the triple–scoop, fudge–swirl delight, while my wife's ice–cream operation can, at best, provide a small chocolate sundae. *MR*

NOTES

1. US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication 1–11. *Marine Air–Ground Task Force Pocket Guide* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1990), n. 1, 1–1.
2. US Army Concepts Analysis Agency Publication CAA–D–83–4. *User's Manual for FASTALS Model* (Bethesda, Maryland: US Army Concepts Analysis Agency, 1988), 1–5.

Captain John M. Britten is an action officer in the War Plans Division, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans. He formerly served with the US Army Concepts Analysis Agency in the support force generation area. He received a B.S. from the US Military Academy and an M.S. from George Washington University.

USAF Academy 15th Military Symposium

The US Air Force (USAF) Academy will hold its 15th military symposium, "A Revolutionary War: Korea and the Transformation of the Postwar World," 14 to 16 October 1992. For further information, write Major Tim Castle at HQ USAFA/DFH, USAF Academy, CO 80840–5701 or call (719) 472–3230.

USACGSC Press

The US Army Combined Arms Command, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, has established the US Army Command and General Staff College (USACGSC) Press under the aegis of USACGSC's Combat Studies Institute. The goal of the press is to become the university press of the Army, publishing works on a broad range of military subjects of interest to soldiers, scholars and the general public. The press is now seeking manuscripts. For more information, contact Dr. Roger J. Spiller, director, Combat Studies Institute, USACGSC, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027–6900.

ᴹᴿBook Reviews

ON STRATEGY II: A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War by Harry G. Summers Jr. 295 pages. Dell Books, New York. 1991. $4.99.

Harry G. Summers Jr., colonel of infantry (retired), now a syndicated columnist and respected member of the civilian defense intellectual elite, did two very important things for the US Army in the late 1970s and early 1980s. He wrote the book *On Strategy* that not only brought Carl von Clausewitz's classic, *On War*, to many Army officers' attention but also got them to read it, some more closely than others. And he provided, for those who had served there, a comfortable explanation of the United States' failure in Vietnam: a classic stab-in-the-back, roughly summarized as, we won all the battles but [others] lost the war.

Although this argument helps the Army avoid a sense of defeatism, it is highly dubious. As retired Marine Corps General Bernard Trainor pointed out in a 30 April 1989 review of retired Colonel David H. Hackworth's memoir, *About Face* (written with Julie Sherman), in the *New York Times Book Review*: "Those who actually fought at the squad, platoon and company level know this [explanation] is largely myth. Far too often, Vietcong and regulars of the North Vietnamese Army savaged American units in battle before withdrawing and leaving Americans in command of a battlefield strewn with their own dead."

Any assessment of this admitted sequel must reexamine Summers' views about the Vietnam War because, indeed, the first third of this new book is a rehash of the old one. Summers argues consistently that the US military did not lose the war in the field but that the war was lost by the president's failure to mobilize the American people, the spinelessness of the then Joint Chiefs of Staff, the press and the civilian defense intellectual elite. He points out that South Vietnam survived the US withdrawal by two years and fell, finally, to a converging, conventional assault. The latter, of course, begs questioning. It overlooks the fact that even if the Vietcong were largely destroyed in the Tet Offensive of 1968, they broke whatever US will for war there was, and it was largely because of this loss of will that US forces were no longer in place when the North Vietnamese advanced in 1975. Ultimately, the North won in its contest with the US

half of the coalition by not losing. The US willingness to watch its ally go by the boards was a measure of the North Vietnamese strategic success.

The middle third of *On Strategy II* treats the intellectual renaissance in the service war colleges and other military institutions of higher learning that followed the Vietnam War. It is here *On Strategy II* takes off. Summers was a key member of the faculty of the US Army War College in those heady days, a fact he is not too shy to point out, and if he overstates the effect of US Army Field Manual (FM) 100-1, *The Army*, and perhaps overstates the influence of his own earlier book, his five chapters on this period point the way for some future military historian to document a truly revolutionary period.

Unfortunately, this revolution seems to be over—student enrollment in the US Army Command and General Staff College (USACGSC) is up while the number of faculty continues to decline; the School for Advanced Military Studies continues to be funded on the margin; funding for staff rides throughout the US Army Training and Doctrine Command is diminishing; and substantive academic courses continue to defend their presence against more traditional doctrinal offerings. The USACGSC itself competes for funding within a total Combined Arms Center budget rather than as a major part of a comprehensive, Total Army education program. It remains to be seen whether the current revision of FM 100-5, *Operations*, will be able to stir much of a debate. One suspects the Army's interests today are elsewhere.

In the final third of his new book, Summers gets to his analysis of the Gulf War using the neo-Jominian tools of analysis—the Principles of War. He adds to this a particularly effective four-place matrix from Colmar von der Goltz's *The Conduct of War*, which calculates the respective possibilities of various combinations of offensive and defensive strategy and offensive and defensive tactics. Summers emphasizes the costs of the Cold War deterrent (strategic defensive) posture without coming to terms with its necessity or offering a more convincing alternative, but this is a particularly valuable device to an understanding of the period. He finishes with a look to the future in which he posits

an activist role for the US military as an arm of the sole remaining superpower.

Much of On Strategy II recapitulates On Strategy. The rapidly diminishing generation of the Army that served in Vietnam quite rightly sees Operation Desert Storm as the vindication of their professional lives since 1975. It is highly unlikely, however, that victory over Saddam Hussein will efface the experience of our youth. Contrary to Summers' view, the military turnaround of the last 15 years can also be seen as a consequence of the recognition by the Army's Vietnam generation of the very thing he denies—that the Army did contribute to the loss in Vietnam, intellectually, technically and ethically— along with all of Summers' familiar collection of usual suspects. The renaissance of which he writes was the military's response, a turning back to a more familiar, more congenial model and a more traditional ethic, followed by the good luck that the next war better fit the comfortable paradigm than the last. The real question is whether the next one will.

On Strategy II is well worth its modest cost. Although little new is said about the Gulf War, a good deal is said about how the Armed Forces that won there got ready. I disagree profoundly with much of the author's analysis of the Vietnam War, particularly concerning responsibility for the final outcome. Having said this, I acknowledge I am indebted to Summers because many years ago his first book led me to Clausewitz and, thereby, to Peter Paret, Raymond Aron and Michael Howard, and then back to reconsider what I had read to begin with. For that, I remain most grateful.

COL Richard M. Swain, USA,
Combat Studies Institute, USACGSC

DEFENDING AMERICA'S SECURITY, 2d edition, by Frederick H. Hartmann and Robert L. Wendzel. 387 pages. Brassey's (USA), Inc., McLean, VA. 1990. $17.95.

This is the second edition of a 1988 mainstay by the same authors, same title, with much organizational similarity. So, the fair questions are why is there a second edition so soon and why does the book merit another review by military professionals? First, the Goldwater–Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 has been tested in Operation Just Cause in 1989, operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm in 1990–1991 and in the less visible military responses to recent events in Eastern Europe. Second, national security policy issues only take on professional meaning in the crucible of challenging international events.

The sections "Shaking Down the New System" and "Making OSD More Effective" may be the most succinct post–Goldwater–Nichols reform assessment yet written. Professors Frederick H. Hartmann and Robert L. Wendzel bring clarity to the recent workings of the biennial planning, programming and budgeting system, with trenchant discussion of procurement and planned force cuts. Arms control and the Strategic Defense Initiative are among the shifting sands of the mid-1990s through the post–Goldwater–Nichols processes. "Iraq's Assault on Kuwait" is shown in terms of what dividends the streamlined national security process can yield in the hands of a determined figure in the White House.

For the civilian student of international relations or political science, the most easily understood introduction to US national security process is still Sam C. Sarkesian's US National Security: Policy, Process and Politics. For the military officer and for the national security process civilian professional, this second edition is the desk–top volume of choice.

Russell W. Ramsey, Air Command and Staff College,
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

THE END OF THE COLD WAR? by Thomas W. Simons Jr. 188 pages. St. Martin's Press, Inc., New York. 1991. $16.95.

For many of us, having lived through the events of the last decade, especially the harsh rhetoric of the early period of President Ronald Reagan's administration, it is very difficult to step back and view these "current events" dispassionately, let alone view this time as one of positive evolving relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. In this excellent book, US Ambassador to Poland Thomas W. Simons Jr. has managed, however, to examine the recent past as history, and in so doing, he provides some meaningful understanding of these Cold War years, as well as useful insights for future US policy.

The book's genesis is in lectures given by Simons at Brown University in the fall of 1989. Simons, relying on his unique perspective as the director for Soviet Union Affairs in the State Department between August 1981 and June 1989, relates the jockeying that occurred in US–Soviet relations during this time. While he emphasizes the significant role of the two key personalities, Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev, Simons stresses that it was the mutual interests of the two sides that ultimately brought the United States and Soviet Union closer together.

He convincingly and authoritatively takes the reader through the complex web of negotiations and events that clouded the 1980s. He details the importance the US defense buildup had in giving the United States confidence in its negotiations with the Soviets—a confidence that led to confrontation and negotiation. A key test case was when the Korean Air Lines' Flight 007 was shot down. While many would probably view this event as symbolic of the confrontation with the evil empire, Simons presents the view that the incident was actually a sign of progress because Reagan refused to let the crisis impact on other negotiations.

Significantly, Simons points out that although both sides sought to define their problems of contention in idealistic and often messianic terms, "actual events were shaped less by ideals than by specific interests in specific situations." For example, Simons argues that the new Soviet approach to a divided Europe was driven not by foreign policy, military considerations or economics but by Soviet domestic politics.

Besides the superb retelling of the US–Soviet developments, the book also gives almost equal -- · the evolution of a divided Europe during the same time. Again, Simons takes a nonconventional view and shows an Eastern Europe that is less than monolithic or unanimous in politics or economics. Simons observes that as Eastern Europe emerges from communism to democracy it faces a particular challenge because of the information age that has already taken hold in the West: the production of knowledge is more important than the production of things. He writes, "The small jumbled economies of East Europe lack resources to compete on the cutting edge of the information revolution." Moreover, he argues, with the demise of the Cold War, on military and economic grounds, the United States will have less reason to care about what happens in Eastern Europe. But we must care, he explains, for both pragmatic reasons of caution and because issues such as democracy, rule of law and free market economies are not simply matters of theory but are precious matters of value.

Simons' book is obviously not completely objective even though it does approach that tone throughout. He states that there are no differences so deeply rooted that they cannot be dealt with by negotiation, and in the future, he believes "competition is likely to be more and more concerned with values and less and less with military security issues or with economic competitiveness." Nevertheless, the work retains an excellent balance that is necessary in a history.

In a time of change that is so rapid that today's events are often no guide to tomorrow, Simons has written a book about those events that will have continued relevancy. Certainly, Germany was not reunited, the Warsaw Pact was still alive, Operation *Desert Storm* had not happened, nor had the coup occurred in the Soviet Union when he compiled his lectures. Nonetheless, his observations are exceedingly poignant as the United States plans its future foreign policy. His thoughts are particularly relevant in the debate over the future of NATO and the continued US role in European security affairs. This book is must reading for any who would understand the events in Europe today and the future of US and Soviet relations.

LTC Douglas D. Brisson, USA, Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army, Washington, D.C.

HISTORY AND STRATEGY by Marc Trachtenberg. 292 pages. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ. $44.50 clothbound. $14.95 paperback.

As historian Marc Trachtenberg explains in his preface, he approaches the broad topic of nuclear strategy as something of a stranger in a strange land. Finding that most literature on nuclear strategy focuses almost exclusively on theoretical models to explain political and military decision making, Trachtenberg turns his training as a historian to good use. In the seven essays in this volume, he sets out to "test theoretical ideas systematically against the historical record."

To do so, he first presents an overview of strategic thought in the United States during the years 1952–1966, concentrating on the work of analysts at the Rand Corporation whose links with the Department of Defense and influence on political decision makers were strong. He follows with an examination of the nuclear balance in Europe in the years immediately following World War II; a study of the nuclear buildup in NATO and its effects on US–European relationships; special investigations of the Berlin Crisis and the Cuban Missile Crisis; and a summary chapter that offers conclusions about the value historical study provides for assessing US nuclear policy during the Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations.

A most interesting survey is also included of the years immediately preceding World War I's outbreak, a war that many believe began almost by accident and something many strategists fear might happen in a nuclear environment, with catastrophic results. Such would not be the case, Trachtenberg argues. World War I was no accident, though

strong leadership may have prevented it. Similarly, he suggests, strong leadership can keep the nuclear threat under control.

What makes this study especially enlightening is Trachtenberg's method. Unlike most theorists, he begins with an investigation of documentary evidence from a wide variety of sources: personal letters, newspaper accounts, minutes of meetings and published reports. As a result, his observations may surprise those who accept the received wisdom regarding nuclear strategy. For example, he demonstrates how the buildup by European countries, especially the Federal Republic of Germany (where, for a long time, the United States participated in a facade of maintaining control of weapons actually under Germany's supervision), was actually a result of the US insistence on reducing the large number of US conventional forces there.

This is but one of several myths this methodical and highly readable study explodes. In keeping with his thesis, Trachtenberg states succinctly of the events that led to World War I, "It is important . . . that our basic thinking about issues of war and peace not be allowed to rest on what are in the final analysis simply myths about the past." Thanks to Trachtenberg, some of the myths about US nuclear strategy have now been exposed for those who wish to understand the truth about the past.

LTC Laurence W. Mazzeno, USA, Retired, Grand Junction, Colorado

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ON NOT CONFUSING OURSELVES: Essays on National Security Strategy in Honor of Albert and Roberta Wohlstetter. Edited by Andrew W. Marshall, J. J. Martin and Henry S. Rowen. 330 pages. Westview Press, Boulder, CO. 1991. $49.95.

On Not Confusing Ourselves is at once a tribute to the husband and wife team of national security strategists, Albert and Roberta Wohlstetter, and a collection of important essays on the past and future of US national security strategy. These essays, produced almost exclusively by former students of the Wohlstetters (eminent strategists all), serve as a history of the development of US security strategy in the immediate post–World War II era through the critical years of US–Soviet confrontation. While the immediacy of nuclear deterrence has faded in this post–Cold War era, the impact of this brilliant couple on the development of US nuclear and national security strategy is unmistakable.

The book is divided into two parts. First, the Wohlstetters' former students describe the couple's impact on policy formulation in the critical confrontation years of the 1960s and 1970s. As such,

the book is a useful reference in the history of the development of US superpower strategy. Second, the book addresses strategic issues facing the United States in light of the easing East–West tensions. Of particular interest are discussions of the new threats to the United States stemming from the easing of these tensions. The belief is that Third World issues and the proliferation of high-technology weapons will cause the greatest problems in the near future. The authors appear uncannily prescient considering the Operation Desert Storm experience.

The final two chapters should pique the most interest with the military reader. Written by Andrew Marshall, the founder and director of the Office of Net Assessment in the Pentagon, and Fred Ikle, a former undersecretary of the Defense Department, these two chapters describe the future of strategy as a profession and the role of character and intellect in strategy.

Bernard Brodie, a contemporary of the Wohlstetters and a renowned strategist in his own right, always bemoaned the lack of strategic interest and sense in military officers. Marshall believes people with military backgrounds have those qualifications. Ikle's chapter emphasizes the traits, such as a "tolerance of uncertainty," as key. Military officers, perhaps more than any other professionals, learn to tolerate uncertainty as a part of their education. Civilian strategists have been preeminent in recent years, often overshadowing the professional military. These two chapters should give hope to would-be military strategists that there is a future in the study and practice of this all-important field.

This book is an excellent source of information on the development of the national security strategy of the United States. It also suggests some answers for particularly delicate problems, something sorely needed in this era of international uncertainty. While not for everyone, it should be considered by the military professional with an interest in the field of strategy and the politics of national defense.

MAJ Charles K. Pickar, USA, School of Advanced Military Studies, USACGSC

BENJAMIN FRANKLIN BUTLER: The Damnest Yankee by Dick Nolan. 374 pages. Presidio Press, Novato, CA. 1991. $24.95.

A common Southern aphorism is: "I was 12 years old before I realized 'damn yankee' wasn't one word." Growing up in Louisiana, I was even older before I realized that Benjamin Franklin Butler's first name was not "Beast." Dick Nolan, a newspaper reporter, has published his first book. It is a

highly readable, albeit partial, account of the general of Fortress Monroe, New Orleans and Bermuda Hundred Campaign fame.

Not only did Butler always act in a perfectly cherubic fashion as a Civil War general, he was the first to think of abolishing slavery and arming blacks. He significantly reduced crime and disease in New Orleans and his famous "bottled up" position in the Bermuda Hundred was sheer military genius and impregnable. Moreover, all of these herculean tasks were performed at his own personal expense without anyone or anything, except liberty, profiting a penny. He would have single–handedly shortened the war by years, if only given one of several chances. All were thwarted by villainous federal enemies. The author makes good cases for some of these amazing claims.

Partiality aside, Nolan relates many accounts concerning Butler's very equitable personal handling of Confederates, civilians, spies, crooks and "contrabands." His writing style is entertaining and makes his pleas for the general's sainthood acceptable. The political intricacies of Abraham Lincoln's administration and Republican discord are particularly well characterized. Nolan clearly shows the effects of political expediency on both the war effort and Butler's career.

The book is marred by certain factual errors: Confederate Vice President Alexander H. Stephens is called "Stevenson." The artillery of the Army of Northern Virginia had thrice the number of cited Whitworth rifled cannons when it sniped at Butler at Cobb's Hill on the Appomattox River. A map of the Cape Hatteras Campaign would have been helpful. The author relied too heavily on the general's own autobiography.

PASS IN REVIEW

TRIUMPH IN THE DESERT: The Challenge, the Fighting, the Legacy. Text by Peter David. Contributions from photojournalists and artists of the US Armed Forces. Edited by Ray Cave and Pat Ryan. 209 pages. Random House, Inc., New York. 1991. $25.00.

Well–illustrated and well–organized, this book is interesting and informative. The very appropriate, large color pictures dramatically highlight the text's Gulf War events. Although there are occasional, minor factual errors, the book provides a concise chronicle of events before and during the Gulf War. Designed as a commemorative to those participating in operations *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm*, it is an enjoyable addition to any library.—**LTC Ruth Cheney, USA, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania**

SECRET AGENDA: The United States Government, Nazi Scientists, and Project Paperclip, 1945 to 1990 by Linda Hunt. 346 pages. St. Martin's Press, Inc., New York. 1991 $24.95.

This book, by an established investigative reporter, is about how various US government agencies brought scientists from former enemy countries to work on technology advances and aerospace and weapon system development projects. Project *Paperclip* was conceived by the United States to prevent or slow the progress of the Soviet Union and other nations from developing nuclear weapons or other technological advances. In some cases, convicted war criminals and people who should have been either investigated or charged with war crimes were bought to the United States illegally.—**Richard L. Milligan, Operations Analysis Center, US Army TRADOC Analysis Command, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

YANK: The Story of World War II by the soldiers and editors of *Yank, The Army Weekly.* 263 pages. Brassey's (US), Inc., McLean, VA. 1991. $16.95.

Produced by GIs for GIs, *Yank* was a popular weekly magazine in all war zones during World War II. This book will surely bring back memories for veterans who read the original 45 years or so ago. It is filled with reprints of articles by Andy Rooney, William Saroyan, Irwin Shaw, Richard Armour and Merle Miller and contains George Baker's immortal Sad Sack cartoons. Included is a 23–page facsimile of a complete *Yank* to show those not familiar with the full–size magazine what it was like. Part hard–boiled and truthful and part humorous, the articles tell the story of how common GIs lived, fought and died on far–flung battlefields.—**John A. Reichley, Directorate of Academic Operations, USACGSC**

This book is a commendable first effort that I quite enjoyed reading. It counterbalances the many other accounts of Butler, the Beast of New Orleans. I came away realizing Butler was a much more diverse and complex individual than I had believed.

MAJ Warner D. Farr, USA, Armstrong Laboratory, Brooks Air Force Base, Texas

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RESPONDING TO LOW–INTENSITY CON-FLICT CHALLENGES by Stephen Blank, Lawrence E. Grinter, Karl P. Magyar, Lewis B. Ware and Bynum E. Weathers. 318 pages. The Air University Press, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL. (Available from the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington, DC) 1991. $14.00.

Five regional specialists from the Political–Military Affairs Division at the Air University Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education (CADRE) focus on policy responses to selected low–intensity conflicts (LICs). They conclude that "governments involved in LICs have filtered low–intensity conflict through their own politico–military biases without subjecting those biases to an examination of the cultural and historical factors that lead to the evolution of effective doctrine, strategy, and force employment."

Lewis B. Ware examines the Arab *Intifadah* within the occupied territories of Israel and the Algerian internal conflict of the 1980s. "Lacking forces that have doctrines, strategies, and military configurations built on a historical perception of these LIC threats, both Israel and Algeria have been condemned . . . to use regular military force in these conflicts." Bynum E. Weathers reaches precisely the same conclusions about the controversial conflicts

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LOVE AND DUTY
by Ben Purcell and Anne Purcell. 223 pages. St. Martin's Press, Inc., New York. 1992. $17.95.

Lieutenant Colonel Ben Purcell was the ranking US Army officer to become a prisoner of war in Vietnam. He and his wife have written this warm and courageous account of their lives during his five–year imprisonment. Obviously, his role merits the greatest coverage, although Anne Purcell's story is equally compelling. A highlight of the book is Ben's account of his two ultimately unsuccessful escapes from his captors. The role of religion for the Purcells during their ordeal is revealed time and time again, even providing the theme for their story.—**Brooks E. Kleber, Newport News, Virginia**

REMEMBERING PEARL HARBOR: Eyewitness Accounts by U.S. Military Men and Women
by Robert S. La Forte and Ronald E. Marcello. 303 pages. Scholarly Resources, Inc., Wilmington, DE. 1991. $24.95.

The authors, University of North Texas history professors, have compiled an extensive collection of eyewitness accounts of the Japanese attack on Oahu, Hawaii, 7 December 1941. The eyewitnesses provide vivid impressions of how completely US military forces were caught off guard and how the varying responses, both military and civilian, were carried out. They all describe what they were doing and their actions shortly before, during and after the attack. Unfortunately, the 50–plus years since the "date that will live in infamy" have taken their toll on the memories, the recalling of events and perceptions.—**COL C. E. Hatch, USMC, Marine Barracks, Yokosuka, Japan**

HITLER SLEPT LATE AND OTHER BLUNDERS THAT COST HIM THE WAR by James P. Duffy. 176 pages. Praeger Publishers, New York. 1991. $19.95.

This excellent, well–written book exceeds the publisher's billing. The author spends little time on the inhumanity and madness of Hitler, allowing the reader to see him as an inept military leader and politician. The book gives an overview of key World War II events, Hitler's early successes and subsequent blunders, tying together facts from sources on both sides. Where data is scarce or facts clouded, the author gives a schooled assessment of the probable events. I especially enjoyed the reference section where I found several other books for future reading. I plan to look for other works by Duffy.—**CPT David D. Moran, USA, 1–212th Aviation, Aviation Training Brigade, Aviation Center, Fort Rucker, Alabama**

still going on in El Salvador and Guatemala.

Lawrence E. Grinter selects LICs in the Philippines and Indonesia for the Asian component. "The Suharto regime and its armed forces have been more efficient and brutal in containing LIC challenges because they are less encumbered by internal political and cultural limitations." By contrast, says Grinter, "Philippine society is more disorganized and less competent, and is in transition from authoritarianism to democracy." Karl P. Magyar examines "South African total onslaught as a response to both internal and external challenges to the state" with the possibly surprising result that South Africa's "Angolan intervention suggests that air power doctrine may be expected in other African conflicts."

Stephen Blank's examination of Soviet operations in Afghanistan, 1978–1988, concludes that "the LIC experience is by no means over for the belligerents but may have entered a new and potentially more destructive phase." Noting that this was the first war fought by the Soviet Union in the high-technology age, Blank feels "that it furnishes to Moscow extremely disturbing possibilities for future wars of either a conventional or LIC nature."

This team of highly qualified regional experts does not indulge in cross-cultural comparisons. Furthermore, their data are drawn from individual regional models, not from cultural patterns and trends. Nevertheless, the sophistication of their essays shows that we have come well beyond the efforts in the 1960s by guerrilla warfare doctrine pioneers such as Bryan Crozier, Franklin M. Osanka, David Galula, John S. Pustay, Roger Trinquier and others to define what we now call LIC and to prescribe antidotes.

The Air University CADRE team is essentially saying that a country with serious internal disorders had better devise a coordinated political, economic and military strategy of containment before the shooting starts. Yet, one suspects that nations with the sophistication adequate to do that inherently sensible task probably would govern their people well enough not to provoke armed rebellion or revolution in the first place. And so, the US policy dilemma endures: What shall we do, if anything, for a badly governed regional ally whose regime is threatened by military overthrow?

Russell W. Ramsey, *Air Command and Staff College,*
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

CONGRESS AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS by James L. Lindsay. 205 pages. The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD. 1991. $29.50.

Does the US Congress have a role in matters regarding nuclear weapons acquisition policy? This is the question author James L. Lindsay, assistant professor of political science at the University of Iowa, explores in *Congress and Nuclear Weapons.* He suggests that during the two decades following the creation of the Department of Defense (DOD), Congress tended to defer to the recognized DOD expertise in technical defense matters.

By 1968, Congress was becoming increasingly active in defense issues. Lindsay identifies the Armed Services committees and the Defense Appropriations subcommittees of the House and Senate as the major players in defense legislation and states that each chamber normally follows committee recommendations. Despite significant increases in committee staffs and the staffs of individual members of Congress during the 1970s, Lindsay maintains that Congress's technical expertise on DOD issues remains inadequate.

Lindsay develops some excellent descriptions of the congressional processes and the interaction between Congress and the executive branch on defense issues. He applies the descriptive labels of hawks, doves, liberals and conservatives to members, based on commonly used indexes, yet recognizes that anomalies occur. He suggests that reelection is a primary interest of members and notes that in DOD weapons issues, members normally vote the policy preferences they hold in common with the supporters who elected them. Conversely, on issues regarding DOD base closings, he finds that voting patterns tend to reflect the interests of a member's constituents.

Lindsay's insights into the congressional processes are enlightening and interesting. The nearly 500 footnotes indicate significant research. Unfortunately, the book does not include a bibliography.

The nuclear weapons aspect of the book reflects little more than a superficial understanding of weapon systems. By failing to define what he means by the generic term "nuclear weapons," Lindsay periodically leaves the reader to wonder whether he is referring to a complete nuclear weapon system,;a nuclear warhead; a weapon system capable of delivering either nuclear or nonnuclear/conventional warheads; a costly, new and innovative but nonnuclear weapon system; or simply weapon delivery hardware. He persists in using the popular media appellation of "neutron bomb" when referring to enhanced radiation warheads. He fails to acknowledge the role played by the Department of Energy or the earlier Atomic Energy Commission in the development of nuclear warheads. The result is a book that becomes distracting to the reader and provides cause to suspect the author's credibility in this area.

The author resists the popular temptation to make a value judgment on the US nuclear arsenal. He rec-

ognizes the impact of a Congress that is active in weapons acquisition issues on executive branch efforts to conduct arms control and foreign affairs negotiations. Finally, he concludes that the Congress, imperfect as it may be, clearly has a role in matters regarding nuclear weapons acquisition policy.

COL Griffin N. Dodge, USA, Retired,
Santa Fe, New Mexico

DYNAMICS OF DEFEAT: The Vietnam War In Hau Nghia Province by Eric M. Bergerud. 383 pages. Westview Press, Boulder, CO. 1990. $29.95.

Perhaps, as some observers have commented, the United States has finally expunged the ghosts of Vietnam. If true, then it is vital for the United States and the US Army, in particular, to carefully and dispassionately examine our Vietnam experience.

Eric M. Bergerud does this in a significant way. By examining the entire conflict in a single, critical province, he succeeds in showing us most of the salient features of the war. While concentrating on the period of massive US involvement, Bergerud begins his study by tracing the insurgency's growth in the period before 1964 and continues it to the fall of Saigon in 1975.

The province chosen for study, Hau Nghia, is an interesting one. Situated between Saigon and the National Liberation Front's (NLFs) Cambodian bases, it lay astride some of the key routes in South Vietnam. Within its borders are located Cu Chi (home of the US Army's 25th Infantry Division), portions of the Ho Bo Woods and the Plain of Reeds. Hau Nghia was the scene of major battles in the "big-unit war" and countless minor skirmishes in the "village war."

It is the argument on the big-unit war versus the village war that forms the focus of the book. Starting from the premise that we fought the wrong war—the big-unit war—Bergerud comes to the conclusion that we fought the only war we could within the limits we set for ourselves.

In his analysis, we understood what was necessary to achieve victory; however, the government of South Vietnam, as a whole, never did. The Diem regime—urban, Roman Catholic and culturally "Western" in its outlook—represented a continuation of the French colonial establishment in the eyes of the peasantry. The successor regimes carried on that tradition. None of the Vietnamese regimes accepted the need for a fundamental reform in Vietnamese society.

By 1964, both the big-unit and village wars needed to be won. The Army of the Republic of Vietnam and US forces won the big-unit war by 1970.

But, without fundamental changes in Vietnamese society, the village war could not be won. Once US forces had withdrawn, the NLF and the North Vietnamese Army rebuilt their strength and launched the series of offensives that finished the war.

Bergerud's well-documented study illustrates one decisive point: counterinsurgency assistance operations must be based on a thorough understanding by both the advisers and the host nation of the causes of the insurgency, the paths to victory and the price of that victory. Without that understanding, do not even begin.

SFC John T. Broom, USA, US Army Armor School,
Fort Knox, Kentucky

TERRORISM AND DEMOCRACY by Stansfield Turner. 274 pages. Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston, MA. 1991. $22.95.

America does not make deals with terrorists for hostages, right? Wrong! The fact is that eight of the nine US presidents faced with hostage situations made some type of deal with terrorists. The list includes George Washington, James Madison, Thomas Jefferson, Theodore Roosevelt, Lyndon B. Johnson, Richard M. Nixon, Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan. President Gerald Ford is the only one who did not engage in deal making.

The author, retired Admiral Stansfield Turner, was the director of the Central Intelligence Agency during the Carter administration and intimately involved in the Iran hostage situation. His position provided him an exceptional vantage point. He describes, in great detail, the workings and sometimes "nonworkings" of the highest levels of government during crisis situations. He starts with a brief history of this country's dealings with terrorists beginning with the Barbary Pirates that plagued Washington, Madison and Jefferson; followed by Ion Perdicaris' kidnapping during Roosevelt's tenure; the USS *Pueblo* incident during Johnson's tenure; the Dawson Field hijacking during Nixon's tenure; the USS *Mayaguez's* capture during Ford's tenure; Iran's capture of hostages during Carter's tenure; and finally, multiple acts during Reagan's tenure.

The major focus is on events occurring during the Carter administration, especially the taking and attempted rescue of the 52 hostages held for 444 days in Iran. Turner describes the true processes by which decisions are made and actions carried out at the highest levels of government. He illustrates the conflicts between the expedient means and the legal or moral means, as well as why the "obvious" solution may not be best or even "do-able." His

analysis of policies and their long–term consequences is very well done and provides valuable insights to the reader.

Turner has written in this area before with his *Secrecy and Democracy: The CIA in Transition*, which details the inner workings of his agency. This volume's focus is outward to other agencies of the government. It is well–written, logical and coherent in its organization and discussion, and definitely not an attempt by a bureaucrat to justify his actions. Turner is honest in admitting his flaws and insightful in his critique of the US responses to terrorism. It is interesting and quick reading. I strongly recommend this book to all Americans interested in how our government works. Some insights and information may prove to be "eye opening," and not all are favorable.

LTC John D. Richards, *USA*,
Army Medical Department Center and School,
Fort Sam Houston, Texas

FLAMES OVER TOKYO: The U.S. Army Air Forces' Incendiary Campaign Against Japan, 1944–1945 by E. Bartlett Kerr. 348 pages. Donald I. Fine, Inc., New York. 1991. $22.95.

In this readable, popular account of the bombing campaigns over Japan, E. Bartlett Kerr tells us much of what we want to know that is not easily available elsewhere in one place. He describes the development of the incendiary bomb; the early US missions from Ch'eng–tu, China; and the fully developed US fire–raiding from Saipan against Tokyo and other cities. He also describes the experiences of individual pilots, the impression of Western witnesses who happened to be present and the overall effect on the cities involved. Kerr brings into focus such things as how the fire bombing policies evolved, what their effects were on the ground and the sophisticated nature of the air defense system arrayed rapidly by the Japanese around their cities.

Kerr's somewhat controversial but most enlightening analysis of the political and military impact of the bombing argues persuasively that widespread incendiary bombing severely damaged the basic social infrastructure—housing, clothing, food, drugs. He says that this, in turn, eroded the long–term political commitment to the war by the Japanese public, which had been largely untouched by hardship prior to November 1944. Kerr maintains that by destroying thousands of small urban subcontracting plants that supplied essential aircraft and other equipment parts and by dispersing their workers, the raids sharply reduced industrial production.

He tacitly challenges the popular wisdom that political will hardens against bombing and that strategic production can be continued at high levels in sheltered or relocated plants. He makes the unfashionable case, which deserves to be considered, that the devastating bombing did precisely what it was supposed to do—critically damage morale and production.

All in all, the book's style is accessible and only occasionally bogs down in detail. Although Kerr's information is plausible and sound primary sources are involved, he does not reveal which particular information comes from which particular source. This prevents the work from being used as a scholarly authority, but it is an interesting and useful book.

Thomas M. Huber, *Combat Studies Institute, USACGSC*

VALLEY OF DECISION: The Siege of Khe Sanh by John Prados and Ray Stubbe. 506 pages. Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston, MA. 1991. $29.95.

The story of the siege of Khe Sanh is very impressive. The two authors have done a magnificent job in telling the complete story of one of the major and significant battles of the Vietnam War. It is a story of courage and determination, as well as political and strategic significance. It is worth reading from a historical perspective and for its analysis of tactics and strategy.

John Prados, a historian, and Ray Stubbe, a retired chaplain who was there, smoothly mesh their styles in this well–documented history. When one reads the stories of the hilltop battles and the Battle of Lang Vei, one sees the imprint of S. L. A. Marshall's influence in the book's style.

The story told in this book combines the individual courage of the Marine rifleman, the politics of conducting a major battle over long supply lines and the political and strategic guidance and infighting between Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) in Saigon and the White House. The reader also gains a perspective of the fighting from the North Vietnamese troops and leaders.

One consistent theme throughout the book is MACV Commander General William C. Westmoreland's desire and continued thrust to have a significant battle of attrition with the North Vietnamese. Another theme is Westmoreland's plan to launch a major invasion into Laos. Intertwined with these are the conflicts of many of the senior commanders concerning the conduct of the battle and the management of air space and fire support.

The conclusions drawn by the authors could reignite the political infighting between the US Marines and the US Army. In the last chapter, the authors point out several lessons learned by both sides during this battle that had an impact on the

conclusion of the Vietnam War and on Operation *Desert Storm*.

Some of the lessons the authors feel that the North Vietnamese learned include "coordinating different combat arms in a conventional, modern warfare setting"; the consequences of having so little air power; and the synchronization of heavy artillery. They also feel the United States learned such lessons as the tactical use of sensors; "tactical use of strategic aircraft"; deliberate reliance on air- lift to haul supplies, equipment and men; and the mass application of firepower.

The authors' research is very extensive and so is their bibliography. They used hundreds of inter- views with participants, official histories and service records of all the military services, journals of many of the senior participants and both published and unpublished monographs. As a postscript, I might add that this book meant a lot to me, having been a Marine officer in the early 1970s and having known Stubbe.

Chaplain (CPT) Thomas C. Condry, USA,
6th Infantry Division (Light), Fort Wainwright, Alaska

THE GUTS TO TRY: The Untold Story of the Iran Hostage Rescue Mission by the On–Scene Desert Commander by James H. Kyle. 352 pages. Orion Books, New York. 1990. $21.95.

On the morning of 25 April 1980, President Jimmy Carter announced the failure of a military mission to rescue Americans held hostage in the American Embassy and Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Teheran, Iran. During that mission, eight Amer- icans died and the prestige of the United States tumbled. A key participant in that attempt was Colonel James H. Kyle, now retired, who writes this firsthand account of the planning and execu- tion of that mission, as well as his own views of what went wrong. He also provides an analysis of the failure as defined by a Department of Defense (DOD) commission.

Three other works discussing the operation have appeared, but Kyle's is the first dedicated solely to the mission by an actual participant. Charlie Beck- with, the Delta Force commander, briefly discussed the ground force mission in his 1983 book, *Delta Force*; Zbigniew Brzezinski's 1982 article in *The New York Times Magazine* told of the mission from a White House perspective; and Paul Ryan at- tempted to analyze the failure in a 1985 book. But Kyle's inside view from planning the mission to tes- timony before congressional committees adds new information to this most controversial operation.

Kyle became intimately involved in the hostage rescue mission nine days after Iranian militants stormed the American Embassy and seized the hos- tages. He chronicles, in detail, the innumerable obstacles faced by those attempting to plan for an operation and assemble forces to assault a target half a world away. In so doing, he provides valu- able insight into the nature of special operations, the critical necessity of multiservice (joint) cooper- ation, unique equipment requirements and short- ages, and the nature of the soldiers and airmen who volunteer for such high–risk missions.

Throughout the book, there is an undertone of criticism of conventional–minded generals who relegated special operations to the bottom of the funding barrel, and who, in the aftermath of the Vietnam War, reduced special operations personnel levels to the bare minimum in spite of the growing menace from international terrorism. The result was that, when the nation needed a trained force capable of conducting a special operation in which the prestige of the nation and the lives of American hostages were at stake, no such force was available. The ad hoc assemblage, due to the factors chroni- cled by Kyle, was unable to meet the challenge.

The DOD commission assembled to investigate the failure found 11 principal causes. Kyle reviews those but then provides his own conclusions, spar- ing no one. He is quick to criticize those he be- lieves were responsible for the failure because they made decisions appropriate for peacetime training but not for the "Super Bowl." He particularly lev- els his blasts at those whom he sees as being too willing to find reasons not to continue, rather than to find ways to keep going. He even reserves some criticism for himself.

The Guts to Try is a fast–paced account that reads like an adventure novel, but the adventure is true and the characters are real. For those desiring to learn more about special operations, to analyze decision making under pressure or to understand why missions fail and how to learn from those fail- ures, Kyle's book is a must.

LTC Richard L. Kiper, USA,
Combat Studies Institute, USACGSC

THE DEATH LOBBY: How the West Armed Iraq by Kenneth R. Timmerman. 443 pages. Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston, MA. 1991. $21.95.

The Gulf War raises many questions—How did Iraq develop one of the most sophisticated com- mand and control systems in the world; near self– sufficiency in high–tech weapons production; a large chemical warfare capability; and an extensive nuclear weapons development program? Kenneth

R. Timmerman attempts to peel back the layers of front companies and governmental duplicity to expose the true source of Saddam Hussein's military strength—the British, French, German and US companies that supplied the material and technology to build the Iraqi military machine and the government agencies of various countries that tolerated it and, in many cases, encouraged it.

Timmerman asserts that Hussein developed a long-term master plan to reach his basic goal—a Pan-Arab military entity under his absolute control. *Death Lobby* presents a chronology of this master plan. Shown are the subterfuges and complex dealings that produced Hussein's chemical warfare program, nuclear bomb development, ballistic missile construction and his multitude of weapon factories. Detailed is the incredible planning and financial cost, mostly borne by US and European banks, that went into the building of Iraq's military might.

Timmerman discusses Hussein's personal command and control shelter, which is located 300 feet under the Tigris River in the heart of Baghdad. It is modeled after the North American Air Defense Command headquarters in Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado. He also covers Hussein's nuclear and chemical warfare facilities buried six stories underground, the "Super Gun" program of Gerald Bull; aircraft shelters that rivaled NATO's, underground oil refineries and the thousands of miles of fiber-optic communication cables that carried Hussein's orders to the front lines, thereby frustrating coalition forces. After Operation *Desert Storm*, Iraq still had much of its capabilities untouched, and unknown, by the West.

Covering the Middle East for many years as an investigative journalist, Timmerman publishes *MED-NEWS*, a newsletter about Middle East security issues, and writes for *Newsweek*, the *Wall Street Journal* and the *International Herald Tribune*. *Death Lobby* is a most intriguing book that proves the axiom— "the best that money can buy."

Robert M. Burns, *National Simulation Center,*
Combined Arms Center–Training,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION: From Armed Struggle to the Declaration of Independence by Jamal R. Nassar. 242 pages. Praeger Publishers, New York. 1991. $42.95.

In view of the stumbling US-sponsored Middle East peace talks, whose aim is to settle the "Palestinian issue," the appearance of this book is most timely. It is a comprehensive, well-organized study of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and speaks frankly of the PLO's failures and successes. It covers the PLO's early policies; internal organization, internal frictions and splits; constituent groups and splinters; and relations with Arab states. The PLO motive for armed struggle is also discussed. The United Nations (UN) and other authorities are quoted in support of PLO's claim of legitimacy for a Palestinian sovereign state. It is the best work produced by the PLO so far and is enhanced by the lack of hyperbole and obscuration usually associated with such publications.

It is frequently said, in a cliché-like manner, that the Palestinian issue is a complex one, but this is not necessarily so. It is a blunt, head-to-head "Mohammed and the Mountain" situation. The UN resolution of November 1947 divided Mandated Palestine between the Palestinian Arabs and the Jews, and so both were given the seeds of modern national legitimacy. Israelis have achieved that goal, but the Palestinians have not. They are still striving desperately to do so; that is the stark issue. Victorious wars and domination of the occupied territories have given the Israelis an immense advantage over the Palestinians, while the less fortunate Palestinians have been poorly supported by Arab states. There are about 5 million Palestinians, mostly in a Diaspora, who are daily becoming more politically aware.

The theme of this study is that Israel must talk to the PLO. The author quotes that eventually the Americans had to talk to the Vietnamese and the French to the Algerians to obtain peace, and now it is the turn of the Israelis. He hopes the PLO, like so many previous "independence movements," including the Haganah, will be transformed into a "tool of peace to become the responsible sponsor of the emergence of a Palestinian entity." A pious hope, no doubt, and one fears there may be much bloodshed ahead over this issue. This book gives a valuable and reasoned insight into the Palestinian "side" of this ongoing struggle.

Edgar O'Ballance, *Matlock, England*

REMAKING THE BALKANS by Christopher Cviic. 113 pages. Council on Foreign Relations Press, New York. 1991. $14.95 paperback.

As the former Balkans correspondent for *The Economist* for 30 years, Christopher Cviic is the perfect candidate to write a book on the recent history of the Balkan States. In one short volume, Cviic succeeds in presenting a concise, yet very informative, description of how the Balkans reached their current situation and of the forces that are coming into play in the resolution of the associated challenges and dilemmas.

As Cviic so expertly points out, "the Balkans" in-

clude much more than the now ever popular hot spot of Yugoslavia and, in particular, Croatia, Slovenia and Serbia. Indeed, within Yugoslavia alone, the sources of conflict go well beyond the adversarial relationships between Croats, Serbs and Slovenes. The fires waiting to erupt as a result of ethnic tensions involve not only these nationalities but ethnic Albanians, Moslems and Macedonians as well. Furthermore, the potential for Yugoslavia's own dissolution to involve Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey over the fate of a land called Macedonia is greater, and more dangerous, than is currently either realized or admitted. Cviic does a superb job of educating the reader on exactly how this set of circumstances could ever have come about, and what policy makers must watch for, and keep in mind, as they endeavor to resolve the inherent tensions associated with these very same circumstances.

That having been said, Cviic also points out that Yugoslavia is, nonetheless, the main focal point of the region, simply because its fragmentation can have (and to a degree is already having) such a dire impact on the remainder of the region. For that reason, he gives a relatively detailed, yet focused, depiction of how the current Yugoslav state first came into being and how the fault lines, which are now beginning to give way, have always been there since the state's creation. In addition, he outlines those events since the death of Tito (and some even before) that were key in bringing about the current discord and violence. While some of his predictions on what might happen in the region have already proved false, in today's tumultuous world of international relations, this is not only forgivable, but almost to be expected.

In summary, while one may not usually consider a 113-page book to be a major contribution to any specific field of study, the breadth, yet simultaneous conciseness, of Cviic's *Remaking the Balkans* makes a perfect source for the person interested in one of today's most crucial hot spots, yet who also has the need to get smart fast.

MAJ Ronald M. Bonesteel, *USA, Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas*

DESERT MIRAGE: The True Story of the Gulf War by Martin Yant. 222 pages. Prometheus Books, New York. 1991. $19.95.

Desert Mirage damns just about everything this country did in the Persian Gulf War. Martin Yant's thesis is that this "was a war of devious deception more than of passionate principle" and that "truth was not only the first casualty but its last concern." He argues that the United States was only interested in asserting its power in the Middle East and the administration deliberately deceived the American people and the press to accomplish its goals. Specifically, Yant charges that it was really Kuwait's provocations (possibly with US support) that started the war; that Iraq posed no real threat to Saudi Arabia; that President George Bush distorted Iraq's nuclear and chemical weapons capabilities; and that the embargo had been effective. The author falls short in proving his points.

Yant is right in asserting that Iraq had legitimate grievances with Kuwait. Kuwait may very well have been drilling more oil in fields on the border than it had a right to; Kuwait was demanding Iraq

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Military Review
Writing Contest Reminder

Entries for the 1992 *Military Review* writing contest will be accepted through 1 July 1992. This year's topic for entries is "The US Army in Joint, Combined and Coalition Warfare." The author of the winning manuscript will receive $500; the award for second place is $200; third place is $100. The winning manuscripts will be published in *Military Review* in the fall of 1992. Confine your essays to between 2,000 and 2,500 words and ensure they are original manuscripts not previously offered elsewhere for publication. Send your entry to Military Review, US Army Command and General Staff College, Funston Hall, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-6910.

repay loans from the Iran–Iraq conflict, from which Kuwait did profit; and Kuwait was refusing to cede islands that could possibly block Iraq's access to the Persian Gulf. Kuwait certainly fell short of being a model neighbor; but this hardly justifies the 2 August 1990 invasion and subsequent annexation. As for any US collaboration with Kuwait and for the charge that our ambassador actually encouraged Iraq, this can be more easily attributed to the "fog of diplomacy," which seems to plague US efforts abroad, than to any anti–Iraq conspiracy.

Whether Iraq posed an imminent threat to Saudi Arabia is debatable. Yant asserts that Soviet satellite photographs in early August do not reveal an Iraqi force poised to invade Saudi Arabia. Without access to classified US satellite imagery from that time, as well as later, I cannot categorically refute this charge. The charge appears to be somewhat flimsy, being based on only one set of photographs at one point in time. Moreover, this charge does not address Iraq's intent or capability, both of which would appear, to the prudent statesman, to pose a real threat.

The reasons Iraq did not use chemical or biological weapons against coalition forces will be studied for some time. Tentative conclusions support the thesis that Iraq feared retaliation, realized that coalition forces were prepared to fight in a chemical and biological environment and that, by the start of the ground war, the air offensive had destroyed much of Iraq's capability, as well as the command and control systems needed for release of these weapons. Moreover, the experience of United Nations (UN) inspectors after the war indicates that Iraq did have a viable capability and may have been closer to development of a nuclear device than we feared. Iraq did use chemical weapons in the war with Iran, and it would have been much less than prudent to belittle Iraq's capacity.

Yant asserts that the embargo was working, and that by January 1991, Iraq had given in to most UN demands. The effect of the embargo is, of course, debatable. Iraq was hurting, but how much is questionable.

The author severely criticizes the United States for faulty intelligence throughout this period and for failing to "understand" Saddam Hussein's rhetoric. Yant also asserts that "the war obviously was now being fought over quibbling points." To support this point, he notes that Iraq insisted on a three–week withdrawal period while the United States wanted only one week; Iraq would release all enemy prisoners of war in three days rather than immediately as demanded by the United States; and Iraq insisted the UN drop all anti–Iraq resolutions, demands for

war reparations and the ban on arms sales. These hardly seem to be "quibbling points" to this reader. Iraq's insistence on linking this crisis to the Arab–Israeli conflict seems to support the judgment that Hussein was not eager to become a responsible force in the Middle East. Giving in to Iraq would have been rewarding aggression as a means of solving international problems.

The book contains numerous references to a wide variety of news sources, but Yant uses only selected references to support his allegations. He does not present arguments that might refute his charges. His one–sided presentation leaves the reader without a full view of each issue that would lead to reasoned conclusions about the Gulf War. In some cases, Yant does not even give us the benefit of knowing his sources.

He states that the Pentagon wanted to censor the press because "if Americans ever saw the full fury of war, they might be less inclined to support it. At least that was reportedly a fear of Bush and many of his top aids, who felt that, because of the Vietnam [War] syndrome, Americans might not support another war fought halfway around the world for unclear objectives." As Yant does not tell us who reported this, we have no way of judging the credibility of this very serious charge.

Having said all this, is *Desert Mirage* worth reading? There are two reasons that it is. First, institution bashing is a favorite American pastime. Those of us who are part of these institutions need to know what the general public, as expressed by the press, is thinking. This will lead to change where necessary and to a reasoned refutation of those charges that do not stand up to scrutiny. More important, Yant raises the very important issue of press coverage of US conflicts. How we balance the public's right to know what is happening with legitimate security considerations is a question that needs to be debated. Yant has provided a valuable service in keeping this question on the American mind.

Daniel E. Spector, *US Army Chemical School, Fort McClellan, Alabama*

DOOMSDAY WEAPONS IN THE HANDS OF MANY: The Arms Control Challenge of the '90s by Kathleen C. Bailey. 158 pages. University of Illinois Press, Champaign, IL. 1991. $22.95.

This book presents an overview of the means of producing mass destruction weapons and delivery systems. Kathleen C. Bailey includes case studies and summarizes recent efforts at arms limitation.

Along the way, she identifies the issues and problems that make arms control such an important defense undertaking. She also offers a number of innovative strategies to better meet this challenge.

Nuclear weapons and strategic missiles are similar in many respects. Each involves costly high technology that has been reduced to practical uses by present producers, and each can be procured under the mantle of a legitimate civil program—nuclear energy for development or boosters to launch scientific satellites. Military applications do, however, require unique components: triggering devices for weapons and guidance systems for missiles.

Requirements for such items in terms of talent, facilities and materials are great enough to warp national priorities and encourage surreptitious efforts to acquire the hardware directly. The book identifies India, Israel and Pakistan as probably having nuclear weapons today while Iran, Iraq and North Korea have well-advanced programs. Other countries are considered capable of developing nuclear weapons but have refrained from doing so. Bailey portrays these national decisions as being driven by demands for security and prestige. Perceived changes in circumstances, such as the sudden success of a potential adversary's program, could prompt any of the capable, but restrained, nations to reconsider their decisions.

Past efforts at limiting proliferation have concentrated on controlling the supply of critical components and technology. These efforts have not stopped determined nations; they have only slowed the process. Bailey, formerly with the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, advocates greater emphasis on controlling demand—eliminating the destabilizing situations that prompt a nation to develop or acquire mass destruction weapons. External powers might guarantee Japan's security if North Korea demonstrated a nuclear weapon.

Chemical and biological weapons present an entirely different challenge. Most can be produced on short notice in existing chemical or pharmaceutical plants using available technology. Small amounts can constitute a major threat. Although each agent poses unique problems in production, storage and shelf life, most problems can be overcome easily.

Bailey sees no feasible controls that can interrupt the supply of these materials. She singles out the US, Soviet, Iranian, Iraqi and Libyan chemical weapons programs but considers proliferation possibilities unlimited. Again, she believes defusing those situations that create demand to be the most promising strategy. Since there are no cases in which chemical weapons have been used if prompt retaliation was expected, the author suggests pro-

viding a small, deterrent inventory of such munitions to all potential belligerents while expanding a system of security guarantees.

These and other ideas make this book well worth reading. Recent reports that Iraq is still producing extended-range Scud missiles underscore the timeliness and importance of this subject for military planners. Let us hope that Bailey will next turn her attention to controlling the existing Soviet inventory and possible terrorist activities that might use doomsday weapons.

COL John W. Messer, *AUS, Retired,*
Ludington, Michigan

ARMS EXPORT REGULATIONS. Edited by Ian Anthony. 267 pages. Oxford University Press, Inc., New York. 1991. $54.00.

This pioneering and very timely book provides useful summaries of the arms export control systems of 24 countries—Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the former Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States. It also discusses five "international regimes"—the Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls, the European Community's effort to develop a common arms export policy, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the United Nations (UN) deliberations on arms control and the UN arms embargo against South Africa.

This ambitious compendium, the first to document and explain (but not evaluate) so many national arms export control schemes, was produced by a research and editorial team headed by Ian Anthony of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) as part of its Arms Production and Arms Trade Project. Anthony also wrote nine of the chapters; other major contributors are Herbert Wulf, Agnes Courades Allebeck and Espen Gullikstad. The chapters include legislation, weapons lists, end-user certificates, government guidelines, the decision-making process, official policy and a table of SIPRI data on the value of the country's annual major weapons exports by recipient, 1981 to 1990. Information is current as of mid-1991, and SIPRI intends to update it periodically. An eight-page bibliography and a list of national legislation on arms export regulations complete the volume.

International concern and action regarding arms transfers and proliferation have reached

unprecedented levels, as evidenced by several important developments. In October 1991, the five major arms suppliers (coincidentally, also the permanent members of the UN Security Council) agreed on common guidelines for restraint in conventional arms exports. In November, the 18-member MTCR agreed to extend the scope of the regime to cover missiles capable of delivering chemical and biological weapons, in addition to nuclear weapons. In December 1991, the UN General Assembly passed a landmark resolution on "Transparency in Armaments" by a vote of 150–0.

This lengthy armaments resolution, inter alia, requested the secretary general to establish a universal and nondiscriminatory Register of Conventional Arms, called on member states to annually submit data on arms imports and exports for the register and requested the secretary general "to prepare a report on the modalities for early expansion of the scope of the register by the addition of further categories of equipment and inclusion of data on military holdings and procurement through national production."

Several Western European governments have recently passed new arms export control legislation, the new democracies in Eastern Europe are reevaluating their arms export policies, and international concern is now focused on the possible proliferation of arms and migration of weapons designers from Russia and the other new states of the former Soviet Union. The SIPRI researchers will have a hard time keeping up!

In the case of US arms export controls, Anthony erroneously groups the relevant statutes into two categories ("executive authority" and "legislative authority"). The mutually exclusive regulatory functions of the departments of State and Commerce in licensing, respectively, commercial exports of defense articles and defense services and dual–use commodities are not adequately highlighted.

Furthermore, Anthony overlooks or confuses the separate and distinct systems for administering commercial defense trade controls and the government-to-government security assistance programs. Anthony states that MTCR's export guidelines "do not prohibit any exports at all," when in fact they do explicitly prohibit transfers of production facilities for Category I items and stipulate a "strong presumption to deny" exports of all items in this category. Nor does he make reference to the US missile proliferation sanctions legislation passed in November 1990, under which trade and contract sanctions were imposed on Chinese, Pakistani and South African firms during 1991.

Such flaws notwithstanding, Arms Export Regula-

tions is a seminal work that should command the interest of scholars, policy makers, government officials, exporting firms and others concerned with international trade controls. While future editions would benefit from consultation with governmental experts in the countries concerned, who could review their respective chapters to improve clarity and accuracy, SIPRI has done a great service in undertaking this project and publishing its results. One can only hope that it will expand upon, revise, update and disseminate this information regularly.

Joseph P. Smaldone, US Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, Washington, D.C.

WINNING THE NEXT WAR: Innovation and the Modern Military by Stephen Peter Rosen. 275 pages. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY. 1991. $34.95.

Professionals interested in national security will find it hard to ignore Stephen Peter Rosen's book, if for no other reason than its alluring title. Winning the Next War suggests a visionary work akin to Richard Simpkin's Race to the Swift: Thoughts on 21st Century Warfare, but Rosen's addition to the distinguished Cornell Studies in Security Affairs is mostly a look at the past. Instead of offering ideas on the nature of "the next war," Rosen recounts how major innovations in the 20th century changed the way wars were fought. His underlying message is that understanding the process of innovation holds more importance to winning future wars than focusing on any particular change in weapons, organizations or tactics.

Rosen examines change from three perspectives: peacetime innovation, innovation in the midst of war and innovation based on new technology. With few exceptions, he concentrates on cases where innovations proved successful on the battlefield. The book begins with the United States' ingenious peacetime innovations in amphibious warfare (1905 to 1940), carrier aviation (1918 to 1943) and helicopter mobility (1944 to 1965). Rosen then contrasts these successes with the US failure to assimilate innovations proposed for counterinsurgency warfare in the early 1960s.

After hostilities commence, changing how forces fight requires a new set of strategies. As Rosen notes, the need for quick results "make[s] even the most ardent supporter of innovation skeptical about [attempting] innovation in wartime." Examples of wartime innovation include the US attempt to bolster the effectiveness of its strategic bombing campaign (1942 to 1944) and the successful change in submarine warfare doctrine (1941 to 1945). In ev-

leadership impacting on higher-level strategy.

Ramsey begins with a candid and forthright account of his early years in Wichita, Kansas. These experiences and his years at the Oklahoma Military Academy shaped the character and courage of the man who would later lead more than 40,000 guerrillas against the cruel and brutal occupation of the Philippines by the Japanese Imperial Army.

After enjoying, as Ramsey states, "the life of a colonial army officer," the rigors of war became apparent during the initial air and ground action of mid–December 1941. While executing a screen for the left flank of the Allied Army on 16 January 1942, Ramsey participated in the Army's historic last cavalry charge with the 26th Cavalry Regiment (Filipino Scouts) at Morong. Despite heroic efforts, the Allies fell back, and Ramsey and the 26th were trapped behind enemy lines. Choosing to fight rather than surrender and become a prisoner of war, Ramsey joined the fledgling resistance.

Initially, the guerrillas were somewhat scattered and uncoordinated, but through the efforts of Ramsey, Captain Joe Barker, Colonel Thorpe and many other brave men and women of the resistance who chose to fight, the guerrillas became a force to be reckoned with. Ramsey brings to life the contributions of the resistance toward the liberation of the Philippines in exciting detail. He lays out all his fears and feelings. It is fascinating to read about how an officer trained to be a cavalryman became a guerrilla. "I was going to be a guerrilla, and I did not even know what that meant."

The US Army Field Manual 22–100, *Military Leadership*, states: "All men are frightened. The more intelligent they are, the more they are frightened. The courageous man is the man who forces himself, in spite of the fear, to carry on." (General George S. Patton Jr.) Despite self–doubt, malaria, dysentery, hunger, injury, a typhoon, fatigue and constant pressure from Japanese forces, including spies, Ramsey persevered. Through this terrible struggle, he came to understand the Filipinos and their courageous desire for freedom.

Though these conditions were all but impossible, Ramsey continued to believe in his mission. Moreover, he states, "Indeed, guerrilla work had now become second nature to me. I no longer felt strange slipping through the countryside at night, hiding out in the hills, and carrying on secret induction ceremonies in the barrios . . . ." His will was sustained by the belief that General Douglas MacArthur would return and by his faith in his Filipino comrades. Ramsey's courage and dedication were rewarded in October 1944, when MacArthur did return to the Philippines and, again in June 1945, when Lieutenant Colonel Ramsey received the Distinguished Service Cross from MacArthur personally.

This superb work presents lessons from 50 years ago that are relevant today as the military works through low–intensity conflict and joint doctrine and re–examines our role in the Philippines. I enjoyed this book immensely and recommend it to all leaders of soldiers and those interested in little–known military history.

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TELL US WHAT YOU THINK ABOUT LEADERSHIP

Military Review is planning its annual "Leadership" issue for August, and we solicit your views on this universal topic. We intend to compile this input and publish it as a feature in the issue.

Thus, we encourage *all* readers to share with us and their colleagues a few thoughts on leadership. Entries should be no longer than 100 words and may address one, or more, of the following questions:

What is your definition of leadership? Why?

What "Great Captain" epitomizes your concept of a leader? Why?

What are the essential qualities of a successful leader? Why?

If you do not like one of these questions, make up one of your own and answer that.

The important thing is that you take a few moments to express your ideas. This is not a contest. The only prize you will get is the satisfaction of participating in the effort and in seeing your name in print. You should mail your entries to: Military Review Leadership Project, US Army Command and General Staff College, Funston Hall, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027–6910

50 Years Ago—

Culminating Point
— AT —
MIDWAY

Yorktown crewmen conduct damage control and man antiaircraft weapons after a Japanese bombing attack during the Battle of Midway, 4 June 1942.

In the spring of 1942, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto devised a grand offensive against Midway Island and the Aleutians in which he hoped to lure the Americans into a decisive sea battle. In May 1942, a giant Japanese armada of over 100 combatants sailed east from Japan.

US Naval Intelligence had been intercepting and decoding Japanese encrypted message traffic for months. Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, the new Pacific Fleet commander, dispatched two task forces consisting of three carriers, eight cruisers and 15 destroyers to await the Japanese attack.

At 0430 on 4 June, the Japanese carrier strike force commander launched 108 aircraft from four carriers—*Kaga, Akagi, Soryu* and *Hiryu*—for an initial strike on Midway Island. A US search plane spotted the incoming waves of aircraft and radioed the position of the Japanese carrier group. The carriers *Hornet* and *Enterprise* launched all their aircraft between 0700 and 0800. The *Yorktown* held its aircraft in reserve against possible Japanese attack, finally launching half its air wing at 1000.

At 0700, Japanese strike aircraft were returning, having failed to fully neutralize Midway's air power. Indecision on the part of the Japanese strike force commander then proved fateful. While he wavered in selecting aircraft ordnance, precious time was lost. At 1020, all was finally ready, and the Japanese carriers turned into the wind to begin launching aircraft.

Strike aircraft from the *Enterprise* and *Hornet* vainly searched for the Japanese force before coming upon it at precisely 1020. The *Enterprise* aircraft dived on the carriers *Akagi* and *Kaga* as they were launching aircraft. The *Yorktown* aircraft engaged the *Soryu* in nearly simultaneous attacks. In just 5 minutes, all three carriers were in flames and out of commission. In subsequent fighting, the Americans were to lose the *Yorktown* and the Japanese, their fourth carrier, the *Hiryu*. Yamamoto realized that his fleet was now too vulnerable with the loss of his carriers. He reluctantly canceled the Midway operation on 5 June and retired to the west.

The Japanese offensive in the Pacific had been halted at an enormous cost to the Japanese—four carriers, 332 aircraft and 3,500 lives, including 100 frontline carrier pilots. It was a loss from which they would never fully recover—the momentum had shifted.